Martial law in Aceh serves military well<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The government has prioritized the extension of martial law
\nover an evaluation of achievements made in the last six months.
\nOne could ask in jest: What party would most potentially be in a
\nstate of emergency after Nov. 19, 2003? Would it be Aceh or
\nIndonesia, or perhaps the military, in connection with the
\nbehavior of many of its personnel during the military operation?<\/p>\n
The government arbitrarily produced a presidential decree on
\nmartial law in Aceh but has failed to follow it up with policies
\nto solve the problem. It has, instead, decided to extend martial
\nlaw, based only on the opinion of legislators and demands
\nreportedly made by mobilized masses.<\/p>\n
The government has virtually ignored any considerations
\nrelated to the total cost that the military operation has
\nincurred, as well as the political, economic and humanitarian
\nrisks entailed for Aceh and also for Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Coordinating Minister for Political and Social Affairs Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono said the above decision was made in the light
\nof a change in the guerrilla strategy adopted by the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM).<\/p>\n
Lt. Gen. (ret) Kiki Syahnakri, former deputy army chief of
\nstaff, has also argued that this extension is necessary "to
\nmaintain the momentum of victory." How significant is this
\nvictory? Does it include controlling the masses for military
\npurposes? Unless well managed, a successful military operation
\nunder martial law would pose a threat from either the armed power
\nof GAM or the masses, similar to what happened after the status
\nof Aceh as a military operation region was lifted on Aug. 7,
\n1998. A desire to avenge the worst impacts of the operation, for
\nexample, turned hundreds of young people into GAM supporters.<\/p>\n
Presidential Decree No. 28\/2003 was produced as a result of a
\nseries of actions to transform an amicable solution to a conflict
\nto one that resorts to violence, as reflected in the collapse of
\nthe agreement between the government and GAM in December 2002,
\nand the subsequent imposition of martial law.<\/p>\n
During the imposition, the PDMD (local martial law
\nadministration) may be construed as a military junta of sorts in
\nNanggroe Aceh Darussalam.<\/p>\n
The main problem is not whether the PDMD has submitted its
\naccountability report to Jakarta, the central martial law
\nadministrator (PDMP). It is whether the officials involved in
\nPDMP -- Cabinet ministers, chief of the State Intelligence Agency
\n(BIN) and the chiefs of staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy --
\nhave submitted their respective reports.<\/p>\n
What are the positions of the regional police chief and the
\nchief of the operational executive command within the structure
\nof the central martial law administration? We have yet to have
\nany public explanation about this, let alone an accountability
\nreport about the imposition of martial law from the parties that
\nlent their political support to it, such as legislators.<\/p>\n
The twin targets of troop deployment are to stop GAM's attempt
\nto intensify terrorist acts, and to minimize GAM's military
\npower. According to the government, only 25 percent of GAM's
\nmilitary power has been destroyed.<\/p>\n
In law enforcement, there are two important achievements.
\nFirst, the police have concluded 844 official reports of
\ninvestigation. Trials in 375 cases have been completed and
\nsentences have been handed down to various suspects, ranging from
\nthose accused of giving rice to GAM members to those serving as
\nnegotiators (noncombatants).<\/p>\n
Second, the military has managed to transform instances of
\nhuman rights violations into criminal offenses (rape) and into
\ncases involving nondisciplinary acts (violence against
\ncivilians). Law enforcement has been applied largely to Acehnese
\nnoncombatants and lay people (relatives of GAM personnel); this
\nhas served to obscure the actual situation on the ground, in
\nwhich human rights have been seriously violated.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile the political structure stipulated in the law on
\nspecial autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam has been completely
\nignored. Jakarta has instead decided to keep regents and
\nmunicipality heads in office, although their terms of office have
\nexpired. The martial law administration has taken over the powers
\nof civilian district heads and given them to military officers.<\/p>\n
The martial law administration has even worked in cooperation
\nwith the province's leadership, which is known to be corrupt. The
\nuse of the state and provincial budget in Aceh is almost without
\ntransparency. This could bring down the credibility of the
\ncentral and local martial law administrations. The martial law
\nand military operations thus have nil accountability.<\/p>\n
In general, the six-month military operation, which has seen
\nthe deployment of some 50,000 troops at a cost of some Rp 6
\ntrillion, has reached only 25 percent of the target. To be able
\nto achieve complete success within the same period of time, the
\ngovernment would have to deploy some 200,000 troops at a cost of
\nabout Rp 24 trillion, but then the number of civilian casualties
\nwould likely be fourfold.<\/p>\n
The success rate might drop if we took into account the
\neconomic and humanitarian cost that Indonesia and Aceh would have
\nto sustain. Scores of Indonesians now live in poverty as they
\nhave lost their livelihoods and have been forced to become
\nrefugees.<\/p>\n
The success rate might drop even further, given the cultural
\ncost (in relation to thousands of children being deprived of
\nproper school facilities) and the cost of allowing the collapse
\nof a civilian political structure brought about by the 1998
\nreform movement.<\/p>\n
The success of the military operation is thus limited to the
\ncapability of mobilizing people, first, to justify the collapse
\nof the December agreement; second, to strengthen the political
\nlegitimacy of the military operations and third, to mobilize the
\nmasses to support the continued military operations.<\/p>\n
There are thus two hypotheses on why martial law has been
\nextended. First, the extension would ensure that the Acehnese
\nwould remain in a state of emergency. They would continue to live
\nin uncertainty amid heightened terror, intensified kidnapping and
\nshock therapy, all forming part of intelligence operations and
\nwarfare. In addition, they could always be mobilized to serve the
\ngoal of a particular political party and benefit the military in
\nthe upcoming general elections.<\/p>\n
Second, if martial law were not extended, it would be the
\nmilitary that would be in a state of emergency, as it would have
\nto brace itself against condemnation from victims of martial law
\nand criticism from human rights workers both at home and abroad.<\/p>\n
The TNI would thus lose its bargaining power in the national
\npolitical arena. Thus, without martial law and its associated
\nmilitary operation, the TNI would lack leverage for its political
\nmaneuvers.<\/p>",
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