Managing the Asia-Pacific quadrangle<\/p>\n
The sixth informal annual workshop on Managing Potential
\nConflicts in the South China Sea is scheduled to open in the East
\nKalimantan city of Balikpapan today. Noted political scientist
\nJuwono Sudarsono looks at the issue from a geo-political
\nperspective.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): China, Russia, Japan and the United States
\nconstitute the evolving strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific
\nregion. Within this political, economic and military nexus lies
\nthe most promising post-Cold War economic phenomenon as well as
\nthe most intractable remnant of Cold War rivalry.<\/p>\n
More than 40 percent of the world's trade is conducted in and
\nthrough the region. Intra-Pacific trade increases by 15 percent
\nannually. At the same time, the Oct. 23, 1994, Agreed Framework
\non Korea attests to the reality that the overall politico-
\nsecurity dimension has a direct bearing on the region's future
\ngrowth.<\/p>\n
The importance of the strategic quadrangle is only partially
\nreflected by the current assessments being undertaken by the four
\nmajor powers. The United States and Russia continue to cooperate
\nin joint conventional military exercises as part of confidence
\nand security-building measures in the post-Cold War era.
\nConfidence-building between the two major nuclear powers
\nconstitutes an important follow-through to the strategic arms
\nreduction agreement reached five years ago.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region is gearing up to
\nthe gradual but perceptible rise in the political and military
\nimportance of Japan and China. A delicate balance of interests is
\nevolving within the strategic quadrangle as these two Asian
\npowers reposition themselves to an increasingly Asian-centered
\nsecurity environment. The new environments in Northeast Asia and
\nthe South China Sea will be profoundly affected by the
\nreassessment of the major powers' strategic intent, particularly
\nwith regard to maritime policy and naval strategy.<\/p>\n
For Russia and United States, the main concern centers on
\nadjusting strategy from one that was aimed at naval engagement
\nbased on global competition in the high seas to one that focuses
\non coastal, near-shore and littoral region conflicts. For their
\npart, Japan and China are aiming to enhance their political and
\nmilitary influence through increased force modernization and
\nnaval capability to move beyond coastal defense.<\/p>\n
These moves are made more acute by competition for sea-based
\nresources and burgeoning off-shore markets across the Asia
\nPacific economies. China's continued participation in the current
\n(Oct. 10-13) Balikpapan workshop on managing conflict in the
\nSouth China Sea is a welcome indication of its commitment to
\nexplore solutions based on broad agreements of \"rules of the
\nroad\" as stipulated in the 1982 Law of the Sea rather than on
\nunilateral claims of territorial jurisdiction.<\/p>\n
The workshop on the South China Sea, though not a negotiating
\nforum, remains of considerable importance. It reaffirms the
\nviability of an informal intra-Pacific dialog, which, by chance,
\ncomplements the defused situation in Northeast Asia arising from
\nthe implementation of the Agreed Framework on Korea.<\/p>\n
The rapid rise in intra-Asia-Pacific trade and investments has
\nunderscored the importance of seaborne commerce and its
\nimplications on naval strategy, tactics and the procurement of
\nweapons systems. Worldwide, maritime commerce accounts for over
\n80 percent of trade among nations, exceeding 3.6 billion tons a
\nyear. Fishing is likewise concentrated in coastal waters and
\nreached 100 million metric tons in 1992-93. The creation of
\n200-mile exclusive economic zones has not been accompanied by
\nincreased attention to the depletion of fishstocks and damage to
\nthe environment.<\/p>\n
Given the renewed attention to contemporary ocean issues
\narising from competition for energy resources and market access,
\nit would be appropriate for an Asia-Pacific multilateral advisory
\ncommittee to be drawn from all sectors of the ocean industry.
\nThis would include representatives from coastal and distant-water
\nfishing, processing industries, off-shore oil and gas interests,
\nthe shipping industry and the maritime science community, all of
\nwhom would map out further guidelines and possible benchmarks.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN states can play an important role in testing such
\ninformal devices which might, depending on the circumstances,
\nlater be transformed into a full-fledged negotiating forum on
\njoint authority exploration.<\/p>\n
The United States, Russia, Japan and China must commit
\nthemselves to a broader array of intersecting peacetime roles:
\nstrategic presence, sea control, crisis response, sea-lift
\ncapability and counter-narcotics operations. The United States'
\nwillingness to secure Japan's economic lifeline is a positive
\nindication that common objectives could be achieved through the
\nrecognition of a strategic agreement among all the powers
\nconcerned.<\/p>\n
Adherence to the Law of the Sea framework is but one step in
\nthe continuous effort to manage political, economic and security
\narrangements affecting the delicate but crucial strategic
\nquadrangle among the major powers.<\/p>\n
The writer is Vice Governor of Lemhannas, the National Resilience
\nInstitute, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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