{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1413042,
        "msgid": "mass-media-a-hero-in-the-coverage-of-e-timor-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-11-19 00:00:00",
        "title": "Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor By Veven Sp Wardhana JAKARTA (JP): The view of East Timor from Indonesia reminds one of the local adage \"Far from the eye, but close to the heart,\" twisted parody-like into \"Close to the eye, but far from the heart.\" This is particularly evident from various reports on this region carried in Indonesia's mass media ever since East Timor was integrated with Indonesia in 1975.",
        "content": "<p>Mass media a hero in the coverage of E. Timor<\/p>\n<p>By Veven Sp Wardhana<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): The view of East Timor from Indonesia reminds<br>\none of the local adage &quot;Far from the eye, but close to the<br>\nheart,&quot; twisted parody-like into &quot;Close to the eye, but far from<br>\nthe heart.&quot; This is particularly evident from various reports on<br>\nthis region carried in Indonesia&apos;s mass media ever since East<br>\nTimor was integrated with Indonesia in 1975.<\/p>\n<p>There are many reasons why this has been the case, one of<br>\nwhich is the limited access to the territory and to the<br>\nproindependence groups among Indonesian journalists. Also,<br>\nvarious reports about East Timor have mostly come from the<br>\nIndonesian government or military authorities.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of the referendum, much of the coverage on East<br>\nTimor kept away from problems related to refugees and the post-<br>\nreferendum future of the region. Coverage instead was geared<br>\ntoward the likelihood of a diplomatic war between the Indonesian<br>\nand Australian governments -- complete with reports on<br>\ndemonstrations staged by Indonesians against Interfet (the<br>\nInternational Force in East Timor), burning of Australian flags<br>\nand demonstrations in front of the Australian embassy.<\/p>\n<p>Some quarters stressed nationalism. It was aroused, among<br>\nother things, by the shooting of a member of the police mobile<br>\nbrigade by Interfet troops in Mota Ain, the border area between<br>\nEast Timor and East Nusa Tenggara and the reported burning alive<br>\nof prointegration militia by Interfet close to Dili&apos;s seaport,<br>\nand also by emphasizing that most members of Interfet, including<br>\nits commander-in-chief, were Australians.<\/p>\n<p>A little further back, before the referendum and the<br>\nreferendum proper, allegations that the United Nations Mission in<br>\nEast Timor (Unamet) had practiced fraud and discrimination in the<br>\ndirect ballot had strengthened the conviction that Indonesian<br>\nnationalism had actually been dallied with by foreign powers.<\/p>\n<p>The question is: Were the facts presented by the media<br>\ncorrect? Many quarters, for example, displayed near conviction in<br>\nthe case of the burning alive of some prointegration militia<br>\ndespite the denial made by Maj.Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, then the<br>\ncommander in East Timor following the announcement of martial law<br>\nin the territory.<\/p>\n<p>His denial did not receive wide coverage. As far as the denial<br>\nwas not reported, the reality accepted by the public was that the<br>\nburning actually occurred.<\/p>\n<p>In the same way, regarding the alleged discrimination<br>\npracticed by Unamet, on Sept. 6, an electoral session was held in<br>\nDili to clarify the protests regarding allegations of fraud, in<br>\nwhich they were unable to be proved. This did not gain much<br>\ncoverage either; the opinion shaped was that Unamet and the<br>\nUnited Nations ignored the protests, leading to the arrogant<br>\nimage of the international institutions.<\/p>\n<p>There are other facts that have not been reported, or have<br>\nbeen removed from reports. Examples include the lack of reporting<br>\non the number of Interfet troops, said to be dominated by<br>\nAustralians, and also about Interfet itself.<\/p>\n<p>The domination of Australians was inevitable considering that<br>\nlogistics requirements could be fulfilled only by the Australian<br>\nside. This would be the better explanation than the suggested<br>\n&quot;unheeding&quot; attitude of the United Nations to Indonesia&apos;s<br>\nobjection of having Interfet led and dominated by Australians.<\/p>\n<p>Australian dominance in Interfet should also be understood in<br>\nthe light of inevitability on the part of the United Nations to<br>\nensure that Interfet would not fall into the trap of showing<br>\n&quot;solidarity&quot; ala ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian<br>\nNations, toward Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>The Indonesian political elite were quoted as stating their<br>\nhopes that most Interfet members should come from Southeast Asia,<br>\nand should be led by Asians, presuming officers from the region<br>\nwould &quot;better understand the Indonesian psychology.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>This harked of similar phrases such as &quot;a democracy particular<br>\nto Indonesia,&quot; which has never solved problems.<\/p>\n<p>The interest of the UN, which was not described in the mass<br>\nmedia, reduced &quot;objectiveness&quot; in viewing the Interfet issue.<br>\nLittle understanding was given to the public that Interfet<br>\nsoldiers were indeed authorized to pursue militias who they were<br>\nassigned to disarm. Pointing guns at disarmed civilians<br>\noverpowered on the roads was inevitable for combat-ready troops.<\/p>\n<p>The background given to the violence following the ballot in<br>\nEast Timor was largely limited to the explanation that it<br>\nreflected fury among prointegration militia against Unamet after<br>\ntheir loss in the direct ballot of Aug. 30. This was also<br>\nconveyed in the analysis of military analyst Salim Said in a<br>\nprivate television broadcast.<\/p>\n<p>Hardly any background was provided about who the Falintil took<br>\nup arms against -- some members of the media wrote that<br>\nFalintil&apos;s enemy was the Indonesian Military but a larger portion<br>\nof coverage was on demands that Falintil should also lay down<br>\ntheir arms just like the prointegration militias. Such demands<br>\nwere therefore off the mark, leading to allegations that Interfet<br>\nwas discriminatory to the favor of Falintil.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, during the Soeharto regime, there was a missing link<br>\nin the history of East Timor. The Soeharto administration and the<br>\nmilitary used to argue that this former Portuguese colony was<br>\ngeographically close and at the same time close at heart. The<br>\ndiscourse which developed placed Portugal as an antagonist,<br>\nsimilar to the way Indonesian history has placed the Dutch<br>\ncolonial rulers, the Japanese occupational troops and the<br>\nIndonesian Communist Party. Those rejecting integration were also<br>\nconsidered antagonists: Jose Alexandre &quot;Xanana&quot; Gusmao, Jose<br>\nRamos Horta, the proindependence organization CNRT, Falintil,<br>\nFretilin and so forth.<\/p>\n<p>Those taking sides with the proindependence groups were also<br>\nregarded as adversaries, with the simple label of<br>\nantinationalists. Unfortunately, the mass media also carried this<br>\ndiscourse.<\/p>\n<p>The reproduction of this military discourse was also seen from<br>\nthe choice of diction in reporting, for example, the shooting of<br>\na member of the police mobile brigade. Almost all television<br>\nmedia here narrated the incident as &quot;shooting of an Indonesian<br>\nsoldier&quot;, &quot;Interfet attacks Indonesian troops&quot;, &quot;Interfet attack<br>\nin Indonesia&apos;s territory&quot;, &quot;Interfet pursues militia&quot; and<br>\n&quot;Interfet kills Mobile Brigade member.&quot; In the print media, among<br>\nothers the Kompas daily and Tempo weekly, the incident was<br>\ndescribed differently, namely &quot;armed contact&quot; or &quot;armed<br>\nconflict&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>An attack is obviously different from armed contact. In the<br>\nformer version, Interfet is pictured as an aggressor -- on a par<br>\nwith the term chosen by then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas:<br>\ntransgression. From the discourse reproduced by the media,<br>\nparticularly the electronic media, the press not only did away<br>\nwith &quot;covering both sides,&quot; but they were also coopted to place<br>\nthemselves as protagonists, or heroes, the role played by the<br>\nSoeharto regime and the Indonesian Military.<\/p>\n<p>The experience, shared by Indonesians condemning Australia and<br>\nInterfet, brings to mind a hero which may be symbolized as<br>\nKumbokarno, a shadow puppet figure in the Ramayana epic story.<\/p>\n<p>Kumbokarno, so the story goes, does his utmost to defend<br>\nBurisrawa, his elder brother, who has kidnapped Sinta, Rama&apos;s<br>\nwife, and taken her hostage. Kumbokarno may be compared with his<br>\nother brother, Wibisono, who sides with Rama for the sake of<br>\ntruth. In a simple sentence, Kumbokarno&apos;s philosophy is &quot;right or<br>\nwrong is my country&quot;, while Wibisono stresses &quot;right or wrong is<br>\nright or wrong.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately, &quot;Kumbokarnoism&quot; is found not only in Indonesia<br>\nbut also in the foreign media -- which is also guilty of<br>\nsimplification, by changing the role of the antagonist with that<br>\nof the protagonist and the other way round.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is coordinator of the Media Watch Program of the<br>\nInstitute of Studies on the Free Flow of Information, and also<br>\nworks for PT Gramedia Majalah in Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>Window: ...the press not only did away with &quot;covering both sides,&quot;<br>\nbut they were also coopted to place themselves as protagonists,<br>\nor heroes, the role played by the Soeharto regime and the<br>\nIndonesian Military.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/mass-media-a-hero-in-the-coverage-of-e-timor-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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