Military retains resources to make come back: Report<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Despite its waning political influence, the
\nmilitary -- especially the Army -- retains several \"political
\nresources\" which could enable it to come back in the future, an
\ninternational policy research group warned in a recent report.<\/p>\n
The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) said in a
\n26-page report titled Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under
\nControl that those resources were the Army's relatively intact
\nterritorial structure, significant control over domestic
\npolitical intelligence and access to substantial sources of funds
\nthat were not subject to external scrutiny.<\/p>\n
ICG said that through its territorial structure, the Army
\nmaintains the military units in every province, district and
\nsubdistrict throughout the country.<\/p>\n
\"This provides it with the means to influence political
\ndevelopments at every level of the government,\" the report, which
\nwas released early this month, said.<\/p>\n
Indonesian Military (TNI) comprises Army, Navy and Air Force,
\nwith personnel numbering around 500,000. The Army is predominant.<\/p>\n
The report said that during the three-decade rule of former
\npresident Soeharto, territorial troops were used \"to break
\nstrikes, remove villagers from their land, crush student protests
\nand, every five years, ensure overwhelming Golkar victories in
\ngeneral elections\".<\/p>\n
\"As long as this territorial structure remains in place, the
\nArmy leadership will have at their disposal an instrument that
\nhas been used in the past to further the military's political
\nobjectives and could be used again,\" it said.<\/p>\n
It added that the Army's strong representation in state and
\nmilitary intelligence agencies was also significant as they
\ncontinued to focus on domestic political and social affairs.<\/p>\n
\"The intelligence agencies undoubtedly made a crucial
\ncontribution to the durability of the New Order regime. They were
\nused during the Soeharto era to repress political opposition,\"
\nthe report said, referring to the State Intelligence Coordinating
\nAgency (Bakin) and the Strategic Intelligence Agency (Bais),
\npreviously known as the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (BIA).<\/p>\n
It said that \"the culture of Bais in the past was far from
\ndemocratic, with military intelligence officers prominent among
\nthose who were alleged to have been involved in human rights
\nabuses\".<\/p>\n
ICG said it was also widely believed in \"Jakarta elite
\ncircles\" that officers associated with Bais were among those who
\nmay be stirring up ethnic and other violence as a means to
\ndestabilize civilian government\".<\/p>\n
\"As long as the intelligence agencies remain dominated by
\nmilitary officers whose values and attitudes were shaped during
\nthe Soeharto era, the democratization process will remain
\nvulnerable to the kind of black operations that they have
\ncommonly sponsored in the past,\" it said.<\/p>\n
Last but not least, ICG said, access to finances is a crucial
\npolitical resource military officers continue to have.<\/p>\n
It said that as long as the state budget supplies only 25
\npercent to 30 percent of the required funds, military units will
\ncontinue to seek funding from other sources.<\/p>\n
\"This opens up the possibility that military commanders can
\ngain access to large sums of money that could be used to finance
\npolitical operations,\" the ICG report said.<\/p>\n
ICG therefore said that it was necessary for the government to
\nensure that \"non-budgetary funds are properly supervised by an
\nagency outside the military itself\", such as the State Audit
\nAgency (BPK).<\/p>\n
ICG was quick to note in the report, however, that despite
\nthese political resources, \"it is not possible for the military
\nto regain control of the government in the near future\".<\/p>\n
\"It is too far fragmented to act cohesively; it lacks
\nconfidence in its capacity to provide answers to Indonesia's
\nmanifold challenges; and most importantly, its leaders know that
\nany attempt to restore its political power would almost certainly
\ntrigger massive demonstrations throughout the country, which
\ncould easily turn into riots - which they are unsure, in turn, of
\ntheir capacity to handle,\" ICG said.<\/p>\n
It concluded that strong and effective civilian institutions
\nwere the best guarantee against the return of the military.<\/p>\n
\"If civilian government is successful, the military is not
\nlikely to challenge civilian authority,\" it said.<\/p>\n
Founded five years ago, the ICG is a private, multinational
\norganization committed to strengthening the international
\ncommunity to anticipate and understand conflicts as well as
\nworking at preventing and containing them.<\/p>\n
The full report on the Indonesian Military, as well as two
\nearlier ones on the political crisis in Indonesia and the Maluku
\nconflict, are available from ICG's website: www.crisisweb.org<\/p>\n
ICG board members include former Indian prime minister Inder
\nGujral, former Israeli prime minister and 1994 Nobel laureate
\nShimon Peres, renowned businessman George Soros and Indonesian
\nlawyer Todung Mulya Lubis.<\/p>\n
The organization currently operates field projects in nine
\ncrisis-affected countries worldwide: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
\nAlbania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Algeria,
\nBurundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Indonesia.
\n(byg)<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/military-retains-resources-to-make-come-back-report-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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