Migration in eastern Indonesia<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on the political impact of
\nmigration in eastern provinces, prepared by Riwanto Tirtosudarmo,
\na researcher at the Center for Social and Cultural Studies, the
\nIndonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Eastern Indonesia, a region of distinct natural
\nbeauty with a heterogeneous population and diverse cultures,
\nbecame a topic of public discussion among academics and
\ndevelopment specialists after the government announced in 1990
\nthat it would pay more attention to the development of the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
Generally speaking, the New Order government's official
\nstatistics clearly indicate an increase in people's welfare in
\neastern Indonesian provinces. However, the social and economic
\ninequality between regencies and groups of the population is also
\nincreasing.<\/p>\n
Like in other parts of the country, the social tension and
\npolitical conflicts that have intensified in several places in
\neastern region over the last five years are strong indications
\nthat genuine sustainable development is not taking place there,
\nproving that the ideology of development adopted by the state in
\nthe last three decades has failed.<\/p>\n
About two decades ago, a Dutch geographer, Milan J. Titus,
\nargued that interregional migration in Indonesia reflected
\ndifferent degrees of social and economic development between
\nregions.<\/p>\n
Titus' findings significantly demonstrate the need to examine
\nthe process of uneven development in Indonesia, particularly the
\nforces which have given rise to such a development process, and
\nwhich seem to be perpetuating it.<\/p>\n
Major studies on migration in the country, however, have
\ntended to overlook the social and political dimensions and
\nemphasized more the demographic and economic aspects of
\npopulation mobility.<\/p>\n
This article attempts to look beyond these conventional
\napproaches. The unequal power relations between central and
\nprovincial governments will be elaborated as a crucial factor in
\nexplaining the social and political structures that contextualize
\nmigration in the eastern region.<\/p>\n
The ramifications of migration, as reflected by the disparity
\nof economic activities between regions as well as between
\ndifferent groups of population, indicate that political and
\ncultural integration is still far from being resolved in the
\nregion. Recent communal conflicts between the population of
\ndifferent ethnic groups and religions in Maluku and West
\nKalimantan, for example, obviously indicate accumulated social
\nresentments among the locals and the migrants from a different
\nethnic background.<\/p>\n
The final part of this article will discuss the prospect of
\nalternative regional development approaches, which convey the
\nheterogeneity of the political and cultural aspects of the
\npeople.<\/p>\n
During the New Order reign, the national political system,
\nwhich was highly centralistic and tightly controlled by then
\npresident Soeharto and the military, directly influenced the
\nrelationships between the central government and provincial
\nadministrations. In 1974, the government promulgated Law No. 5,
\nwhich designated the legal framework for the role and authority
\nof provincial administrations.<\/p>\n
According to the law, provincial administrations exercise only
\npowers that have been granted to them by the central government.
\nThe national government, represented by the Ministry of Home
\nAffairs, has the responsibility to supervise and support all
\ndevelopment activities carried out in the provinces.<\/p>\n
In 1976, the government established local Development Planning
\nBoards (Bappeda) to strengthen the provincial administrations'
\ncapability in planning and coordinating development programs. In
\ntheory, Bappeda should perform a number of functions, such as
\nformulating basic regional development plans, coordinating
\nplanning among sectoral line agencies, drafting regional
\ndevelopment budgets and monitoring as well as evaluating
\ndevelopment activities at the provincial level. In practice,
\nhowever, what neatly seems to be bottom-up planning, does not
\nreally take place. The actual planning still largely follows a
\ntop-down process. Development programs and projects at the
\nprovincial level are mostly designed and planned by the National
\nDevelopment Planning Board (Bappenas) and various ministerial
\noffices in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
The primacy of population sizes as the major criteria for the
\nallocation of provincial budgets not surprisingly ensures that
\nthe largest proportion of the budget pours into Java.
\nFurthermore, this imbalance is reinforced by the lack of an
\nincentive criterion, such as tax efforts, and the failure to
\nconsider regional potential in fund allocations. The financial
\ntransfer from the center to the regions plays no significant role
\nin reducing the existing regional disparity, particularly between
\nJava and the outer islands.<\/p>\n
The implications of the New Order government's bureaucratic
\narrangement, particularly on the suppression of local people's
\npolitical participation, are very obvious. The political sphere
\nof society at the regional levels is very limited and the local
\npeople are marginalized.<\/p>\n
A recent study by a research team of the National Institute of
\nSciences (LIPI) indicates that the central government's regional
\nautonomy project conducted in 1996 mainly dealt with the
\ntechnical administrative aspects of regional autonomy and clearly
\nwould not have a significant effect on existing center-regional
\nrelationships.<\/p>\n
At the provincial level, resentment of being "economically
\nsqueezed" by the central government is also prevalent among
\npeople in the provinces rich with natural resources, such as
\nAceh, Riau, North Sulawesi, Irian Jaya and provinces in
\nKalimantan.<\/p>\n
The flourishing polarizing sentiments, originating from ethnic
\nand religious self-identification, perhaps are also natural human
\nresponses to the current climate of political uncertainty.<\/p>\n
A more anthropological observation on local society and
\nculture suggests that the imposition of the Village Law of 1979
\nsignificantly transformed the remaining local social institutions
\nbased on (adat) customary laws. However, the push for integration
\nand unity was not without opposition from local adat society,
\nreligious groups and other interest groups. But the political
\nauthority and military strength of the central government ensured
\nthe relatively smooth implementation of the policy.<\/p>\n
Adat, in people's minds, is not a means to preserve ethnic
\nidentity but is perceived as a means to maintain their cultural
\nand moral legitimacy in the face of dominant external state and
\nculture. People's responses, within any local group, in fact,
\nprovide a forum for the constant reformation and reconstitution
\nof adat and group identity within the wider political and
\neconomic environment.<\/p>\n
A recent national gathering of adat leaders representing about
\n50 different ethnic groups in Jakarta reflected the increasingly
\nsignificant role of indigenous people in national politics.<\/p>\n
The unequal relationships between the state and civil society,
\nas well as between the center and the regions, however, have been
\nstrongly questioned following the collapse of the Soeharto regime
\nin May 1998. A new political equation is apparently on the
\nhorizon, and its implication for a future path of regional
\ndevelopment is therefore inevitable.<\/p>\n
In terms of population size, according to the 1995 Intercensal
\nPopulation Survey, eastern Indonesia comprises only 13.3 percent
\nof the country's total population. From a national demographic
\nperspective, eastern Indonesia comprises nine provinces -- those
\nlocated in Sulawesi, the Maluku islands, Irian Jaya (formerly
\nWest Papua) and the Nusa Tenggara islands.<\/p>\n
Population density varies. Maluku and Irian Jaya, for example,
\ntogether are the least densely populated areas in Indonesia. In
\n1995, the density of population in both the Maluku islands and
\nIrian Jaya was only eight people per square kilometer, as
\ncompared to 850 in Java and an average of 95 throughout
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Javanese dominate the bureaucracy in Jakarta and they,
\ntherefore, perceive the eastern provinces as empty land. Such a
\nperception was apparently behind the decision in the 1980s to
\nredirect the transmigration policy to those provinces. The
\ndecision to move transmigrants to eastern provinces significantly
\ncontributed to an increase in the transmigration budget because
\nthe transportation costs became very expensive.<\/p>\n
The impact of the central government's decision to bolster the
\ntransmigration program in the eastern provinces is clearly shown
\nby the positive net migration trends since 1980 in designated
\ndestination provinces, such as Irian Jaya, Maluku, Southeast and
\nCentral Sulawesi. In-migrations apparently also play an important
\nrole in the relatively high annual population rate of growth in
\nthose provinces. On the other hand, in provinces like North and
\nSouth Sulawesi, as well as in West and East Nusa Tenggara,
\nnegative net migration has also contributed to the low level of
\nannual population growth in those provinces. As a result of the
\ncollapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s, the national budget for
\nthe transmigration program was drastically cut back, thereby
\nsubstantially reducing the number of transmigrant families that
\nhad originally been planned for resettlement.<\/p>\n
Window: Major studies on migration in the country, however,
\nhave tended to overlook the social and political dimensions and
\nemphasized more the demographic and economic aspects of
\npopulation mobility.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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