Low-cost military engagement for Aceh settlement sought<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
\niman@thejakartapost.com<\/p>\n
By the time this newspaper reaches readers on Monday, the two-
\nweek deadline set by the government for the separatist Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) to accept special autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh
\nDarussalam province and voluntarily disarm also ends.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian government's chief negotiator for the
\nsettlement of the Aceh conflict, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, has
\nindeed argued that as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
\n(COHA) provides for a five-month period during which the
\nplacement of arms is to be accomplished, and theoretically the
\ngovernment should wait until after July 9 before it can be
\njustified in carrying out a military operation in the province.<\/p>\n
But as the government has publicly given the go-ahead for a
\nmilitary campaign, it is highly improbable that the planned
\nmilitary operation to quell the separatist movement in
\nIndonesia's easternmost province immediately after the May 12
\ndeadline passes will be canceled.<\/p>\n
It is therefore hardly possible to ask the government, or in
\nthis case, the Indonesian Military (TNI), which has lost patience
\nwith dialog and with pursuing a peaceful settlement to the Aceh
\nissue, to cancel the attacks on the separatist movement's bases.<\/p>\n
The only remaining possible thing to do is ask whether the
\ngovernment can avoid a full-scale military operation, but instead
\nconduct a limited one in Aceh, considering that the country does
\nnot have such a vast amount of money to finance a military
\noperation, including post-operation restoration and
\nrehabilitation programs.<\/p>\n
A rough budget calculation for a conventional military
\noperation, involving 50,000 troops plus several jet fighters and
\nother combat equipment, and the cost of subsequent restoration
\nprograms in the province could reach hundreds of billions of
\nrupiah. The required budget for the planned military operation
\nwould be huge, especially when the whole military campaign could
\ntake months to complete.<\/p>\n
There are some unexplained reasons for the TNI to hastily
\ndeploy 50,000 troops and immediately start the military campaign
\nin Aceh.<\/p>\n
There remains questions of why the TNI has readied two F-16
\nand four Hawk-200 jet fighters, besides other military aircraft,
\nfor the military operation. It is difficult to understand the
\nlogic behind using jet fighters to quell GAM, which according to
\nthe TNI has 5,000 members.<\/p>\n
Is it because the TNI anticipates possible external threats to
\nthe province in the wake of the military campaign?<\/p>\n
It is also questionable why the TNI has to deploy the Navy's
\nelite troops, the marines, and the Air Force's elite Paskhas
\ntroops to Aceh as they are not familiar with land combat.<\/p>\n
Speaking about their specialties, both the marines and Paskhas
\nhave been trained for combat in their respective specific fields
\n-- respectively securing and taking control of sea areas and
\nsecuring and taking control of air space -- and not for land
\ncombat, which is what the Army's Strategic Reserves Command
\n(Kostrad) and Special Forces (Kopassus) are for.<\/p>\n
A similar question is whether both the marines and Paskhas
\ntroops are really being deployed to secure the water and air
\nspace surrounding the province from possible external threat.<\/p>\n
Military presence in Aceh is relatively as old as the Republic
\nof Indonesia itself.<\/p>\n
So, it is not understandable if the military does not know
\nevery inch of Aceh land, including GAM strongholds and bases, as
\nwell as the hiding places of its leaders.<\/p>\n
It would save much money if the TNI launched a limited
\noperation focusing on only seizing and taking control of GAM
\nstrongholds and bases, as well as \"capturing\" its top leader and
\nregional leaders.<\/p>\n
In the majority of battles, once the key leaders are captured
\nor killed, the war soon comes to an end as their followers'
\nresistance ebbs in the absence of their leaders.<\/p>\n
A limited operation would not need as many as 50,000 troops
\nand would avoid the use of a vast sum of money if compared with
\nthe amount needed for a conventional military operation.<\/p>\n
And a conventional military operation, including possible air
\nstrikes if the jet fighters are used to attack GAM guerrillas,
\nwould be sure to more claim civilian lives than a limited
\noperation.<\/p>\n
One recent example of this is when many civilians were killed
\nduring air strikes at the beginning of the Iraq war,
\ndespite the sophisticated weaponry and detection systems of the
\nU.S.-led allied forces.<\/p>\n
Here at home, the TNI does not have the sophisticated weaponry
\nand detection systems of the U.S. and its allies and the
\npossibility of civilian casualties is far greater.<\/p>\n
An obvious lesson from the Iraq war is that the United States
\nand Britain, as the initiators of the war, have to bear the
\nresponsibility of restoring peace and, most of all, reviving the
\nwar-battered Iraqi economy.<\/p>\n
As for the Aceh case, it will be the Indonesian government
\nthat will have to restore security and peace after the military
\ncampaign, as well as revive the province's ruined economy.<\/p>\n
The question will then be whether the government or the state
\nhas ample money to pay for all the damage and all the post-attack
\nexpenditures.<\/p>\n
Or, perhaps the government can save a huge amount of funds and
\nprevent a great number of civilian casualties by avoiding a
\nconventional military operation and instead stage a limited one.<\/p>",
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