Looking toward a transatlantic relationship meltdown<\/p>\n
Bantarto Bandoro, Editor 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
\nCentre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
\nbandoro@csis.or.id<\/p>\n
The emergency summit in Azore, Portugal, on Sunday between the
\nU.S. president and the British and Spanish prime ministers
\nproduced a 24-hour deadline for the United Nations to enforce its
\nown Iraq disarmament resolution or accept war within days. Bush's
\nstatement that \"the U.S. will go to war with or without the help
\nof the UN\" has become reality, as the diplomatic process to avert
\nwar ended in a deadlock.<\/p>\n
The diplomatic process was considered over when the French
\ndeclared it would veto any new UN resolution.<\/p>\n
It is not only a war game that the world community is
\nbeginning to witness, but also a deeper fracture in the
\nrelationship between the U.S. and its European allies -- which
\nhas become more evident since last year when the two sides tabled
\nstrategies on how to resolve the Iraq issue.<\/p>\n
As war became more imminent, Britain accused France of
\n\"poisoning\" the diplomatic process at the UN, saying the actions
\nof the French had made it more difficult to avoid war. The French
\nand Germans had organized the opposition to U.S. efforts to bring
\nthe current crisis to a definitive conclusion.<\/p>\n
Thus, postwar Iraq will witness a moment when the U.S. and its
\nEuropean allies will need to overcome further frictions in their
\ntransatlantic relationship. Foreign policy will then be the next
\nfront the U.S. and its European allies will have to face to
\nprevent further disarray in transatlantic relations.<\/p>\n
The reluctance of the Germans and French to support the U.S.
\nmilitary approach to Iraq has drawn bitter criticism from the
\nU.S. and some of its European partners.<\/p>\n
During the diplomatic process, France in particular was seen
\nas the most resistant to the U.S. war policy. Paris lobbied the
\nnonpermanent members of the Security Council against the Anglo-
\nAmerican second resolution and declared its willingness to veto
\nthat resolution.<\/p>\n
France also sought to block NATO assistance to one of its own
\nmembers, Turkey, forcing the other members of that organization
\nto neutralize France's obstructionism by moving to an alternate
\nvenue.<\/p>\n
Washington and Paris differ on a number of issues, such as
\nglobal warming and the missile defense system. Their differences
\non certain issues have led them to view their respective
\ninternational positions from their own standpoints.<\/p>\n
Being \"old Europe\", French opposition to the U.S. war approach
\nis simply meant to prevent an enlarged Europe from being
\npolitically dominated by U.S. interests.<\/p>\n
It is highly likely that postwar Iraq will see further
\ndeterioration in U.S.-French bilateral relations. Thus, the
\ndaunting challenges for U.S. policymakers after the war will
\ninclude rebuilding U.S. trust relations with Europe, particularly
\nFrance.<\/p>\n
The war in Iraq will not automatically outdate the European
\npreference of multilateralism in resolving international
\nproblems. Europe will perhaps say no to U.S. requests for an
\nincrease in European armaments in case of a future crisis like
\nthe current one. Support for multilateralism in Europe will
\nbecome stronger, thus rebuffing the unilateral approach the U.S.
\nis likely to adopt in the future.<\/p>\n
The immediate impact of war will be a serious rift between
\nEurope and the U.S. The already unequal relationship between the
\ntwo will become more transparent, and perhaps they will require
\nmore time to put their transatlantic relations back on the right
\ntrack. As a result of the war, Europe will demand a more equal
\npartnership with the U.S.<\/p>\n
Obviously, equalization is more developed in some spheres than
\nin others. In particular, the U.S. remains unchallenged as a
\nmilitary superpower. But perhaps it would be foolish to expect
\neven in a crisis of this magnitude to deflect such powerful
\ntrends. Rather, the challenge will be to harness these trends
\nconstructively. A U.S.-Europe coalition cannot be sustained
\nwithout a more equal transatlantic relationship.<\/p>\n
Iraq after the war will see Europe enjoying some competitive
\nadvantage at the regional and global levels as transatlantic
\nequalization proceeds. The EU will operate in a multilateral
\nfashion based on the rule of law. Its chosen method of governance
\nwill be more in harmony with a changing world than hard-nosed
\nmilitary unilateralism. European leaders will be more assertive
\nabout these methods and interests should the U.S., in the future,
\nagain be tempted to insist on hegemonic multilateralism.<\/p>\n
With the beginning of the war, and the crisis that will ensue
\nover the role and position of the UN, it should be clear that it
\nis the U.S. that has insisted that it will not be bound by the
\nUN, that has undermined the UN's credibility and chosen the path
\nof unilateralism. This will be extremely damaging to the UN's
\ncredibility and in the long run also for transatlantic relations.<\/p>",
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