Megawati's foreign policy legacy<\/p>\n
Teuku Faizasyah, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Despite domestic political hiccups at the sunset of Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri's Cabinet -- that is, controversy surrounding the
\nCabinet's reshuffle -- within the sphere of foreign policy,
\nMegawati's government apparently is not clouded by mischief.<\/p>\n
Megawati's government appears resolute in moving forward with
\nits foreign policies choices, and in implementing programs that
\nhave been decided earlier. An example of this, is that all
\npreparations, both in terms of substantive and administrative,
\nfor the convening of the Asia-Africa Summit 2005 are well in
\nprogress.<\/p>\n
The case of the Summit preparations shows the kind of platform
\nthat Megawati has instituted within the realms of Indonesian
\nforeign policy. To put it succinctly, there is a legacy of
\nMegawati in Indonesian foreign policy.<\/p>\n
The foreign policy is shaped by her strategic decisions of
\nappointing a professional from the ministry, Hassan Wirajuda, to
\nlead the office; and appointing Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna, the
\ntwo most seasoned Indonesian diplomats, as her advisers and
\nspecial envoys.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian diplomatic community has benefited from this
\nstrategic move. The appointment of a professional to lead the
\nministry resulted in internal consolidation, that is, the
\nrestructuring of the ministry to meet the present challenges. The
\ntwo most important features of the new structure are the post of
\nthe ministry's spokesperson and an office responsible for the
\nprotection of Indonesian citizens abroad.<\/p>\n
Clearly, the spokesperson and the citizen protection's office
\nare efforts to reach out and project a down-to-earth foreign
\npolicy. Seemingly, the ministry wishes to inject a new image that
\nit deals with issues of public interests and not with \"ivory
\ntower\" issues. Despite the host of many factors that led to the
\nrelease of Indonesian nationals kidnapped in Iraq, the ministry
\ndid assume a leadership role at national level to deal with the
\ncase involving Indonesians abroad.<\/p>\n
The internal consolidation also resulted in a more focused
\nforeign policy. Indonesian foreign policy under Megawati can be
\ncalled pragmatic, but always maneuvering between idealism and
\nrealism. It has to be pragmatic because Indonesia's post-crisis
\nhas been weakened, in terms of its capacity and credibility. The
\nintention of former president Wahid was that Indonesia played an
\nactive role in solving numerous international conflicts sounded
\nhollow, in the wake of Wahid's government inability to overcome
\nthe problems of Aceh and Ambon.<\/p>\n
Therefore, Megawati's government decision to concentrate its
\nenergy in its immediate region is a pragmatic one. Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) again becomes the cornerstone of
\nIndonesian foreign policy. During its chairmanship in ASEAN,
\nIndonesia re-established its cardinal position by ways of
\nsuccessfully charting the future direction of the grouping
\nthrough ASEAN Community conception, consisting of three pillars:
\nASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN
\nSocio-cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community pillar,
\nproposed by Indonesia, provides the region with assurance that
\nthe members would always opt for peaceful means in settling their
\ndifferences.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has also been able to maneuver between idealism and
\nrealism. Its idealism is shown in the way it handled the debacle
\nfollowing the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies.
\nAlthough, Indonesia could empathize with the U.S.' grief of their
\nloss following the Sept. 11 attack, Indonesia censured the U.S.
\nso-called rights for the preemptive strike in Afghanistan and
\nIraq.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, Indonesia's willingness to engage many countries
\nin counterterrorism cooperation, including the U.S. and
\nAustralia, is a pure case of realism in its foreign policy.
\nHaving limited resources, Indonesia needs the support of these
\ncountries to counter any threats posed by extremist groups from
\nwithin and outside Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The appointment of Ali Alatas and Nana Sutresna as advisers
\nand special envoys, serves Megawati's interest to have Indonesia
\nplay a prominent international role. At the same time, the
\nspecial envoy is Megawati's means to cut short the backlog of
\nbureaucracy. She assigned Alatas to Sweden to make clear to the
\nhighest authority there, Indonesia's position about the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) and she dispatched Sutresna to North Korea to
\noutline Indonesia's position about the nuclear crisis in the
\npeninsula. On the latter case, Megawati's diplomatic chip is
\nIndonesia's cordial relations with North Korea, as well as with
\nSouth Korea and the rest of the countries engage in the six peace
\ntalks.<\/p>\n
Certainly, by way of appointing a special envoy, Megawati has
\ngained more leeway in the conduct of Indonesian diplomacy. She
\nassigned the envoys to deal with selected cases where Indonesia,
\nin her eyes, has some political advantages. In the North Korean
\ncase, for instance, seemingly she wishes to capitalize on the
\npersonal relationship between the leaders of the two countries:
\nBetween her late-father and Kim Il-sung, and between herself and
\nKim Jong-il.<\/p>\n
To conclude, Megawati should feel content that the strategic
\nmoves she took have helped Indonesia reposition its foreign
\npolicy. Indeed, she helped resuscitate foreign policy, which at
\none point in time, during Wahid's government, lost its soul.<\/p>\n
Two questions remain, however, what would be Indonesia's
\nforeign policy post-Megawati? Would the next president continue
\nwith the platform laid by Megawati? At the moment there are not
\nmany clues because, in contrast to other issues, foreign policy
\nis the least discussed subject during the campaign trail. Without
\nsufficient insight, it is hoped that the new government would
\nremain faithful on the good things that the predecessor
\ngovernment has done.<\/p>\n
The writer has a Ph.D in Diplomatic History and Conflict
\nResolution, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. He
\ncurrently serves with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. The
\nopinions in this article are personal and do not reflect the
\npolicy of the Foreign Ministry.<\/p>",
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