Minorities and nation-building<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles excerpted from a speech
\ndelivered by Yayan G.H. Mulyana, chief of the Social Economic
\nAffairs Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the second
\nInformal Seminar on Human Rights of the Asia-Europe Meeting
\n(ASEM) in Beijing on June 28 and June 30.<\/p>\n
BEIJING: Indonesia, which has approximately 583 languages and
\ndialects, is one of the most ethnically, religiously and
\nlinguistically pluralistic nation-states in the world.<\/p>\n
Since its formation as a modern state, the country has been
\npluralistic in nature. A study by Anthony Reid shows that
\nIndonesia in the \"age of commerce\" (15th-17th centuries) was
\nreplete with centers of commerce which were not only locally
\npluralistic but also cosmopolitan.<\/p>\n
Pluralism is an inherent quality of the Indonesian nation-
\nstate. Mechanisms that uphold mutual interaction, adjustment and
\nharmony operate within the pluralistic societal system. Some
\nmechanisms are genuinely built in the society, inspired by local
\ngenius, while some others are established as a result of
\ninteraction with outside cultures.<\/p>\n
In general, there are two categories of minorities in
\nIndonesia: native minorities and non-native minorities.<\/p>\n
The first category comprises all native ethnic groups
\nthroughout the Indonesian archipelago. These groups are equally
\n\"native\" and \"minority\" and are successfully immersed into an
\nimagined community\/nation-state under the name \"Indonesia\".<\/p>\n
Non-native minorities consist of European, Arabian, Indian and
\nChinese descendants.<\/p>\n
The rest of this article will focus on the Chinese minority
\nand its opportunities and constraints in engaging and being
\nengaged in the Indonesian nation-building and national-
\ndevelopment process.<\/p>\n
Contact between the Chinese and the Indonesians began around
\nthe 13th century or earlier. A kingdom named Sriwijaya on
\nSumatra, one of the main islands in modern Indonesia, is known as
\na center for commerce and scientific advancement, where Chinese
\nscholars and Buddhist monks visited and resided for years. The
\nencounter led to fruitful interaction and mutual learning.
\nSriwijaya was then known as a center for the study of Buddhism in
\nSoutheast Asia.<\/p>\n
In a later period, when Europeans began to land in the
\nIndonesian archipelago and when modern cities and centers of
\ncommerce were growing, the Chinese continued to mingle and
\nmutually adapt with the native Indonesians.<\/p>\n
A study by HJ de Graff, et al., shows that in the 16th and
\n18th centuries the Chinese were an important part of the existing
\nsocieties and ruling authorities. Bong Swi Hoo (better known as
\nSunan Ampel), for example, was a leading Muslim leader in 16th-
\ncentury Java. Jin Bun (Raden Patah), also of Chinese origin, was
\nthe first king of Demak in Java. Common people of Chinese origin
\nwere as adaptable as those figures of Indonesian history.<\/p>\n
In modern Indonesian history, particularly from the early
\nyears of independence to the end of the late president Sukarno's
\nrule (1966), the process of engaging the Chinese in the national
\ndevelopment process was affected by the ideological conflicts of
\nthe Cold War and the split of China into nationalist and
\ncommunist blocs.<\/p>\n
The increasing influence of the Chinese communists in
\nIndonesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s amplified anti-
\nChinese sentiments. Such sentiments were worsened by the severe
\neconomic difficulties of the period.<\/p>\n
In the era of president Soeharto (1966-1998), the Chinese-
\nIndonesians were actively engaged in the Indonesian economy. The
\ngovernment's growth-oriented policy of the period resulted in
\ndevelopment projects and activities that led to the emergence of
\nprivileged Chinese-Indonesians with wide economic access,
\nbusiness concessions and political protection from the
\nauthorities. This rich business class, or cukong, was able to
\nbuild political patronage with the ruling authorities. Under the
\npolitical aegis of the ruling authorities, the Chinese-
\nIndonesians were able to vibrantly engage in strategic sectors of
\ndevelopment and to advance businesses in most strategic sectors.<\/p>\n
The cukong-type diversification and joint investment-levered
\ndiversification were parallel with the increasing economic
\nliberalism through open-door policies in foreign capital
\nintroduction and the foreign exchange system as well as import
\nsubstitution in intermediate and capital goods sectors. The
\npolicy of economic liberalism unexpectedly caused the increase of
\nlarge Chinese-owned business groups and the decline of native
\nminorities' capital.<\/p>\n
The mechanism of engaging Chinese-Indonesians in national
\ndevelopment in the period of the New Order (under president
\nSoeharto) was not viable as it ended up furthering the anti-
\nChinese sentiment among the indigenous minorities. The ruling
\ngovernment had a very hard time devising a mechanism that could
\nencourage creative diversity. The ramifications of the May 1998
\nriots are perhaps the most striking incident that proved the
\nmechanism inapplicable.<\/p>\n
Hope for better engagement is obvious and ardent in the post-
\nNew Order era. The succeeding government under President
\nBacharuddin Jusuf Habibie that began in May 1998 has a sincere
\nand strong commitment to devise a more viable mechanism to engage
\nthe Chinese-Indonesians in as many aspects of nation-building and
\nas possible.<\/p>\n
One first step that President Habibie has been taking toward a
\nmore viable mechanism is legal reform. On Sept. 16, 1998, the
\nPresident issued instruction No. 26\/1998 that prohibits
\ngovernment agencies and officials from acts of discrimination
\nagainst any Indonesian based on his or her origin.<\/p>\n
The President also instructed ministers, heads of state
\nagencies, governors, mayors and regents to refrain from using the
\nterms pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native).<\/p>\n
One big legal step just recently taken by the present
\ngovernment is the ratification of the International Convention on
\nthe Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965, with
\nLaw No. 29\/1999 on May 25, 1999. The government is also reviewing
\nand planning to revoke a number of \"discriminatory\" rules.<\/p>\n
The end of president Soeharto's era in may 1998 has created
\nthe most conducive environment for political participation of
\nnative and non-native minorities since 1966.<\/p>\n
The Chinese-Indonesians and other minorities -- native and
\nnon-native -- can express their political freedom as much as they
\nwish and can have political orientations to as many of the 48
\ncontesting political parties as possible. Major political parties
\nin the June 7 general election, such as the Indonesian Democratic
\nParty of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the National Awakening Party
\n(PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) that have gained the
\nhighest votes by far, are broad-based and all-inclusive parties.
\nMany of Indonesia's prominent ethnic Chinese are leading figures
\nin the parties.<\/p>",
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