Megawati: Her father's daughter?<\/p>\n
By R. William Liddle<\/p>\n
OHIO (JP): Megawati Soekarnoputri, Indonesia's newly elected
\npresident, lives under the gaze of her father. A life-size
\nportrait of Sukarno, in his quasi-military uniform and
\nnationalist cap, dominates the cavernous living room of her home
\nin suburban Jakarta. To many Indonesians, a Megawati presidency
\npromises a return to the revolutionary spirit of her father and
\nhis generation of leaders, who struggled successfully for
\nindependence in the 1940s.<\/p>\n
To this observer, who first lived in Indonesia during the
\ntumultuous final years of Sukarno's presidency, hope that the
\ndaughter shares the father's high ideals is tempered with fear
\nthat she will copy his often disastrous policies.<\/p>\n
As president, Megawati confronts challenges in three major
\npolicy areas similar to those faced by President Sukarno in the
\n1950s and early 1960s: center-region relations, the
\npoliticization of the armed forces, and a declining economy. In
\nhis time, Sukarno's response to each challenge was ruinous,
\nespecially in its long term implications for society and
\npolitics. Demands for regional autonomy were answered with
\ntightened control by the central government in Jakarta. This laid
\nthe foundation for today's pervasive restiveness and for the
\nseparatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, Indonesia's
\nwesternmost and easternmost provinces respectively, that now
\nthreaten the integrity of the Indonesian nation.<\/p>\n
Demands by officers at central armed forces headquarters for a
\nshare in national power were acceded to in return for support of
\nSukarno's presidential leadership. This led to the entrenchment
\nof officers in non-military posts and of the military as an
\ninstitutionalized and-in its own eyes-legitimate political force.
\nThe army also became a major player in the economy, owning large
\nbusinesses which freed it from reliance on government budgets.
\nThe most powerful state enterprises, including the national
\npetroleum company Pertamina, came under military control.<\/p>\n
Sukarno had little understanding of modern economies.
\nIndonesia's then tiny band of professional economists attempted
\nrepeatedly to teach him the fundamentals of macro-economic policy
\nand development planning. But Sukarno chose to sacrifice economic
\ngrowth and stability in return for short term personal political
\ngain or the simulacrum of national glory. Examples of the latter
\nare his campaign in the 1950s against the ex-colonial ruler, the
\nDutch, over sovereign control of the territory of Irian Jaya
\n(then called Western New Guinea) and his agitation in the 1960s
\nagainst Great Britain and the United States over the formation of
\nneighboring Malaysia, which included territories bordering on
\nIndonesian Borneo.<\/p>\n
The ultimate result, negative growth and runaway inflation,
\nwas finally curbed by the army general Soeharto, who did listen
\nto the economists. During Soeharto's presidency, Indonesia
\nenjoyed 30 years of East Asian-style development, combining an
\naverage growth rate of more than 6 percent per year with a
\nsignificant measure of distribution of the benefits, especially
\non Java and in major cities throughout the country, which earned
\nhim considerable legitimacy as the father of development.<\/p>\n
In the end, however, Soeharto like Sukarno also chose to
\nsacrifice the modern economy, not for national glory but for the
\npersonal financial interests of members of his family and his
\ncronies.<\/p>\n
As vice president under President Abdurrahman Wahid since
\nOctober 1999, Megawati showed disturbing signs of following her
\nfather's lead in two of these three areas. Abdurrahman at first
\nresponded positively to demands for regional autonomy by adhering
\nto the timetable for implementation of new decentralization laws
\nadopted by the previous government. As problems arose, however,
\nMegawati repeatedly spoke out against what she considered
\nexcessive pressure for the devolution of decision making power to
\nthe regions. Most troubling, she has appeared to favor strong
\nmilitary action against separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Based
\non recent experience, in East Timor as well as Aceh and Irian
\nJaya, military action will be counterproductive, sharpening local
\nanger toward Jakarta and heightening the probability that in the
\nend these two provinces will become independent.<\/p>\n
Megawati also appears to have little understanding of the
\nimportance of civilian control of the military in modern
\ndemocracies. In this respect, unfortunately, she is not alone.
\nMost top party leaders and parliamentarians have passed up
\nseveral opportunities to depoliticize the armed forces. Last year
\nall the major parties voted to keep appointed armed forces'
\nrepresentatives in the People's Consultative Assembly at least
\nuntil 2009. But Megawati has seemed especially willing to listen
\nto officers' grievances against Abdurrahman and especially quick to
\ndefend them against charges of brutality in East Timor and
\nelsewhere. The suspicion is strong that, like her father, she
\nintends the military to be a supporting pillar of her presidency.<\/p>\n
The one bright ray of hope, so far, for a Megawati presidency
\nis economic policy. In this area it is former president
\nAbdurrahman, known to fall asleep during cabinet economic policy
\ndiscussions, who was the throwback to the Sukarno era.
\nAbdurrahman deeply distrusted the policy recommendations of
\neconomists. Like many Indonesians today, he believed that they
\nserve the interests of big business, not ordinary people, despite
\nthe overwhelming twentieth century evidence that capitalist-style
\ngrowth is the best foundation for shared prosperity in modern
\neconomies.<\/p>\n
To her credit, Megawati has distanced herself from Abdurrahman in
\nthis area and sought the advice, Soeharto-style, of market-
\noriented economists. The widely respected Widjojo Nitisastro, a
\nprofessor trained at Berkeley and for decades Soeharto's chief
\neconomic advisor, spoke frequently at cabinet meetings chaired by
\nMegawati when she was still vice-president. Younger economists,
\nshut out of the Abdurrahman government, prepared policy papers
\nfor her and wrote glowingly of the prospects for a Megawati
\npresidency in their newspaper and magazine columns. Most
\nimportantly, as vice president she made significant policy
\ndecisions of her own, tightening the state budget and reducing
\npetroleum subsidies, that demonstrated both understanding of the
\neconomy and political courage.<\/p>\n
One for three, in politics as in baseball, is perhaps not a
\nbad average, especially since economic growth is so crucial to
\nthe construction of a modern society. But it is also imperative,
\nif growth is to be maintained for the decades that will be
\nrequired before Indonesia becomes fully modern, that Indonesians
\nbring their armed forces under civilian control and that they
\nwork out a widely acceptable pattern of relations between the
\nregions and the center.<\/p>\n
If Megawati bats three for three, even Sukarno in the end
\nmight agree that his daughter had truly forged a revolution.<\/p>\n
The writer is professor of political science at The Ohio State
\nUniversity in the United States of America.<\/p>",
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