{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1441973,
        "msgid": "military-battles-to-win-over-acehnese-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-08-18 00:00:00",
        "title": "Military battles to win over Acehnese",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Military battles to win over Acehnese By Ati Nurbaiti LHOKSEUMAWE, North Aceh (JP): Police and the military, who the Acehnese consider the source of their troubles, are on a campaign to regain the trust of local residents by changing their name. And through smiles. Military roadblocks are commonplace on the highway to North Aceh following renewed signs of activity of the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM).",
        "content": "<p>Military battles to win over Acehnese<\/p>\n<p>By Ati Nurbaiti<\/p>\n<p>LHOKSEUMAWE, North Aceh (JP): Police and the military, who the<br>\nAcehnese consider the source of their troubles, are on a campaign<br>\nto regain the trust of local residents by changing their name.<br>\nAnd through smiles.<\/p>\n<p>Military roadblocks are commonplace on the highway to North<br>\nAceh following renewed signs of activity of the separatist Free<br>\nAceh Movement (GAM). Officers from the National Police units of<br>\nthe elite mobile brigade or bomb squad Gegana ask motorists to<br>\npull over. Drivers are requested to open the hoods of their<br>\nvehicles, truck cargoes are poked around and identity cards are<br>\nchecked.<\/p>\n<p>Gone, however, are the harsh words and rude manner of the<br>\npast.<\/p>\n<p>It is the new face of the police security operation, called<br>\n\"Operasi Sadar Rencong II\" and launched on Aug. 1. The name<br>\n\"Crack Riot Troops\", strongly associated with arson and killings<br>\nhere, is no longer used.<\/p>\n<p>But problems remain. It is unclear who is in command between<br>\nthe military and police. The riot troops, whose members were from<br>\nboth the police and military, were theoretically under the<br>\npolice, as are the new operations since Aug. 1.<\/p>\n<p>Although formal separation of the police from the Indonesian<br>\nMilitary (TNI) started on April 1, some Aceh residents say they<br>\nfind it difficult to distinguish between friend and foe.<\/p>\n<p>\"We're tired of filing reports... (we'd) better (be silent)<br>\nto avoid trouble,\" a private employee here said in referring to<br>\nalleged extortion by soldiers.<\/p>\n<p>Siding with GAM is no guarantee of protection. Suspected<br>\nseparatist sympathizers are hunted down every day.<\/p>\n<p>The confusion is compounded by the military's continued<br>\nenjoyment of wide-ranging powers under the dual-function<br>\n\"sociopolitical\" doctrine. Little seems to have changed.<\/p>\n<p>An officer at the Pidie Military Command acknowledged the<br>\npolice rule of a maximum 24-hour detention. He added that<br>\npermission from the police gave them the \"right to detain a<br>\nperson on the grounds of security and political (threat), and to<br>\nhold him in detention for questioning as long as necessary\".<\/p>\n<p>Residents said the death of a suspected GAM sympathizer from<br>\nthree gunshot wounds in July was committed by personnel at the<br>\ncommand. The local police chief said the man suffered a heart<br>\nattack and scratched his body falling on the asphalt.<\/p>\n<p>The provincial police chief and his subordinates have publicly<br>\nbacked the military's far-reaching authority but, in reality,<br>\npolice officers have reportedly haggled for the release of some<br>\ndetainees following requests from their relatives and activists.<\/p>\n<p>Rights activist and lawyer M. Yacob Hamzah said \"the<br>\nSubversion Act has been revoked. There has not been an<br>\nannouncement of a new status of military operations, so I don't<br>\nsee the justification of (such an authority),\" he said.<\/p>\n<p>He said arbitrary detention of people by soldiers has<br>\ncontinued even after the new police operations.<\/p>\n<p>Another problem may be insensitivity on the part of the<br>\ngovernment, leading to bad public relations. National Police<br>\nChief Gen. Roesmanhadi recently announced the new series of six-<br>\nmonth-long operations to crush the rebels.<\/p>\n<p>His \"shoot on sight\" order only served to reinforce misgivings<br>\nthat instead of shooting armed rebels, once again security<br>\npersonnel would abuse or even kill unarmed civilians.<\/p>\n<p>Statements that the earlier deployed Crack Riot Troops no<br>\nlonger existed, as they had been replaced, brought little comfort<br>\nas many of the soldiers in the current operation were members of<br>\nthe former troops known by the acronym PPRM .<\/p>\n<p>\"There is no more PPRM,\" says Aceh police chief Col.<br>\nBachrumsyah. The new operation stresses not only a security<br>\napproach but also a \"cultural and religious approach,\" he said.<\/p>\n<p>In North Aceh, operations commander Col. Nurdin said half of<br>\nthe Crack Riot Troops had been sent home from the regency,<br>\nleaving only one battalion supported by members of the National<br>\nPolice and members of respective local military commands.<\/p>\n<p>In all, Lilawangsa military commander Col. Syafnil Armen,<br>\noverseeing north-east Aceh and Pidie, says he now has 90 percent<br>\nof the ideal figure of 5,000 troops, beefing up security in the<br>\nregency.<\/p>\n<p>The failure of the earlier deployed troops to crush armed<br>\nuprisings is blamed by police on them being wrongly equipped to<br>\nface crowds, with only rubber bullets or blanks, and shields.<\/p>\n<p>Distrust<\/p>\n<p>Those with real bullets among the Crack Riot Troops were<br>\n\"relatively small\" in number, Bachrumsyah said, while police and<br>\nthe military say they do not know the number of enemies they<br>\nreally face.<\/p>\n<p>The partial withdrawal of the Crack Riot Troops was not done<br>\nwith fanfare. Indeed an announcement would not have been entirely<br>\nwelcomed as not all the troops were withdrawn. The addition and<br>\nreduction of troops here is an issue clouded in distrust,<br>\nregardless to what the authorities actually say.<\/p>\n<p>Without adequate action to prevent more violence, and merely<br>\ndenials from the authorities and the Free Aceh rebels regarding<br>\ntheir suspected involvement, the public has been left to a<br>\nguessing game of \"whodunit\".<\/p>\n<p>Identification of armed groups differ among military and<br>\npolice officers. Some say the \"GBPK\" or armed disturbance groups,<br>\nare the proper names for the Free Aceh Movement while others<br>\nrefer to both as the groups to watch over their backs for.<\/p>\n<p>A few police officers have acknowledged the possible<br>\ninvolvement of military troops in arson and intimidation of<br>\ncivilians. However this does not include the abduction and<br>\nkillings of security personnel blamed on \"armed hoodlums.\"<\/p>\n<p>Aceh police chief Col. Bahrumsjah says they do not know who<br>\nthe armed hoodlums are despite intelligence work by the military<br>\nand police.<\/p>\n<p>\"Since President B.J. Habibie visited Aceh in March and<br>\npledged that the violence would end, hundreds have died,\" a<br>\njournalist of the Kontras tabloid said in Banda Aceh.<\/p>\n<p>Spokesman for police operations, Lt.Col. Armin Karim, said the<br>\nnew operation stresses on \"repressive action supported by<br>\npreventive action to uphold the law.\"<\/p>\n<p>But one other obstacle is that the operation and orders to<br>\nshoot on sight were launched in the absence of a political<br>\napproach to problems in Aceh, inherited from the military<br>\noperations status of 1989 to 1998 and following sporadic<br>\nviolence.<\/p>\n<p>In such a condition the police chief's claim that the<br>\noperation includes \"cultural and religious approaches\" has not<br>\nmet much response.<\/p>\n<p>Trauma<\/p>\n<p>Scholars and activists have pointed to the widespread trauma<br>\nwhich is far from healed. The rest of the country was made aware<br>\nof the killings, torture and rape and abduction of Acehnese only<br>\nafter people spoke out when Soeharto quit the presidency last<br>\nyear.<\/p>\n<p>The cultural and religious approach is indeed in line with<br>\nsuggestions by scholars and community leaders of Aceh.<\/p>\n<p>But at the same time while local authorities have not ruled<br>\nout dialog with Free Aceh leaders, those in Jakarta say talks<br>\nover the possibility of an independent Aceh, including students'<br>\ndemands of a referendum, is unthinkable.<\/p>\n<p>When criticized that his office has been too silent regarding<br>\nAceh, the best that the Minister of Home Affairs Syarwan Hamid<br>\ncould come up with was that while Acehnese aspirations should be<br>\nrespected, \"it should be in the context of a unified state.\"<\/p>\n<p>Aceh scholars have said the failure of the government to<br>\nlegally enact its status of a special province has greatly<br>\ncontributed to the problems here.<\/p>\n<p>The unbalanced comparison of what Aceh has contributed in<br>\nterms of its oil, gas and agricultural resources, to what it has<br>\ngained from the government, has widely been cited as a reason for<br>\nits problems. People know by heart the estimates that less than 1<br>\npercent of Aceh's contribution to the national budget comes back<br>\nto the province.<\/p>\n<p>People here say that \"Jakarta only needs Aceh's land and rich<br>\nresources, and does not need its people.\"<\/p>\n<p>Late<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile life continues to be tense in many parts of Aceh,<br>\nand dissatisfaction remains.<\/p>\n<p>The violence associated with security personnel and a<br>\nseemingly detached government, render the new police operations<br>\ninadequate. Supposedly friendly security personnel now welcome<br>\nrefugees, while only two weeks ago they were deliberately roaring<br>\ntheir trucks past refugee camps housing up to 145,000 people.<br>\n\"But the refugees ignore (their friendly gestures) now,\" a<br>\nstudent doing volunteer work for refugees said.<\/p>\n<p>Another problem hindering efforts to win over Acehnese trust<br>\nis the continued cloud of secrecy over decisions regarding<br>\nsecurity personnel. Their numbers announced by Roesmanhadi and<br>\nlocal authorities do not exactly match, with the former<br>\nmentioning some 11,000 and the latter 7,000 \"including largely<br>\nnon-combat personnel.\"<\/p>\n<p>One highly placed police officer in Banda Aceh says he is not<br>\nsure of the figure.<\/p>\n<p>Another issue which has become a source of gossip, in absence<br>\nof reliable information, is the deployment of Jakarta officers to<br>\nAceh who do not report to local authorities.<\/p>\n<p>While a military spokesman earlier said Jakarta officers Lt.<br>\nGen. Fachrul Razi, an Acehnese, and Maj.Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin,<br>\na former Jakarta military commander, had come to Aceh earlier<br>\nthis year \"to seek input,\" police and military leaders here say<br>\nthey have not been informed of results of the visits.<\/p>\n<p>\"But whoever is sent here (from military headquarters) must<br>\ncome with good intentions,\" says Lilawangsa military commander<br>\nCol. Syafnil Armen. A lack of transparency on the issue has<br>\ncontributed to hearsay that the Indonesian military or the<br>\ngovernment has unknown plans for the province, while it cannot<br>\ncontrol or lacks intention to control the armed groups.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/military-battles-to-win-over-acehnese-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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