Lobbying whoever to preserve power<\/p>\n
Political lobbying is now crisscrossing through political
\nparties and even bypassing them, such as through the alignment of
\nrepresentatives of Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sumatra and Kalimantan.
\nSurabaya-based sociologist Daniel Sparingga helps to throw some
\nlight on this bewildering political landscape.<\/p>\n
Question: Ahead of the special session of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR), President Abdurrahman Wahid has been
\nlobbying all kinds or parties, including the caucus of those
\nclaiming to represent eastern Indonesia (Irian, Maluku, Sulawesi,
\nKalimantan), known as the Iramasuka group. Your comment?<\/p>\n
Answer: Iramasuka is really a coalition built on a collective
\nawareness based on geographical and anthropological similarities,
\ngiven the ethnic sentiments involved. In short, they are from the
\n\"outer Java islands\" in the \"Java\/non-Java\" dichotomy.<\/p>\n
Politically, such a coalition does not have an adequately
\nstrong interest because the political party basis is often more
\ndominant. Political parties are, therefore, still a threat to
\ngroups such as Iramasuka in political bargaining.<\/p>\n
So there would clearly be a problem of political legitimacy if
\na group of people claimed to represent the Iramasuka regions and
\nother areas in Eastern Indonesia.<\/p>\n
You mean there would be many protests disturbing negotiations?<\/p>\n
Yes. If they enter negotiations with the President this would
\nnot easily lead to a guarantee of clear cut results, even though
\n(the Iramasuka coalition) could show strength in certain issues.<\/p>\n
When negotiations reach a stage of who gets what, their
\npresence becomes significant. This group has been much criticized
\nbecause of its intense orientation toward (high ranking)
\npositions. It's being very political in terms of gaining power,
\nas compared to their (demonstrated) commitment to developing the
\neastern regions.<\/p>\n
So results are quite possible if positions are being offered
\nin negotiations.<\/p>\n
So would lobbying the Iramasuka group be effective?<\/p>\n
It's rather hard to predict its effectiveness in maintaining
\nthe position of the President by the time of the special session
\nbecause ... political parties are still strong.<\/p>\n
The question is the influence of the coalition's bargaining
\nwith parties using these regional ties. But once again, through
\ntheir regional headquarters, the control of political parties
\nover their regional supporters is still very strong.<\/p>\n
Even the demand to form a regional representatives faction in
\nthe Assembly has been hampered by the big political parties.<\/p>\n
And hasn't the caucus' actions invited protests from a number
\nof intellectuals in Eastern Indonesia itself, such as from
\nSulawesi?<\/p>\n
People like Hamid Awaluddin from the Hasanuddin University
\nhave even become outraged at the (politicians') actions.<\/p>\n
He says that, while there is still a problem with the issue of
\ntheir representation, they have gone so far as to bargain over
\npositions on behalf of eastern Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The rage of such critics from the eastern areas is largely
\nbased on their suspicion that these (politicians) are mere
\npolitical opportunists chasing after seats once they get the
\nchance to bargain for positions.<\/p>\n
From the times of former president Soeharto it seems the
\nbuilding of regional-based supporters has been considered
\nimportant.<\/p>\n
In the past anything ethnic, racial and regional was
\nconsidered crucial by the New Order -- but this was related to
\nthe belief that (these factors) could threaten the concept of a
\nhegemonic, centralistic nation state.<\/p>\n
That is why the management of such diversity was done through
\nconquering local elites, rather than mobilizing masses. The New
\nOrder integrated ethnicity, race and regionalism within a
\nhegemonic national political system.<\/p>\n
In the past two years this format has become less clear.
\nThe strong impression is that (the country) is still ruled by
\nJakarta while the regions are walking individually within their
\nrespective highly dynamic contexts, including the dynamic of
\neconomic resources.<\/p>\n
The national scope has not related to such local dynamics --
\nexcept when Jakarta has tried to retain control of local
\nresources (for its benefit). Iramasuka is a new phenomenon in our
\ndemocratic transition. President Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) and
\nmost of the Jakarta elite have so far been unprepared in
\nresponding to this emergence.<\/p>\n
The fall of (former president) Habibie was marked by the
\nmarginalization of Iramasuka politics, in which those involved
\nhad gained extensive opportunities to take up strategic roles in
\nHabibie's time.<\/p>\n
Now this group is still trying to play its cards but, at a
\ntime of potentially sharp friction at the national level, they
\nhave tried to slip in their elitist political agenda amid
\nuncertainty over the future national political configuration.<\/p>\n
From the Iramasuka coalition the names Yusril Ihza Mahendra,
\nHamzah Haz and businessman Baramuli have been mentioned as
\npotential candidates for vice president. How do you see this?<\/p>\n
That was the offer of the political elite outside the circle
\nof Gus Dur, assuming that he would be forced to resign following
\nthe special session ... (the coalition) could trade with the
\nPresident's side and also with the political elite who want Gus
\nDur out of the presidency.<\/p>\n
Actually, such lobbying and \"cow trading\" has been conducted
\nby legislators, but the mainstream lobbying is based on party
\nlines.<\/p>\n
The Iramasuka coalition has been learning fast from the (cow
\ntrading of) political parties, making use of the reality that the
\nparties have neglected the eastern regions. (Asip A. Hasani)<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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