More questions than answers after Bogor<\/p>\n
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Though economic leaders of the Asia Pacific
\nEconomic Cooperation (APEC) forum were all smiles as President
\nSoeharto triumphantly announced the results of the \"Bogor
\nDeclaration,\" many watching soon began to ponder on the
\nconsequences of what had been pronounced.<\/p>\n
APEC economic leaders agreed that comprehensive trade
\nliberalization would be achieved by no later than 2020, with
\ndeveloped countries pursuing a faster 2010 track.<\/p>\n
With post-APEC fever dying down, member countries now have to
\ncome to grips with the economic realism of what was mainly a
\npolitical declaration.<\/p>\n
Reasserting the rhetoric of free and open trade is by no
\nmeans a boastful conquest and setting a deadline without a clear
\nblueprint merely creates the potential for future melee.<\/p>\n
Indeed, encouraged by Indonesia, the leaders have produced a
\ndocument providing a vague destination for the future but failing
\nto mention the route or vehicle by which it should be approached.<\/p>\n
When queried on how exactly this vision would be achieved,
\nSoeharto said it would be \"left to the ministers concerned.\"<\/p>\n
United States President Bill Clinton the next day expressed
\nvagueness when he said that the implementation would begin as
\nsoon as a blueprint can be formulated and agreed upon.<\/p>\n
In other words what the Bogor Declaration gives is a
\ndestination with no road map on how to get there.<\/p>\n
Apart from the ambiguity of the process, the evolution of
\nAPEC has unfolded dubiety and rigid differences which have become
\nincreasingly difficult to iron out.<\/p>\n
First, APEC clings to the fear of institutionalization and
\nfails to gallantly acknowledge this already established fact as
\ntruth.<\/p>\n
In the beginning, members of the Association of South East
\nAsian Nations (ASEAN) conditioned that the forum must remain a
\n\"loose consultative forum\" and not an institution.<\/p>\n
However, in the past year we have seen a gradual push towards
\nfurther institutionalization of the forum.<\/p>\n
As Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas recently
\nadmitted, the process was \"unavoidable\" and that some
\ninstitutionalization had inevitably occurred.<\/p>\n
Tony Miller, head of the Hong Kong delegation during the
\nmeetings here last week, pointed out that APEC had
\ninstitutionalized much faster than other organizations which had
\nproclaimed themselves institutions.<\/p>\n
If APEC cannot judge itself with sincerity, how does it expect
\nto tackle a much larger and complex issue such as free trade?<\/p>\n
Recognition of APEC's status would do away with arguments on
\nthe question of \"institutionalization\" which have detracted
\nofficials from spending valuable energy on the larger task of
\ndevising a tangible policy of trade liberalization.<\/p>\n
During the second Senior Officials Meeting in Bali last May,
\ndelegates consumed many hours quelling Malaysia's reluctance to
\ntransform the ad-hoc group on Economic Trends and Issues into an
\nEconomic Committee.<\/p>\n
Malaysia based its objections on the grounds that the
\ncommittee would signify increased institutionalization.<\/p>\n
It took two Senior Officials Meetings before this matter was
\nsettled at the third meeting in Yogyakarta three months later.<\/p>\n
Senior political scientist at the Indonesian Institute of
\nSciences Dewi Fortuna Anwar pointed out that every organization
\nrequires some institutionalization to function optimally. \"The
\nquestion is, how strict it will be,\" she said.<\/p>\n
Second, though the declaration has been publicly proclaimed as
\nconsensus based, statements made following the Bogor meeting have
\nleft many wondering.<\/p>\n
No sooner had the declaration been announced than Malaysia's
\nPrime Minister Mahathir Mohamad took pot-shots, pointing to the
\ndocument as non-binding, carrying no compulsory obligation to the
\nmembers.<\/p>\n
\"The targets dates of 2020 and 2010 are indicative dates and
\nnon-binding on member states,\" read a Malaysian statement
\nreleased just hours after Soeharto's speech.<\/p>\n
Even Japan's Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama acknowledged
\nthere were those during the meeting who held reservations about
\nthe declaration.<\/p>\n
What kind of message does this send when leaders, just a few
\nhours after their proclamation to the world, begin poking holes
\nat their own decision.<\/p>\n
Malaysia's emphasis on noting the target dates as merely
\n\"indicative\" leads to another question on the tenability of the
\ncommitment.<\/p>\n
The Bogor declaration itself states an extremely loose
\ncondition for members to implement the arrangement -- \"those that
\nare not ready to participate may join at a later date.\"<\/p>\n
Of course there are arguments that the essence of the
\ndeclaration's flexibility complies to APEC's loose and
\nconsultative nature.<\/p>\n
If that is so then the more fundamental question should be how
\nreadily committed are all the 18 member economies beyond public
\nrhetoric?<\/p>\n
Based on their economic, capital and technological supremacy,
\nthe main beneficiaries of trade liberalization will be the
\ndeveloped countries such as the U.S.<\/p>\n
A day after the Bogor summit President Clinton pointed out
\nthat the U.S. will gain much from the declaration since the U.S.
\n\"already has the most open markets on earth.\"<\/p>\n
By opening up other markets, American products will be more
\ncompetitive, he argued.<\/p>\n
Jakarta has also justified its approach by giving statistics
\nfrom the Ministry of Trade showing that Indonesia's market shares
\nin developed countries will increase as much as seven percent.<\/p>\n
However, Bob Hadiwinata, an international relations lecturer
\nat Parahyangan University in Bandung, said that for developing
\nnations, free trade principles are more often not manifested in
\ntheir economic policies.<\/p>\n
He said the application of free trade tends to occur only in
\nthe already controlled sectors of the international market.<\/p>\n
Closer to home, Dewi Fortuna questioned Indonesia's readiness
\nto meet such a bold idea as free trade. \"Domestically we don't
\nhave any free trade,\" she said.<\/p>\n
Quite candidly, Bob Hadiwinata recently wrote that despite
\nJakarta's ratification of the new General Agreement on Tariffs
\nand Trade principles, Indonesian economists have stressed the on-
\ngoing need for protection of the service sectors along with small
\nand medium industries.<\/p>\n
Hadi Soesastro from the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,
\nwho holds observer status in APEC, simply asks, \"is it realistic
\nto expect that tariffs and non-tariff barriers be totally
\neliminated?\"<\/p>\n
Moving away from discussions on whether member economies can
\ntruly apply the economic principles of free trade, APEC officials
\nand delegates must brace themselves for the unenviable task of
\nproducing a concrete plan for trade liberalization.<\/p>\n
Even without the problems of the difficulties stated above,
\nthese deliberations will be highly complicated and laden with
\nvarying national interests that precede the ideals of free trade.<\/p>\n
If nothing else, the near impasse on the adoption of an
\ninvestment code during the recent Senior Officials Meeting is
\nalready an omen. Such was the obvious frustration of the
\n\"investment code\" ordeal, that even the consensus based decision
\nmaking mechanism of APEC fell into suspect.<\/p>\n
Though she is not of the same view, Mari Pangestu, also with
\nPacific Economic Cooperation Council, said a number of countries
\nduring the meeting expressed that the forum would be more
\nefficient if the consensus was dropped.<\/p>\n
Thai's Deputy Prime Minister Supachai Panitchpakdi went so far
\nas to say, \"I don't think we can go by a consensus basis in that
\nevery one of the 18 countries would have to agree on particular
\ndates or work programs.\"<\/p>\n
With all these fundamental questions hovering and a murky,
\nrugged path ahead, it will be a daunting prospect for APEC to
\nconclude a blueprint before the next leaders meeting in Osaka.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia, whatever fate lies ahead next year, it has made
\nhistory in hammering-out the Bogor Declaration.<\/p>\n
We can only hope that the declaration, with all its ambiguity,
\nhas not dug a hole so deep for APEC that it cannot climb out.<\/p>\n
Prior to last week's meetings Hadi Soesastro said that
\nministers and leaders should perhaps leave the flamboyant talks
\non timetables for future deliberations and tackle the basic
\nproblem of achieving free and open trade first. \"Certainly they
\nare well advised to do so,\" he said, despite being ignored.<\/p>\n
Window A: The evolution of APEC has unfolded dubiety and rigid
\ndifferences which have become increasingly difficult to iron out.<\/p>\n
Window B: For Indonesia, whatever fate lies ahead next year it has
\netched history in hammering-out the Bogor Declaration.<\/p>",
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