Myth of strong state under threat<\/p>\n
Political scientist Cornelis LAY from the Yogyakarta-based
\nUniversity of Gadjah Mada says state symbols have become the
\ntarget of people's resentment in recent years and the government
\nshould promptly remedy the situation.<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): For a long time the New Order government has
\nbeen considered a strong state. It is supposed to hold absolute
\nautonomy devoid of pressures and demands of the people and is
\nperceived as having nearly absolute power over the community.<\/p>\n
The consequence is that various efforts to understand
\nIndonesian politics are invariably made through an exploration of
\nthe state. The most common analysis is intra-bureaucratic in
\nnature. In many cases, it is reduced to the analysis of
\n\"centrally\" driven politics. Hence, understanding Indonesian
\npolitics is understanding Jakarta's politics. It is rare to find
\nan analysis from the viewpoint of marginal people.<\/p>\n
But recent developments have brought forward different signs.
\nViolence arising from people's anarchical energy channeled into
\nsociopolitical riots have started to rip the shroud of the myth
\nof a strong state. The use of violence as a social, economic and
\npolitical negotiating instrument by the community, vaguely
\ndiscloses the serious frailty of the New Order government.<\/p>\n
The community dearly pays for the consequences of social
\nunrest. But on closer observation, each case shows the state is
\ntargeted even more. There are three main state symbols targeted
\nby the people.<\/p>\n
First, political symbols and public service. This clearly came
\nto light in the Tanah Abang incident on Jan. 28, 1997. The
\nsubdistrict office, a state symbol at local community level, was
\nravaged by a mob of people. Second, the symbol of law enforcement
\nand justice as reflected by the burning down of the office of the
\ncourt of justice in Situbondo on Oct. 10 last year.<\/p>\n
Third, the symbol of the guardian of social order and
\nsecurity. The military were directly attacked in nearly all the
\nriots. In Medan, North Sumatra, even military barracks came under
\nattack. In the bloody ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan, a
\nmilitary post sheltering refugees from one of the ethnic groups,
\nbecame a target of repeated assaults. It was said that in some
\ncases the military were even compelled to abandon the people
\nunder their care to the attackers.<\/p>\n
Police stations have also been the target of attacks in many
\nprovinces. A few years ago all police stations and barracks in
\nKupang, East Nusatenggara, had to be protected by the military
\nfor days. In Pekanbaru, Riau, a police post became a target of
\nattack. Similar cases occurred in Pasuruan. In Tasikmalaya, the
\nsymbol of the guardian of social order was attacked when police
\nstations were ravaged by the people.<\/p>\n
People vented their anger openly toward bureaucrats, judges,
\nprosecutors, the police, the military, and other functionaries.
\nThis display of anger was not new. But in the 1970s and 1980s the
\ndiscontent was directed to individuals within the bureaucracy who
\nwere supposed to have abused their power.<\/p>\n
In recent years, the people's frustration is no longer
\ndirected to individuals but toward the state symbols at the
\ncommunity level. The community has realized that their various
\nproblems stem not from erring individuals but a product of the
\nstate as a collective institution, which is conspiratory in
\nnature.<\/p>\n
The consequences are evident. It is now more common to see
\nsupposedly erring officials being chased into a narrow alley, the
\nopposite of what was happening only a few years ago.<\/p>\n
In previous years the state -- symbolically represented by
\nofficial cars and the uniforms of the Indonesian Civil Servants
\nCorps (Korpri) -- could freely and proudly move around displaying
\ntheir omnipotent power even outside work hours. Now, especially
\nclose to the election, official vehicles in many regions have
\ndouble license plates. Private license plates are used when
\ngovernment officials move around in the community. Official
\nlicense plates are only used in areas considered safe from
\npossible community resentment.<\/p>\n
In the past, the Korpri uniform was a symbol of social pride
\nand prestige and was even donned at wedding parties. But now,
\nespecially during the election campaign, it has become a kind of
\nan anathema for many civil servants. Therefore, it is not
\nsurprising that now and during campaign, the Korpri uniform has
\ndisappeared from the public eye and is only seen in office
\nsurroundings.<\/p>\n
This discloses the state's fragile side. The New Order is now
\nunder great pressure exerted by people's inner resentment. The
\nNew Order state looks like a terrifying giant on the outside, but
\nstores within itself various flaws and chronic ills.<\/p>\n
When the three main symbols at community level become the most
\ntargeted enemies of the community, and the state apparatus does
\nnot dare to be present among the people naturally, we can no
\nlonger speak of the state. This is a risky situation.<\/p>\n
Indonesia needs a strong state to exist amid a dynamic
\ncommunity. Therefore, the New Order government must achieve the
\nstatus of a clean state and clean government before the existing
\nsystem runs without a system.<\/p>\n
The writer is a lecturer at the School of Political Sciences
\nat Gadjah Mada University.<\/p>",
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