Lifting the lid on truth of 1965 abortive coup attempt<\/p>\n
Pancasila Sanctity Day on Thursday commemorates the state's
\nsuccess in crushing the 1965 coup attempt by the now defunct
\nIndonesian Communist Party (PKI). Hermawan Sulistiyo, a political
\nresearcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, reflects on a
\nday which changed the course of the nation's history but still
\nholds lingering questions.<\/p>\n
Question: The government's version of the abortive coup 33
\nyears ago is under renewed public scrutiny. Do you believe there
\nhas been manipulation of historical facts?<\/p>\n
Hermawan: Distortion of our history began on Oct. 5, 1965,
\nwhen the Army issued its own version of the event in a series of
\npropaganda vehicles. Unfortunately, those stories were then used
\nas the basis for writing history.<\/p>\n
The late president Sukarno's 1966 letter -- better known as
\nSurat Perintah 11 Maret (Supersemar or Letter of Instruction of
\nMarch 11) -- mandating then Maj. Gen. Soeharto to take over an
\noperational task to restore order, for example, was later
\ntransformed into a legitimate transfer-of-power document. The
\nArmy, which had political interest in constructing the history,
\nmust be responsible for that.<\/p>\n
It seems that no one has countered this version of history?<\/p>\n
Some Western scholars have penned various versions of the
\nevent, but no Indonesian historians have had the courage to write
\na different version for fear of reprisals.<\/p>\n
Some suggest that former president Soeharto was involved in,
\nor at least was aware of, the plan to kill seven generals, all of
\nwhom he reportedly disliked. What is your opinion?<\/p>\n
I believe Soeharto was not involved in the killing because
\nthere is no evidence. Recent media reports quoting PKI executive
\nLatief as saying from prison that the latter had told him about
\nthe plan on the eve of the killings were not supported by
\nevidence.<\/p>\n
Was the coup attempt merely the eruption of an internal
\nconflict within the Army?<\/p>\n
It was not purely an internal conflict within the Army, but
\nthe involvement of PKI leaders and some Army officers indicates
\nthat there was then a serious conflict among the political elite.
\nAt the same time, the nation also witnessed a serious social
\nrift, marked by recurring clashes between PKI followers and other
\ncommunities in East Java almost every week.<\/p>\n
Do you consider the factual transfer of power from Sukarno to
\nSoeharto, based on Supersemar, as constitutional?<\/p>\n
It was unconstitutional because it was not made through
\nconstitutional procedures. I think the Army made a mistake by
\nsupporting the unconstitutional transfer of power and the purging
\nof the Sukarno regime between 1965 and 1971.<\/p>\n
However, Sukarno also made a mistake by refusing to meet the
\npeople's demand to disband the PKI. Only two weeks after the coup
\nattempt, mass killings of PKI members broke out in Java and Bali,
\nstirring up a political tension conducive to the transfer of
\npower. About 400,000 people were killed.<\/p>\n
Could the demand be made that the government or the Armed
\nForces take responsibility for the mass killings?<\/p>\n
Such a demand is possible but difficult to carry out because
\nthe killings occurred 10 years into recurrent social conflicts
\ninvolving PKI followers and other societal groups, including the
\nArmed Forces. If the case was solved legally, perhaps about one
\nthird of the country's population would have to be taken to
\ncourt. Producing evidence in court would also be very difficult
\nbecause there would be no documents or data supporting the
\nincidents. Furthermore, no one would have the courage to raise
\nsuch an issue in a legal process.<\/p>\n
The government often accuses demonstrators of being
\ninfiltrated by PKI members. Do you believe the PKI is still a
\nlatent danger to the nation?<\/p>\n
The government uses such a stigma to overcome contemporary
\npolitical problems because it does not know how to play the
\npolitical game in a more elegant way. The Armed Forces' recent
\nstigmatization of demonstrating students from Forum Kota was
\nextraneous because even the most stupid student knows that
\ncommunism, as an ideology, has failed to achieve its goals.<\/p>\n
What is the political impact of the recent discussions on the
\ncoup attempt with an aim to reconstructing history?<\/p>\n
The current heated public discussions indicate that a battle
\nis still going on among the political elite. The Habibie regime
\n-- which is widely regarded as a carbon copy of the Soeharto
\nregime and which lacks legitimacy among the public -- is
\napparently trying to distance itself from the former government
\nby allowing the open discussions to go on with a hope that it may
\nlead to a conclusion that Soeharto and his supporters made a
\nmistake.<\/p>\n
The discussions also gain support from witnesses of the coup
\nattempt who are still alive. With the fall of Soeharto, they now
\nhave an opportunity to disclose the facts, some of which have
\nbeen manipulated.<\/p>\n
However, the discussions, which will make the people more
\ncritical about their civil rights, may boomerang on the Habibie
\nregime because the public may reach a conclusion that the
\ntransfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie on May 21 was also
\nunconstitutional. (riz)<\/p>",
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