Myanmar test for ASEM future<\/p>\n
Natee Vichitsorasatra, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok<\/p>\n
It is a just two months until the next Asia Europe Meeting
\n(ASEM) summit, this time in Hanoi. These two remaining months
\nwill stand as a test as to whether ASEM, a forum that has been
\nvariously described as \"lacking in substance\" and \"forum-
\nfatigued\" to \"ambitious\" and \"indispensable\", is considered
\nvaluable enough to receive a lifeline from all parties involved.<\/p>\n
Equally importantly, the results of this test will be an
\nindicator of exactly how much interest the Asian and European
\nUnion (EU) sides of ASEM, especially the latter, have left in the
\nongoing process.<\/p>\n
The ASEM process has never been so endangered since its
\ninitiation in 1996. The inaugural meeting in Bangkok was filled
\nwith high expectations and the promise of equal partnership and
\nreciprocity, occurring within an informal dialogue. The optimism
\nwas watered down with the ensuing Asian economic crisis and few
\npeople took much notice of the Copenhagen ASEM IV Summit, a
\nmeeting that focused largely on the control of terrorism.<\/p>\n
Instead of growing into a mature and structured framework for
\ncooperation in its fifth upcoming summit, the Asian and European
\ncounterparts of ASEM are instead wrangling over the issue of
\nMyanmar.<\/p>\n
Indonesia and Thailand have already criticized the decision to
\ncancel two ministerial meetings, which they said had been made
\nwithout proper consultation with ASEAN.<\/p>\n
This seems to point towards an increasing disinterest in ASEM
\nfrom its European members. The focus of the ASEM process has been
\nmainly on the economic side and trading figures show that the
\nAsian side of ASEM has been the main beneficiaries of closer
\nchannels of access to their European counterparts.<\/p>\n
Even today, the EU's trade deficit with their ASEM partners
\nremains an issue on the table at ASEM Summits. Eurostat figures
\nshow EU's external trade with China, one of the main motivations
\nfor cooperation in the ASEM process, begin to see a widening
\ntrade deficit which quadrupled from US$11.6 billion in 1995 to
\n$44.6 billion in 2000. Similar, though less drastic trends exist
\nwithin the trade figures of EU trade with the rest of the Asian
\nASEM members.<\/p>\n
If the EU's interest in ASEM had waned due to the Asian
\neconomic crisis and the continued trade deficit with Asia.<\/p>\n
Since ASEM I, human rights have constantly been a European
\nconcern, whereas Asian participants have preferred an exclusive
\nfocus on trade.<\/p>\n
At ASEM II, Europe informally raised the issues of human
\nrights, labor practices, arms control and non-proliferation
\nissues. It received little cooperation from countries such as
\nIndonesia, China, and Myanmar, on the issues of East Timor and
\ninternal affairs, respectively. At ASEM III, the EU embarrassed
\nitself by not being able to make a common response to the
\nquestion of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea,
\ndespite the \"Declaration for Peace\" announced in Seoul.<\/p>\n
The Copenhagen Summit yielded little beyond issues of economic
\ncooperation, as the Council of Minister was only able to express
\nits dissatisfaction with the slow progress of democratic
\nrestoration in Myanmar, but little else. By then, the EU
\nobviously realized that it was not benefiting from either the
\npolitical or the economic pillars of ASEM.<\/p>\n
The \"New Partnership with Southeast Asia\" communication from
\nthe Commission drafted in 2003 appears to be the EU's new means
\nto fix what might have become a deadlocked ASEM. It is clear that
\nwhile it offers an increased flexibility in the EU's relationship
\nwith ASEAN, issues of conditions have been placed as a further
\nbargaining chip in the cooperation process between the two
\nregions.<\/p>\n
According to the European Commission, an \"essential element\"
\nclause must be included in all future bilateral agreements with
\ncountries of Southeast Asia. At present only Vietnam, Laos, and
\nCambodia have signed this, while other present bilateral
\nagreements lack this clause. This clause also offers a way out
\nfor the EU, which would be more reluctant in placing conditions
\ninto its relationship with potentially lucrative China than it
\nwould with ASEAN member states.<\/p>\n
It appears that the EU may have already decided that the ASEM
\nprocess is expendable and highlighting the issue of Myanmar with
\napparently little room for negotiation makes a mockery of ASEM's
\nprinciples of \"equal partnership\" and \"reciprocity\".<\/p>\n
Current EU sanctions against Myanmar are also widely perceived
\nas ineffective and lacking in impact. In addition, the EU is
\nclearly guilty of double standards because it is not demanding
\nthe exclusion of one-party communist states such as Laos, Vietnam
\nor China.<\/p>\n
A debate on whether Myanmar deserves to join international
\nforums which would definitely benefit the military regime needs
\nto continue, but if the EU's member governments do not soften
\ntheir stance concerning Myanmar's inclusion in ASEM, the forum's
\nprinciples of equal partnership, reciprocity and flexibility are
\nthrown out of the window.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, ASEM's credibility as a promising and much-needed
\nforum between Asia and Europe takes a large hit. If the ASEM V
\nSummit in Hanoi does not contain more substance and full top-
\nlevel cooperation from all member states, it will be difficult
\nfor anyone to take the already struggling process seriously.<\/p>",
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