Megawati must learn from history<\/p>\n
Ignas Kleden, The Center for East, Indonesian Affairs\/CEIA,
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
From time to time Indonesia has had to grapple with serious
\nquestions when public concern rises to a certain point.<\/p>\n
One such question is of national leadership.<\/p>\n
During Sukarno's time, nation-building was the main concern.
\nInitially, it appeared to be a question of whether it was
\npossible and viable to have so many ethnic groups, speaking some
\n500 languages, into a united nation, which would share similar
\nnational beliefs and be committed to common national ideals.<\/p>\n
By the end of his rule in 1965 the question arose again.
\nShould the country tolerate all political groupings or should
\nthere be some limitations in order not to endanger the existence
\nand the survival of the new nation? Sukarno was brought down by
\nhis political opponents and the New Order regime was born.<\/p>\n
Soeharto came to power strongly believing that if one wanted
\nto save the nation something had to be done with the economy. He
\ndid, and it turned out to work well. However it became
\nincreasingly clear that economic growth as such could not become
\na national savior unless it was guided by some political and
\nsocial principles.<\/p>\n
The true wealth of a nation is not merely the result of
\neconomic growth per se, but rather a democratic way of handling
\nthat growth. The direction of national development set by
\nSoeharto was clear, but still many were misled. Soeharto who won
\nthe hearts of people because of the economic success had to step
\ndown because of an insurmountable economic crisis in 1998.<\/p>\n
B.J. Habibie, the then vice president, took over the
\ngovernment partly because of Soeharto's own appointment without
\nan approval of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It
\nbecame a case of a government without legality or legitimacy.<\/p>\n
Under his rule, the exchange rate of the rupiah relative to US
\ndollars was pushed up from Rp 16,700 on June 17, 1998 to Rp 7,000
\non Oct. 20, 1999. However, the main political struggle for
\nHabibie was to win his legitimacy outside the MPR, both
\ndomestically as well as internationally.<\/p>\n
Domestically, he pushed for political openness. These measures
\nwere his response to the public's aspirations in order to show
\nthat he stood fully committed to democracy and an open society.<\/p>\n
Internationally, the same effort was made to demonstrate his
\ndetermination to encourage democracy and human rights. East Timor
\nwas given the free option to become independent from Indonesia or
\nbecome an autonomous province of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Despite the majority of Indonesians who supported democratic
\nreform, East Timor's freedom was seen as a slap in the face of
\nthe nation by those same people.<\/p>\n
None of these achievements gave Habibie's enough legitimacy to
\novercome the people's dislike of the New Order, which he was
\nstill considered part of, and he had to give way to Abdurrahman
\nWahid who became the first president to come to power in a
\ndemocratic election.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman was a very popular Muslim leader, who was known
\nfor his commitment to democracy, his advocacy for the minorities,
\nand his fundamental stand for political moderation. His
\npopularity was due partly to his personal background as the
\ngrandson of the founder of Nadhatul Ulama (NU) (the country's
\nlargest Muslim organization) and the son of the first minister of
\nreligious affairs. One can neiter forget his own performance and
\nachievement as a leading Muslim scholar, who enjoyed national and
\ninternational recognition.<\/p>\n
He was also an outspoken intellectual familiar with many
\nintellectual communities and was welcome in various cultural
\ncenters. His courage to struggle for freedom of expression became
\na great nuisance for the regime of Soeharto.<\/p>\n
So there was no problem of legitimacy for Abdurrahman. If
\nHabibie and his government suffered from a lack of legitimacy,
\nAbdurrahman ran the risk of becoming over-legitimate -- which can
\nbecome a risk for both the ruler and the ruled.<\/p>\n
If the ruler has too much of a mandate he\/she can easily
\nneglect power accountability. For the ruled this situation can
\nbecome a liability -- the ruler is not challenged to do something
\nwhich benefits the people to get their recognition and submission
\nin return.<\/p>\n
Such a mandate gave Abdurrahman the courage to deal with the
\npolitical institutions of the New Order establishment, much of
\nwhich were still firmly in place, for better or for worse. He
\nforced the military to withdraw from power politics, this being
\ndone in a surprisingly peaceful way and in a very short time.<\/p>\n
He dissolved the ministry for information and suggested a
\npeaceful resolution in Aceh. However, when he called for the
\ndissolution of the legislature after a slew of no-confidence
\nvotes against him, he had brought the nation to the brink of
\ncrisis. A special MPR session was convened, after it was
\ndissolved by the president, which decided to end his presidency.<\/p>\n
Megawati Soekarnoputri was immediately installed as president
\nby the MPR on July 23, 2001 and was given a vote of confidence to
\nlead the nation until the next 2004 elections. Her Indonesian
\nDemocratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) won the 1999
\nelection with a third of all the votes. She was a respected
\nleader able to lead her party through difficult times when her
\nparty seemed powerful enough to become a rival for Golkar, the
\nthen ruling party.<\/p>\n
Her background as Sukarno's daughter played obviously an
\nimportant role in strengthening her position as a political
\nleader. During political repression under Soeharto, Megawati
\nstayed firm, unshaken and solid. Silence was golden at that time,
\na dignified attitude of political resistance. However, people now
\nexpect her to provide guidance and direction.<\/p>\n
People want to know, for instance, what her position is with
\nregard to the case of Akbar Tandjung, or the sale of Indosat.
\nPeople are curious about her responses towards student
\ndemonstrations or how she plans to deal with flooding in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
There should be a substantial change in roles played by both
\nMegawati and PDI Perjuangan according to the new political
\nposition they are now in.<\/p>\n
The rise and fall of Indonesian national leaders clearly show
\nthat the strengths which can put a president in office turn out
\nto become the very things which bring about presidential failure.<\/p>\n
Sukarno's undaunted elan for nation-building and national
\nunity helped him succeed in bringing various ethnic groups and
\nvarious political groupings together as one nation. However, his
\npreoccupation with national unity made him reluctant to dissolve
\nthe then Indonesian Communist Party as demanded forcefully by the
\nstudents, the military and the religious groups. He was finally
\ntoppled by his own indecisiveness on that issue.<\/p>\n
In the case of Soeharto economic growth was his obvious
\nsuccess, but the failure to overcome the crisis was the death of
\nhim.<\/p>\n
Habibie suffered from a lack of legitimacy and therefore
\nstruggled during his administration to win recognition and
\nacceptance of the people. However, his decision to give East
\nTimor freedom made him too unpopular with nationalists.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman was supported by full legitimacy. And yet his
\nover-legitimate position made him less cautious in dealing with
\npolitical institutions. He was ousted, essentially for being too
\nzealous with institutional reforms.<\/p>\n
Thus, Megawati should heed this pattern, develop a political
\nvision and tell us about it, and not allow her former strength to
\nbecome the very weakness which could bring her down.<\/p>",
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