Musharraf can learn from RI<\/p>\n
Ali Dayan Hasan, New York<\/p>\n
On his visit to Indonesia this week, President General
\nMusharraf, the Pakistani strongman who came to power in a 1999
\ncoup and the post-Sept. 11 darling of the West, has much to learn
\nfrom Indonesia's success at pursuing a secular political culture
\nand marginalizing militant Islam from the mainstream political
\ndomain.<\/p>\n
President Musharraf would undoubtedly agree with these goals,
\nbut his actions often belie his words. Musharraf loves to say
\nthat his government operates on the principle of \"enlightened
\nmoderation.\" On the one hand, this involves putting the genie of
\nIslamist politics and militancy, unleashed by the Pakistan Army
\nin the 1980s and 1990s, back into the bottle.<\/p>\n
On the other, Musharraf will tell anyone willing to listen
\nthat he replaced a \"sham democracy\" with a real one (though,
\nunlike in Indonesia, he has refused to hold a presidential
\nelection).<\/p>\n
Last week, both \"enlightened moderation\" and the \"real
\ndemocracy\" were in action.<\/p>\n
From April 14-16, thousands of supporters of Benazir Bhutto's
\nPakistan Peoples Party (PPP) were arrested in a country-wide
\ncrackdown. The mass arrests were conducted in order to prevent a
\npublic reception for Bhutto's husband Asif Zardari on his return
\nfrom a trip to Dubai to meet his family. Zardari, was released on
\nbail last November after spending eight years in prison on
\ncorruption charges, though he was never convicted.<\/p>\n
PPP supporters who managed to reach the Lahore party
\nheadquarters near the airport and the airport itself were dragged
\naway by the police. Many, including women, were manhandled by
\npolice officers and beaten when they attempted to chant slogans
\nor protest police brutality. At least three women were severely
\ninjured and have been hospitalized.<\/p>\n
Journalists were detained at the airport for several hours and
\ntheir cell phones and camera equipment were snatched and footage
\ndestroyed. Other reporters faced intimidation in attempting to
\ncover events in a city effectively cordoned off by thousands of
\npolice personnel.<\/p>\n
This was not, however, a crackdown against Islamist militants.
\nThe PPP had made it clear that the event was not even a protest
\nrally.<\/p>\n
The PPP, the single largest political party in Pakistan,
\navowedly liberal and secular -- and with a long record of
\ncorruption and poor governance -- finds itself in an unusual
\nsituation. The stated foreign and domestic policy aims of
\nMusharraf's military government now echo its own manifesto. It
\nthus seems that a marriage of convenience between the PPP and
\nMusharraf is all but inevitable.<\/p>\n
This would bring the PPP back into a power-sharing arrangement
\nwith the Pakistan Army -- the most any civilian political group
\ncan aspire to in the context of a hyper-militarized state. It
\nwould provide Musharraf with real, meaningful political support,
\nenabling him to pursue \"enlightened moderation\" full throttle. So
\nwhat's the hitch?<\/p>\n
Political observers believe the crackdown resulted from a
\ndeadlock in negotiations between the Musharraf government and the
\nPPP. While Musharraf has now started acknowledging publicly that
\nthe PPP is the principal secular political force in the country
\nand a party he must deal with, the reality is that Pakistan's
\nmilitary is dedicated, above all, to the preservation of its
\nmonopoly on power.<\/p>\n
Consequently, it is simply not interested in real power-
\nsharing with a legitimate civilian power-block. To that end, the
\nmilitary wants the PPP to accept Musharraf's continued dual role
\nas president and army chief. Fearing Bhutto's popularity, the
\nmilitary also insists on her \"non-participation\" in the political
\nprocess, including in elections due in 2007. Thus far, Bhutto has
\nrefused. Hence the crackdown.<\/p>\n
So if this is how the Pakistani military treats those who
\nshare its alleged vision, how does it treat its stated enemies?
\nIt is instructive to consider the military's relations with the
\nMuttaheda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of Islamist parties
\nthat controls the North West Frontier Province bordering
\nAfghanistan and polled 10 percent of the national vote in the
\n2002 election.<\/p>\n
The MMA does not appear to believe in basic freedoms such as
\nequal rights for women, freedom to worship according to one's
\nconscience, and freedom of expression. Its members schooled and
\ntrained the Taliban and it wishes to impose Sharia, Islamic law,
\nas the basic law in Pakistan. In many ways if is the enemy of
\nenlightened moderation.<\/p>\n
Presumably, a military committed to enlightened moderation
\nwould oppose such a party. Well, not quite. The reality is that
\nthe MMA is a virtual creation of Musharraf. In 2002 Musharraf and
\nthe military needed an outlet for popular anger at Pakistan's
\npost-Sept. 11 alliance with the United States.<\/p>\n
So the military took steps to ensure a featured political role
\nfor the Islamist alliance. To ensure MMA candidates could stand,
\nMusharraf issued instructions that Madrassah certificates be
\nrecognized as equivalent to a university degree.<\/p>\n
In contravention of parliamentary practice, the government
\nappointed Maulana Fazlur Rahman, an MMA leader, as leader of the
\nopposition in the National Assembly, even though the PPP-led
\nAlliance for the Restoration of Democracy had more members of
\nParliament. The MMA then joined hands with Musharraf to pass a
\nconstitutional amendment that ostensibly legalized Musharraf's
\n1999 coup and made him an \"elected\" president.<\/p>\n
Indonesia still faces many challenges, not least in reining in
\nits military in places like Aceh and Papua, ending the massive
\ncorruption in the TNI that fuels human rights abuses, and holding
\nTNI members accountable for their actions in places like East
\nTimor and Aceh. There are still tensions between secular and
\n\"green\" forces in the military and in the wider political culture
\nthat have yet to be fully resolved in favor of a tolerant and
\nrights-respecting political culture.<\/p>\n
Yet Indonesia offers a valuable lesson that the Pakistani
\nmilitary establishment has yet to learn -- that decades of
\nauthoritarian rule and the military's political and economic
\npredominance ultimately failed to thwart the desire of average
\ncitizens for a more inclusive politics that respects basic rights
\nand limits the power of men in uniform.<\/p>\n
Perhaps most important, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a
\nformer general, can explain to President Musharraf, a current
\ngeneral, that there is life after military rule and that
\nPakistan, like Indonesia, would be better off with an elected
\npresident in a suit instead of a uniform.<\/p>\n
The writer covers Pakistan for the New York-based Human Rights
\nWatch.<\/p>",
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