'May Revolution' in perspective<\/p>\n
By Aboeprijadi Santoso<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Only a few weeks ago, many analysts watching
\npolitical developments in Indonesia tended to think in terms of
\ntwo models of change: the so-called Tiananmen model and the
\n\"People Power\" model. Much to everybody's surprise, the events in
\nJakarta turned out to be neither so bloody as in China, nor as
\nabrupt as in the Philippines, but a quick and largely peaceful
\ntransition.<\/p>\n
Still, the two other models remain relevant as there may be
\nboth hope and worry about things to come.<\/p>\n
The Tiananmen model of June 4, 1989, assumed that some heavy
\nhanded acts of the state's repressive apparatus might ultimately
\nbe found necessary and should be made acceptable internationally
\nto resolve the crisis.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the Chinese authorities effectively managed to
\npreserve the very bases of the state, which were challenged by
\nthe students, and restored stability after changes in the state
\nand party elite and limiting further social and economic damage
\nof the three-month-long revolt.<\/p>\n
Even in terms of its diplomatic consequences -- perhaps the
\nmost damaging effects Beijing had to suffer -- the situation
\nseemed to be controllable after only some five to seven years.<\/p>\n
Thus, at the end of the day, a monolithic regime was able to
\nremain in place because the state found its recipe to restore the
\nstatus quo by bloodily crushing the opposition forces.<\/p>\n
The People Power of the EDSA highways in Manila in 1986, on
\nthe other hand, may be the reverse of the Chinese solution.<\/p>\n
Popular anger against Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship was
\nexpressed at all social levels. Political and spiritual
\nleadership was manifested readily in the persons of the widow of
\nthe assassinated popular senator Benigno Aquino, Corazon Aquino,
\nand Cardinal Jaime Sin.<\/p>\n
Popular opposition platforms were ready and led by the left
\nwing nationalistic front, the National Democratic Front (NDF),
\nand other movements.<\/p>\n
Since decades of Marcos' dictatorship had heavily politicized
\nand radicalized the Filipino society, all one needed to do to
\noust the dictator, so to speak, was merely a few acts on the part
\nof his generals to change sides. This happened at a crucial
\nmoment when General Fidel Ramos did just that.<\/p>\n
However, the People Power movement also opened, and was soon
\nthreatened by, a momentum of continuing military rivalries and
\nrebellions, with the Rambo game of Col. Gringo Honasan being the
\nmost well known example.<\/p>\n
On a broader level, a significant divide occurred as well when
\nthe NDF boycotted Cory Aquino's first general election. Had theNDF not done so, the political landscape of the Philippines would
\nhave been very different.<\/p>\n
Hence the new political game became a democratic one, but
\nelitistic in nature. The EDSA revolution thus ended up in what
\nsome Filipinos called an \"elitistic democracy\".<\/p>\n
In short, while both revolts were clearly supported by most
\nsections of society, the mainly urban-based student revolt in
\nChina was too small and weak to face the state apparatuses.<\/p>\n
In the Philippines, in contrast, the disobedience and revolt
\nwere truly mass based, while the state apparatuses were too weak
\nand divided to effectively act against the social dissonances.<\/p>\n
Jakarta's \"May Revolution\", as the student protests leading to
\nthe fall of Soeharto are now called, contained mixed elements.
\nLike in China, the structural imbalances between the student
\nmovement and state apparatuses in Indonesia were obvious,
\nalthough China, of course, is a party state in which the armed
\nforces are subjugated under the party's leadership.<\/p>\n
Like in China, the student rebellion was actively and
\nimplicitly widely supported by the society, but the state
\nleadership in Indonesia -- both before and after the fall of
\nSoeharto -- suffered from a much more serious crisis than their
\ncounterparts in China.<\/p>\n
Symbolism emanating from student power in Jakarta and Beijing
\nseemed to have created greater trouble and in so doing provoked a
\nquicker act of the state than it did in Manila.<\/p>\n
Like the Chinese, the Indonesian students chose the very locus
\nof the power they challenged for their protest.<\/p>\n
The building complex of the legislature and People's
\nConsultative Assembly (DPR\/MPR) at Senayan and the National
\nMonument were supposed to signify the legitimacy of their protest
\nagainst what they saw as the illegitimate people's representative
\nand governmental bodies (although the planned gathering at the
\nNational Monument was canceled at the eleventh hour). Echoes of
\nJakarta in Pakistan and Zimbabwe emphasize this symbolic effect.<\/p>\n
Much the same way, it was the legitimacy of the \"Heavenly
\nPeace Mandate\" supposedly bestowed upon the government and
\nparliament which the Chinese students challenged by occupying the
\nTiananmen (\"The Great Square of Heavenly Peace\").<\/p>\n
No state government would tolerate such a pointed humiliation
\nbefore the eyes of the world one minute longer than needed.<\/p>\n
Hence, in Beijing, just like in Jakarta, the government was
\ndesperate to act quickly to end the international embarrassment:
\nfive days in the case of Jakarta and few months for Beijing.<\/p>\n
In the Chinese case, however, there was little, if any,
\nspecific moral anger so deep as to precipitate an awakening of
\npopular and middle classes movements like in Manila and Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Certainly, the Chinese students and urban masses' struggle for
\nfreedom was motivated by a general protest against the
\nmonopolistic communist regime.<\/p>\n
But the Tiananmen model lacked the great and specifically
\ndirected moral force manifested in the Philippines and Indonesia
\nfollowing, respectively, Aquino's cold-blooded killing and the
\ntragic death of students at Trisakti University in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
This explains the broader social support the Indonesian and
\nFilipino protest movements gathered. But if China's model lacks specific crucial ingredients, the
\nrole of its armed forces represents a potential threat that could
\nhappen elsewhere in different way or at a later stage.<\/p>\n
Indonesian opposition figure Amien Rais has claimed the reason
\nhe called off the mass gathering on the early morning of May 20th
\nwas that one Indonesian general warned him that \"we too could do
\na Tiananmen blow\".<\/p>\n
If this is true, it may prove to be a significant aspect of
\nJakarta events that could remind us of China's way to end a state
\ncrisis. In the present day context of the post-Soeharto
\ntransition, uneasy and uncertain as it is, this potential also
\nneeds to be considered in the future.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's Armed Forces (ABRI) played a decisive, but very
\ncautious role. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, who as vice chairman of the
\nlegislature gave permission to the students to stage a big
\nprotest at the Senayan DPR\/MPR complex, would not have done it
\nwithout consent from the top. More importantly, at the top level,
\nABRI had during the crucial weeks in mid May \"only\" played a
\nwaiting game and finally agreed to ask Soeharto to step down.<\/p>\n
However, as a big ally and key powerholder during the three
\ndecades of Soeharto rule, it is only natural that ABRI faced an
\ninternal crisis which only intensified as the national leadership
\ncrisis aggravated.<\/p>\n
Salim Said and others pointed out that ABRI had gone through
\nits own crises for some time and started accordingly to do what
\nthey promised: tut wuri handayani, playing a guiding social role
\nfrom the back seat. In the era of globalization -- an era of
\n\"Reform or Die\" -- there seemed to be no other choices for the
\nABRI top brass than to structurally adapt to the new situation.<\/p>\n
Hence, like in the Philippines, the People Power action in
\nJakarta also tended to provoke and intensify the already existing
\nmilitary rivalries. The sudden fall of the commander of the
\nStrategic Army Reserve (Kostrad), Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subijanto,
\nwould seem to strengthen the impression that Jakarta's events
\nalso had their own version of Gringo Honasan. Although the
\nHonasan-like game in Jakarta could not be played out openly, the
\nessential ingredients, like in Manila, were there.<\/p>\n
They are to remain there as long as the Habibie government or
\nits successor fails to restore its both domestic and
\ninternational credibility and ability to guarantee the people's
\nbasic needs.<\/p>\n
\"The most important prerequisite to reform is... efficient
\nand capable national leadership,\" said the ABRI chief of
\nSociopolitical Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
\nrecently. \"I'd like to stress (the importance) of state
\nleadership because it is of paramount importance in the campaign
\nfor reform\" (The Jakarta Post May, 30, 1998).<\/p>\n
At the end of Annus Mirabilis, the European \"Year of Miracles\"
\nof 1989, a great number of students, joined and supported by
\nhuman rights and church affiliated organizations marched in the
\ncity of Leipzig and Dresden chanting \"Wir sind Das Volk,\" (We Are
\nThe (sic!) People).<\/p>\n
It was a famous march of a prodemocracy movement that led to
\nthe fall of Erich Honnecker's communist regime in East Germany.
\nThe call effectively targeted the regime that claimed to be theonly true representative of the people.<\/p>\n
The call for Reformasi Total from Senayan against a regime
\nwhich refused to do real reforms, could have had deeper effects
\n-- not only the fall of Soeharto, but also the real acts to
\nfulfill the needs of the people and to start a democratization
\nproses like in East Germany -- if the \"Jakarta May Revolution\"
\ndoes not suffer too much from Chinese-like structural imbalance
\nand the Philippines' Honasan-like maneuvering.<\/p>\n
Like in Beijing, but unlike in Manila and Leipzig, the
\nprodemocracy movement in Jakarta lacked a solid political
\nplatform to lead the momentum of change because the student
\nprotest was insulated as \"a moral force\" and the politicians were
\ntoo divided. Conversely, the non-governmental and mass
\norganizations were politically too weak as a result of Soeharto's
\nthree decades of repressive policy and its paralyzing impacts.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist based in Amsterdam. He watched
\nclosely the events in Jakarta recently, in Manila in 1986-1987
\nand in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990.<\/p>\n
Window: In the Philippines, in contrast the disobedience and revolt
\nwere truly mass based, while the state apparatuses were too weak
\nand divided to effectively act against the social dissonances.<\/p>",
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