M. Riefqi Muna<\/p>\n
Member, Supervisory Group
\nGlobal Facilitation Network for
\nSecurity Sector Reform (GFN-SSR)
\nriefqi@gmx.net
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Indonesia is the largest maritime or archipelagic state in the
\nworld. The legal framework recognizing this status follows
\nIndonesia's ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
\nLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.<\/p>\n
UNCLOS provided a legal foundation for Indonesia to exercise
\nits sovereignty over its entire, internationally recognized
\nterritory. Before the ratification we did not have fixed borders
\nexcept for the islands scattering from Sabang, in Aceh, to
\nMerauke, in Papua.<\/p>\n
That the country is an archipelagic state with thousands of
\nislands should have direct implication on its defense policy. Yet
\nour defense system is based on the principle of continental
\ndefense, called the Major Islands Defense System (Sistem
\nPertahanan Pulau Besar), considered by many to be the best
\napproach for our defense. Yet the land-based strategy has been
\ncontaminated by the economic adventures of the army.<\/p>\n
The major islands defense system is believed to be greatly
\ninfluenced by the classic or \"traditional\" land-warfare
\nprinciple, which relies on guerrilla activities, dating back to
\nthe struggle for independence since the 1940s. This is totally
\nincompatible with the promotion of a professional military
\norientation, which aims to prevent even a single enemy
\ntrespassing our soil.<\/p>\n
Continuing the land-based system is also outdated from the
\nview of what is called the revolution in military affairs. The
\ntheory of war itself is changing -- while officers from the air
\nforce or navy do not have courage to criticize the army
\ndomination. The objectives and orientation of the new system
\nshould be changed by leaving behind the army's hegemony over the
\ncountry's political sphere.<\/p>\n
In early 2002 the House of Representatives (DPR) passed into
\nLaw No. 3\/2002 on National Defense. Article 3 of the Law states,
\n\"The defense policy has to consider the geographical reality that
\nIndonesia is an archipelagic state\".<\/p>\n
This article should become the legal basis for the future
\ndefense system, which comprises the doctrine on national defense
\nand the organization of the defense forces. The defense system
\nmust be based on proper defense requirements, instead of mere
\nhistorical romanticism of the revolutionary period.<\/p>\n
The nation's history will influence the culture relating to
\nstrategy. Any military doctrine should recognize such a culture,
\nand that it is subject to revision. History is a matter of fact,
\nnot an entitlement; a military doctrine is not static and is not
\nan ideology. The doctrine is subject to evaluation and revision
\nin the face of the need to adapt to a new international or
\ndomestic environment, which includes the technological side.<\/p>\n
The law on national defense is thus a wake-up call to our
\nstrategic planners. A defense policy of any state must consider
\nthe type, nature and the degree of threats. This condition will
\nalso influence the doctrine at all levels, from the combined
\noperational doctrine to the doctrine of each unit in the defense
\napparatus.<\/p>\n
Further, the defense posture and structure should always be
\nadapted to possible changes in the security environment. Yet the
\nstrategic thinking during the New Order period still has a strong
\ninfluence over the culture and mentality of top military
\nofficers.<\/p>\n
The development of a proper defense system that gives more
\nattention to the navy and air force still faces resistance
\nparticularly from the army, whose officers say that our major
\nthreats are still internal threats. They also argue that the navy
\nand air force require expensive equipment.<\/p>\n
This is true, while it still shows the remaining dominance of
\nthe army over the blue-print for our defense policy. This year
\nthe army proposed a further increase of soldiers, which entirely
\ncontradicts our actual defense needs.<\/p>\n
Instead of more troops we need more rapid deployment forces
\n(RDF) that are mobile and ready to be deployed across the
\narchipelago whenever needed.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the world political context is changing and so is
\nthat of Indonesia. The types of threats are proliferating, beyond
\nclassical military duties. Officers are now expected to pay close
\nattention and be professional in regards to human rights. They
\nrepresent the state; soldiers must hence protect all Indonesians,
\nnot only the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<\/p>\n
Human security therefore cannot be violated at the expense of
\n\"state security\" -- as is still understood by many civilians as
\nwell as military officers. Changing that mentality, in many cases
\nthat the people are the enemy, is perhaps the hardest task in
\nreforming the armed forces.<\/p>\n
We now lack adequate power and capability to encounter major
\nthreats at sea. First, the sea-based threats are mostly of
\ntransnational security threats -- such as individual smugglers
\nand terrorists. Secondly, our navy has very limited equipment,
\neven in guarding our territorial boundaries. Our waters are a
\nhaven for foreign illegal fishing -- leading to an estimated loss
\nof US$3.5 billion this year so far due to illegal fishing. Worse,
\nair surveillance is lacking.<\/p>\n
The threat of piracy has also increased and we have the
\nworld's most sea crimes. The International Maritime Bureau
\nreported that from 285 cases of piracy this year, 117 were
\ncommitted in Indonesian waters.<\/p>\n
Other rampant crimes in our waters are illegal migration, drug
\ntrafficking, and smuggling of small arms and other commodities.<\/p>\n
The Ministry of Defense is now formulating three major reports
\nfor our defense policy. The first is the Defense White Paper, a
\nshort-term policy on our defense for the next two years.
\nSecondly, the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) is being prepared,
\naimed to prepare Indonesia's defense forces for the next 10 to 15
\nyears.<\/p>\n
Third, the ministry will review the draft of the bill on the
\nTNI to replace the outdated Law No. 1998.<\/p>\n
The SDR is the most crucial and basic policy review regarding
\nIndonesia's defense. It will evaluate in detail our current
\npolicy and will take into account threat scenarios and normative
\ncalculations for defense planning. The SDR will have to paint a
\nbroad picture of the identity of the maritime state in its
\ndefense policy. The review will also recognize that the economic
\nburden to develop sea potential and air power is the most crucial
\ncompared to developing other areas of defense.<\/p>\n
However, the approach has to be directed not to enhance the
\ndeployment of warships, but rather the basic need for our navy to
\nguard our territory. High speed patrol boats could better secure
\nour Exclusive Economic Zone.<\/p>\n
Additionally, our air force must be developed modestly.
\nIndonesia's security will rely more on naval and air power. The
\nair power could help the navy and army in surveillance. We do not
\nneed dozens of air-attack squadrons such as F-16s or even more
\nsophisticated fighters. Indonesia needs more C-130 cargo and
\ntroop carriers to deploy our troops and police personnel whenever
\nand wherever needed in a very short time. Better surveillance
\ntechnology will help the navy patrol the boundaries.<\/p>\n
Indonesia remains vulnerable to communal conflicts and
\nseparatism. The orientation of the army's operation needs to be
\nchanged, an effort which should refer to the government
\nagreements with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).<\/p>\n
The use of force which is increasingly unpopular must become
\nthe last resort and must be carried out through a political
\ndecision.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is also a member of the international community that
\nmust guard global peace through peacekeeping missions.
\nConsequently, Indonesia should develop special training in
\npeacekeeping operations especially for its army. Those with good
\nskills, a high level of professionalism and good command of
\nEnglish could be standing forces for missions of the United
\nNations.<\/p>\n
Those lacking necessary language skills could serve in
\nmilitary operations other than wars such as humanitarian
\nassistance, search and rescue, and other models of civic mission.<\/p>\n
Proper reform of a defense system requires time and serious
\ncooperation between the army, air force and navy -- and indeed
\nthe civilian authority who must determine the relevant policies.<\/p>\n
The writer is also Executive Director of The Ridep Institute, and
\na researcher at the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI),
\nJakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/m-riefqi-muna-1447899208",
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