Lingering problems: TNI, the state, the nation<\/p>\n
Damien Kingsbury, Senior Lecturer, International Development,
\nDeakin University, Victoria, Australia<\/p>\n
Just before he died, in 1998 the architect of the military's
\nmiddle way, Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, said that he regretted the
\nmilitary's development of the dual defense and political
\nfunction. He said that this was because the dual function had
\ncome to exceed his intentions for a civil role for the military,
\nand because the military had become a law unto itself.<\/p>\n
Gen. Nasution was not the only one to regret the military's
\npolitical role. The outpouring of public frustration in the last
\ncouple of years of Soeharto's rule and just after indicated that
\nthere was deep and widespread discontent with the dual function.<\/p>\n
The fall of Soeharto, and the partial winding back of the
\nmilitary's political function, was greeted by the vast majority
\nof Indonesians with relief. This was the era of reform.<\/p>\n
Just a few short years later, very few people still talk about
\nthe reform process as a contemporary event. Most now say the
\nprocess has halted, and many even say that some of its gains are
\nbeing wound back.<\/p>\n
Most worrying in this changing political climate is the use of
\npolitical correctness. The military formerly required public
\nobedience to the ambiguous five principles (Pancasila) of the
\nstate. Now the military requires public obedience to the even
\nmore vague mantra of \"nationalism\", encapsulated within the term
\nof the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).<\/p>\n
This new political correctness has most clearly been seen in
\nrelation to the current military operation in Aceh. It has also
\nseen the reintroduction of restrictions on what is arguably the
\ngreatest reform achievement, a free press, which is now being
\ncajoled, threatened, and worse.<\/p>\n
But this new NKRI mantra has two fundamental problems. The
\nfirst problem is a basic confusion of ideas.<\/p>\n
Nationalism implies a sense of belonging to a political group
\nin which constituent members voluntarily identify with each
\nother. That is, they identify in common as members of a broad
\nform of united political expression.<\/p>\n
The nation, therefore, refers to people, and its equivalent
\nword in Indonesian is bangsa. Yet the term NKRI clearly refers to
\nthe state (negara), which in this case is defined as both unitary
\nand republican. The state implies a spatial territory and the
\nlaws and institutions that govern it.<\/p>\n
The commonly aspired to political model for formally modern
\nstates is as a nation-state. States that are based on national
\nidentity, such as most of those of Europe and North America, can
\nclaim to be nation-states. The advantage of the nation-state is
\nits relative sense of voluntary cohesion and hence stability.<\/p>\n
However, those states not formed around a pre-existing
\nnational identity have greater difficulty in staking a claim to
\nbeing a nation-state, and consequent problems with stability.
\nSome states can and do move towards constructing a national
\nidentity, and Indonesia has been an example of this process.<\/p>\n
Its exercise in \"nation creation\" has been relatively
\nsuccessful, especially when considered against the odds of a
\nculturally diverse basis across a non-contiguous territory and
\ndrawing upon the geographic rationale of the conquests of a
\ncolonial empire.<\/p>\n
However, this created sense of \"nation\" does not exist amongst
\nall in the state, and the imposition of national identity has
\nonly succeeded in so far as the state has had the will and the
\ncapacity to enforce it.<\/p>\n
Such imposition of \"nationalist\" corporate statism has most
\ncommonly been identified with variations of fascism. Political
\nanalysts have long noted the philosophical origins of the
\nIndonesian state, and in particular of the TNI, both of which
\nwere deeply influenced by European organicism and Japanese
\nmilitarism, both of which were fascistic.<\/p>\n
These malignant influences found their fullest expression
\nunder Soeharto. One very important consequence of this was that
\nmany people included in the still emerging state, and who might
\nhave been warming to the idea of nation, were alienated from it.<\/p>\n
Instead of the corporate state welcoming and encouraging its
\ncitizens in all their diversity, it too often imposed harsh
\nrepression, lost their trust and goodwill, and ultimately drove
\nthem away from the idea of \"nation\".<\/p>\n
The clearest examples of this now exist in Papua and in Aceh,
\nalthough it was also explicit in East Timor, and finds varying
\ndegrees of expression in places like Maluku, Riau, West and
\nCentral Kalimantan, and parts of Sulawesi.<\/p>\n
The answer to this \"nation-failure\" has been state violence,
\norganized and perpetrated by the TNI, or its proxies. This then
\nleads to the second problem with the NKRI mantra.<\/p>\n
An earlier case of opposition to the organization of the
\nstate, the PRRI- Permesta Rebellion, was crushed by the TNI's
\nmilitary forerunner. It then used this military success as the
\nrationalization for its political role, via Gen. Nasution's
\n\"middle way\", which ultimately created the corporatist state
\nunder Soeharto. It was here that Gen. Nasution realized he had
\nunleashed a self-perpetuating monster.<\/p>\n
Instead of corporate statism, however, the state's response to
\ngrievances should have been to listen, to recognize their
\nlegitimacy and to help resolve them. This would have encouraged
\ndissenters to feel they are part of a national family, rather
\nthan outcasts only fit for punishment.<\/p>\n
After 1998, there was a brief shift away from the \"punishment\"
\nmodel, recognizing that, in large part, legitimate grievances
\ncould only be answered by increasing local control over local
\naffairs. \"Local autonomy\" was offered as a sort of \"federalism
\nlite\".<\/p>\n
Yet the recent rhetoric of \"special\" autonomy for the worst
\naffected regions -- Aceh and Papua -- has never sounded sincere.
\nNow, in both cases, \"autonomy\" rings truly hollow. If separatists
\nin either place rejected this shallow and limited offer of
\nautonomy, such rejection now looks to be fully justified. Papua
\nis being dissected, and Aceh is being destroyed.<\/p>\n
There has been no thought to further pursuing a political
\nsolution to these problems, even though such solutions remain
\npotentially viable in both Aceh and Papua. That is, a solution
\nremains viable if there is the political will, and the capacity
\nto assert civilian authority over recidivist military
\nreactionism.<\/p>\n
The risk -- and the likelihood -- is, however, that the
\nascendant TNI will continue to define the response of the state
\nto the question of the nation. In this respect, it will continue
\nto assert the state by opposing the nation, and consequently
\nalienating it, or parts of it.<\/p>\n
The TNI is therefore now sowing the seeds of future dissent
\nand conflict. As a bureaucratic institution, it is also
\nconforming to the logic of self-perpetuation. And it is re-
\nestablishing the groundwork for again rationalizing a role for
\nthe military in civil political affairs.<\/p>\n
Watching the performance of the TNI in Aceh, and Papua, and
\nlistening to its mantra of NKRI as the definition of nationalism,
\none is struck by a most valuable adage. And that is, those who
\nforget the lessons of history are condemned to repeat its
\nmistakes. Gen. Nasution would be turning in his grave.<\/p>\n
Dr Damien Kingsbury is head of Philosophical, Political and
\nInternational Studies at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia,
\nand is currently writing the third edition of his book, The
\nPolitics of Indonesia (Oxford).<\/p>",
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