Megawati and the military<\/p>\n
By Kusnanto Anggoro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The three most important political and security
\nportfolios in the new Cabinet lineup go to generals: Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono, coordinating minister for political and
\nsecurity affairs; Hari Sabarno, minister of home affairs; and
\nAgum Gumelar, minister of transportation. A civilian, Matori
\nAbdul Djalil, is now in charge of defense. It remains to be seen
\nwhether this signifies a further step toward more democratic
\ncontrol of the armed forces.<\/p>\n
Indeed, by focusing on what has developed after the downfall
\nof Soeharto, few significant trends or programs show a
\ndiscernible path toward civilian supremacy.<\/p>\n
Generals do, however, appear to have accepted the notion of
\nauthority within civilian institutions, while Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) delegates at the legislature played a reasonably
\nconstructive role in the battle between Abdurrahman Wahid and the
\nHouse of Representatives (DPR) over the \"Bruneigate\" and
\n\"Buloggate\" scandals. Nevertheless, contemporary behavior of the
\nmilitary may indicate the opposite.<\/p>\n
Under the government of Abdurrahman, the military questioned
\nthe judgment of a democratically elected President. They rejected
\nthe president's decree on the state of emergency. Depending on
\nwhether moral judgment or real politics was the barometer, their
\nstance could signal either \"commitment to constitutional
\ndemocracy\" or \"insubordination to the Commander in Chief\". The
\nmilitary may have played politics without doing anything.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the military might only have reacted to Abdurrahman's
\nerratic style of leadership. Nonetheless, nothing is certain.
\nCivilian control of the military will still be a contentious
\nissue in future years. In fact, too many issues must be resolved,
\nstarting with human rights abuses, illegitimate use of force and
\nunaccountable governance of the military. These issues are
\nclosely related to the agenda of reform and thus, may even become
\nthe eventual powerful issues needed to boost popular legitimacy
\nfor Megawati.<\/p>\n
Questions abound about the prospect, direction and substance
\nof military reform. The prospect of having to deal with
\ntremendous internal stability, a prerequisite for a stable
\ngovernment, may also, for better or worse, invite the military to
\nplay a role in domestic affairs. Also, Megawati might owe the
\nmilitary for her ascension to the presidency. Many have even
\nspeculated that the military will be pulling the strings of her
\ngovernment from behind the scenes.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, Megawati and the military share a conservative
\noutlook of statehood and statecraft. They are the conservatives,
\nthough not necessarily reactionaries, in the highly needed
\nprogram of reform, including amendment of the Constitution and
\nthe devolution of centralized power to the regions.<\/p>\n
Several retired military and police generals are members of
\nher party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-
\nPerjuangan). Such a close rapport may hinder Megawati in reining
\nin the military.<\/p>\n
On the positive side, however, Megawati had struggled against
\nthe military-backed regime of Soeharto for more than a decade.
\nShe appears to understand that Indonesia needs a strong military,
\nbut that it should remain a defense force used to protect the
\nnation's unity.<\/p>\n
Indeed, she may have no clear idea or practical program for
\nwhat needs to be done with the military, but the recent
\npresidential decree issued to expand an East Timor human rights
\ninvestigation, in which high-ranking officers could be
\nimplicated, may indicate her commitment to dealing with the
\nmilitary.<\/p>\n
In all probability, it is almost certain that Megawati will be
\nmore cautious than Abdurrahman was. Her style will be different
\nfrom his, which involved strategies that relied heavily on
\nintrigue, political maneuvering and divide-and-conquer tactics.
\nHer adherence to \"legal process\" will make it less possible for
\nher to devise dramatic programs and gestures.<\/p>\n
Of course, this should not necessarily signal weakness. Style
\nis no more important than substance. Appropriate style, a
\nsensible approach and reasonable policies are equally necessary.
\nOne only has to look at Abdurrahman's gestures to see that they
\nwere actually hollow -- never actually delivered or only carried
\nout with extreme caution due to political discord. In fact,
\nreform of the TNI during Abdurrahman's leadership, was primarily
\nthe result of internal dynamics within the TNI.<\/p>\n
Perhaps reforming the military is too large a task to be
\nundertaken by Megawati alone. The DPR should play a decisive
\nlegislative role and exercise budgetary control in defense and
\nsecurity affairs.<\/p>\n
Civil society must play a role in advancing public concerns
\nand awareness of the military's excessive role in politics. The
\ndefense ministry should provide a \"window of opportunity\" for
\ninvolvement of civilians in the policy-making process. Most
\nimportantly, the military needs to realize the psyche of
\ntransition from a post-military dominated regime and must
\nrecognize the limits to their sphere of influence.<\/p>\n
That could well be a perilous trajectory. Listening from the
\nback bench of the DPR to the discussion on the State Defense Act
\nlast July, my doubt is not that the military will be able to
\nrevive their glory of past, but that we have no common agenda and
\ncoherent strategy for placing the military under democratic
\ncivilian control.<\/p>\n
Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for
\nStrategic and International Studies and a lecturer in strategic
\nstudies for the postgraduate studies program at the University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>",
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