Military return to power would open old wound<\/p>\n
Ardimas Sasdi, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
\nardimas@thejakartapost.com<\/p>\n
After laying low and being in a defensive mood for almost five
\nyears the military has made it surprisingly clear that it aims to
\nreturn to power by shooting three salvos within a matter of days
\nof each other in the last two weeks.<\/p>\n
The salvos, tactically and timely planned by the military
\nthinkers, were initiated by the National Intelligence Agency
\n(BIN), which seeks broader investigative powers, including the
\nright to detain suspects for questioning as long as it feels
\nnecessary to do so, followed by the Army, which is demanding more
\nsay in the handling of internal security.<\/p>\n
The latest salvo came in the form of a controversial military
\nbill. Article No. 19 of the bill authorizes the military to
\ndeploy troops to strife-torn areas of its own discretion, an act
\ntantamount to insubordination because by law such an action is
\nthe prerogative of the President as supreme commander of the
\nmilitary.<\/p>\n
Such requests have strengthened suspicions that the generals
\nhave been unhappy with the process of reform which puts the
\nmilitary under the supremacy of civilians.<\/p>\n
Political analysts said Article No. 19 could be twisted by the
\nmilitary to seize power under the guise of protecting national
\ninterests as it had done in 1967 when Soeharto and several
\ngenerals launched a bloodless coup against president Sukarno, the
\nfather of President Megawati Soekarnoputri.<\/p>\n
Former president Soeharto used the military as a political
\ntool to suppress human rights activities, outspoken politicians
\nand academics through intimidation, torture and illegal arrests.
\nThese bitter memories are still fresh in the minds of the
\nvictims.<\/p>\n
The military's reputation was blemished by human rights
\nviolations in incidents in Tanjung Priok, Lampung and East Timor
\nand excesses in military operations in Aceh and Papua. Their
\nimage was no longer one of a guardian of the nation, but as those
\nwho operated protection rackets and worked for the elite.<\/p>\n
The military along with political ally Golkar, which
\nrepresented civilians in the bureaucracy and major organizations,
\nalso served as Soeharto's government political machinery which
\ndetermined the course of politics, the economy and security.<\/p>\n
The role of the military in Indonesian politics diminished
\nwith the fall of its patron Soeharto in May 1998.<\/p>\n
But it has gotten over wrestling with the image problems.<\/p>\n
Now the military is still the most solid organization in the
\ncountry compared with other state institutions, even though its
\nrole is now limited to purely a defense force with the police
\ntaking over the duty of handling internal security.<\/p>\n
The military has also seen its dominant role curtailed with
\nthe separation of the police force from the military, the
\nsuspension of its dual function of security and politics and the
\nabolition of its territorial function.<\/p>\n
Many critics have noted that military reform should have
\ntargeted key aspects such as the dismantling of the Army's
\nterritorial command structures whose scope of duties overlap with
\nthe police force, extending its control from Jakarta to the
\nvillages.<\/p>\n
However, this key area has been left untouched in the military
\nreform with the Army's command structures like Kodim (the
\nmilitary district), Koramil (the sub-district military office)
\nand Babinsa at village levels still in existence.<\/p>\n
In a half-hearted response to demands from reformists and
\npressure from international powers, the military carried out
\ninternal reform in 1999 popularly as "restructuring and
\nrepositioning" the military's role by, among other means,
\nabolishing the territorial command posts.<\/p>\n
The drastic cut in its power has heightened anxiety and
\nfrustration among active officers who lost their privileges to
\noccupy key positions in the governments and retired servicemen,
\nwho are now being tried over past human rights violations in the
\ncivilian courts.<\/p>\n
Now it is also harder for military officers to become
\ngovernors, regents and mayors as they are no longer appointed,
\nbut elected by the people through elections.<\/p>\n
Under the government of President Megawati, who came to power
\nwith the backing of a coalition of big political parties and the
\nmilitary, the fate of military reform is going no where.<\/p>\n
Last year's landmark decree of the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR), which ended military representation in the
\nassembly in 2004 instead of the initial target of 2009, was the
\nresult of a maneuver by Megawati's rival Amien Rais, who is
\nspeaker of the assembly.<\/p>\n
Megawati, contrary to her predecessor Abdurrahman "Gus Dur"
\nWahid who purged the military of its role in politics without
\nmercy, even tried to coax generals to side with her through
\nvarious policies which benefited the military. The rapport
\nincluded a controversial Rp 39 billion (US$4.4million)
\ncontribution to the military, which later broke out into the
\nAsrama Gate (Barrack Gate) scandal.<\/p>\n
But Megawati, who has little political experience, had no
\nother choice but to rely on military support to bolster her weak
\npresidency.<\/p>\n
Internal factors such as the government's dismal performance
\nin handling economic and political crises, which was aggravated
\nby disintegration threats like secessionist movements in Aceh and
\nPapua, made it difficult for Megawati to be firm with the
\nmilitary.<\/p>\n
External factors were also not in the President's favor with
\nthe dramatic changes in the political constellation of the world
\nafter the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attack in America. The U.S.
\nand Australia have tilted toward better ties with the military,
\nwhich is considered an effective power to contain the threat of
\nhard-line Muslim groups in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The aim of the military to return to power, which clouded the
\nprocess of reform, did not emerge all of a sudden.<\/p>\n
Military observer Lt. Gen.(ret) Hasnan Habib said in February
\nlast year that the current Indonesian Military (TNI) Chief Gen.
\nEndriartono Sutarto, who had entered retirement when he was
\npromoted to the post, lacked the progressive outlook needed to
\ncontinue military reform.<\/p>\n
Antireform officers were still very strong in the Army and the
\nreform camps, which should be a major force to keep military
\nreform on track, had parted ways not long after they toppled
\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n
Though conditions may be conducive for the military to return
\nto power, the generals must note that a military-backed
\ngovernment or military junta is no longer popular and that it
\nwould kill the newborn democracy. More importantly, it would open
\nold wounds among the victims of military repression in the past.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/military-return-to-power-would-open-old-wound-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}