Mired at home, RI can't lead ASEAN<\/p>\n
Takashi Shiraishi, The Daily Yomiuri, Asia News Network, Tokyo<\/p>\n
Since the downfall in 1998 of the Soeharto regime, Indonesia
\nhas seen three presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman
\nWahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Soekarnoputri, who took office in
\n2001.<\/p>\n
Throughout the past five years, Indonesian politics had been
\nmarked by deep-seated instability, beset by such problems as the
\nseparatist Free Aceh movement in northern Sumatra and the
\nterrorist activities of the Jamaah Islamiyah.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the Indonesian economy has failed to continue on its
\nonce-vibrant high-growth path. The annual growth rate over the
\npast four years has hovered at about 3 percent to 4 percent.<\/p>\n
As a result, Indonesia has turned in on itself, and is unable
\nto take the initiative in steering the Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations.<\/p>\n
Given Indonesia's importance to Japan in economic and
\ngeopolitical terms, it is most worrying indeed for us to see the
\ncountry drifting politically and mired in a socioeconomic crisis.<\/p>\n
How are things in Indonesia likely to evolve in the
\nforeseeable future?<\/p>\n
Indonesia will hold parliamentary and provincial assembly
\nelections in April. The first round of the presidential election
\nwill take place in July, followed by a second round in September.<\/p>\n
Will these elections bring about major changes in Indonesian
\npolitics?<\/p>\n
The results of a survey conducted in September by the
\nIndonesian Survey Institute (LSI) with the help of the Japan
\nInternational Cooperation Agency may provide some answers. The
\nsurvey was carried out in 30 provinces and covered 2,240 people
\nfrom 224 areas. Aceh was not included in the survey.<\/p>\n
First, how do the respondents assess Indonesia's political
\nsystem?<\/p>\n
Since Soeharto was ousted, the Indonesian political system has
\nundergone a major transformation from a centralized authoritarian
\nsystem to a decentralized democracy. Because of this change,
\npolitical parties and the parliament have emerged as new power
\ncenters along with the presidency and the military.<\/p>\n
In addition, provincial governments are now playing more
\nimportant roles in society, comparable to that of the central
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
After five years of reformasi (reforms), how do people
\nevaluate the current political framework?<\/p>\n
When asked in the poll whether they think democracy is the
\nbest political systems, 65 percent of respondents answered yes,
\ncompared with 71 percent in the previous poll in 2001. But
\ntellingly, in response to the question, \"Do you think the
\nSoeharto regime was bad?\" only 26 percent said yes, compared with
\n60 percent in 2001.<\/p>\n
Asked whether they think it undesirable for a member of the
\nmilitary to hold political office, only 40 percent agreed, while
\n53 percent said they were dissatisfied with the state of
\ndemocracy in Indonesia, and 56 percent said they thought the
\nSoeharto regime was better than the current democratic system.<\/p>\n
These findings indicate that while the majority of Indonesians
\nsupport the decentralized democratic system today, their number
\nis declining, while those in favor of a centrally governed
\nautocratic system such as that the one that existed under the
\nSoeharto regime are increasing. This is mainly because the
\ncurrent government has failed to live up to public expectations.<\/p>\n
What do people want from the government?<\/p>\n
Responding to the question, \"What do you think is the most
\nimportant problem facing Indonesia?\" 65.4 percent cited economic
\ncrisis, with public order, corruption and law and order trailing
\nwith 7.7 percent, 1.5 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively.<\/p>\n
It is clear that most Indonesians want the government to deal
\nwith the economic crisis. But what does the term \"economic
\ncrisis\" indicate?<\/p>\n
In the two years since Megawati became president, the
\ngovernment has been generally successful in stabilizing the
\nmacroeconomic situation. This can be seen in the stabilization of
\nthe rupiah's exchange rate and the decline in inflation and
\ninterest rates.<\/p>\n
The economic growth rate, however, was less than 4 percent in
\nboth 2001 and 2002.<\/p>\n
An annual growth rate of 6 percent is required for the
\ncreation of new jobs to secure employment for the 2.5 million or
\nmore people entering the Indonesian labor market every year. This
\nmeans the current pace of growth is insufficient.<\/p>\n
In short, what most Indonesians mean by overcoming the
\neconomic crisis is that the government has to realize a high
\neconomic growth rate of 7 percent to 9 percent a year, as was the
\ncase from the late 1980s to the first half of the 1990s under the
\nSoeharto administration. A growth rate this high would lead to
\nthe creation of ample new jobs and give people a real sense that
\ntheir livelihoods are improving.<\/p>\n
The government is well aware of this, and has worked out an
\neconomic policy package designed to help Indonesia after it has
\ngraduated from the International Monetary Fund's financial rescue
\nprogram at the end of 2003.<\/p>\n
To improve the investment climate, however, the government
\nneeds to address a plethora of thorny problems, including labor
\nissues, law and order, reforming the judicial system and the
\nelimination of corruption. To do so, all the elements comprising
\ngovernment must unite and show their unshakable, strong resolve.<\/p>\n
A question that must be asked is whether Indonesia, through
\nthe upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, can give
\nbirth to a government that is able to meet the people's
\nexpectations.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the chances of this happening are slim.<\/p>\n
Without attempting an in-depth analysis of the survey results,
\nI have come to two conclusions.<\/p>\n
First, the elections will not help the Indonesian parliament
\nbreak its three-cornered deadlock. Three parliamentary
\nforces--the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle headed by
\nMegawati; Golkar, the holdover party from the Soeharto days; and
\na number of Islamic parties with fundamental Muslims as their
\npower base--are now locked in a power struggle, each unable to
\nestablish supremacy. The elections will not break this deadlock.<\/p>\n
Second, although Megawati remains unquestionably the strongest
\npresidential candidate, popular support for her is precariously
\nlow--less than 20 percent. This means that to win a second term,
\nshe will have no alternative but to form a coalition with either
\nGolkar or the Islamic forces, offering vice presidential and
\nministerial posts as inducements. If this comes to pass,
\nMegawati's new administration, while basically economic growth-
\noriented, will be composed of players with different backgrounds.
\nThe newly formed administration would not be able to act in
\nunison to solve the weighty problems facing Indonesia, such as
\npromoting investment, fostering economic growth and creating new
\njobs.<\/p>\n
In other words, the three-cornered impasse will remain in
\nplace in and after 2004.<\/p>\n
What implications does the current state of Indonesian
\npolitics have for the future of Indonesia and Southeast Asia?<\/p>\n
First, should the new government be unable to achieve an
\nannual economic growth rate of 6 percent or so, the public will
\nbecome even more disenchanted with democracy.<\/p>\n
There is no knowing whether Indonesia will revert back to a
\nSoeharto-style authoritarian system of government.<\/p>\n
If the new administration fails to create new jobs, the social
\ncrisis will deepen, which might lead to a political crisis if
\nIndonesia is affected by external shocks as in 1997. Even if
\nthere are no crises, the people's expectations of strong
\nleadership and strong government will continue to grow.<\/p>\n
Second, there are clear signs that Indonesia will continue to
\nturn even more inward, becoming fully preoccupied with domestic
\npolitical affairs. It would then be highly unlikely that
\nIndonesia would take an active leadership role or play a part in
\nthe war on terrorism.<\/p>\n
In all likelihood, Indonesia will remain adrift for quite some
\ntime to come.<\/p>",
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