Lessons from Yugoslavia<\/p>\n
The article is based on a paper presented by Makmur Keliat, a
\nUniversity of Indonesia lecturer, at a recent seminar on the Non-
\nAligned Movement with the theme \"The Crisis of Yugoslavia and the
\nRole of Non-Aligned Movement\", organized by the university's Non-
\nAligned Movement Study Center.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Yugoslavia presents an interesting paradox from
\nthe European continent. While large parts of Europe, as shown in
\nthe case of the European Community, have been in the continuous
\nprocess of integration, Yugoslavia has displayed a contradictory
\ntrend.<\/p>\n
When the country became a federal republic on Nov. 29, 1945,
\nit included six republics -- Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
\nHerzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In June 1991, Croatia and
\nSlovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. Macedonia
\nfollowed suit in January 1992. Bosnia-Herzegovina took the same
\nstep in 1992. The remaining republics that have agreed to unite
\nand declared themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are
\nSerbia and Montenegero.<\/p>\n
The latest mass media reports have given an impression that
\nthe process of disintegration might continue unabated. Though a
\npeace plan to end the Kosovo conflict was accepted in June 1999,
\nafter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 11-week air
\nwar against Yugoslavia, there is no clear indication that Kosovo
\nseparatists, mainly represented by the Kosovo Liberation Army,
\nwill cease their demand for independence. In addition there has
\nbeen a report that Montenegro is also moving slowly toward
\nindependence. Therefore, it may not be an exaggeration to say
\nthat Yugoslavia in the post cold war has been remarkably noted
\nfor the process of its disintegration.<\/p>\n
In order to avoid emotional bias in discussion, this article
\nattempts to analyze the conflict in Yugoslavia by focusing on two
\nkinds of tensions that may have taken place in the country --
\nbetween the idea of state and that of nation, and between demand
\nfor democratization and demand for national unity. In a nutshell,
\nthe article tries to show that the break-up of Yugoslavia is the
\noutcome of these two tensions.<\/p>\n
Let us begin from the first tension. Seen from a historical
\nperspective, Yugoslavia is almost similar with Indonesia in the
\nsense that the existence of the state precedes the existence of
\nthe nation. Indeed, the term Yugoslavia, meaning the Land of the
\nSouth Slav, was coined in 1929 by King Alexander I.<\/p>\n
Indeed, a hundred years before the establishment of
\nYugoslavia, one could find in the country the Serbs who were
\npredominantly Orthodox, the Albanians and the Bosnian people who
\nwere primarily Muslim, and the Croats and the Slovenes who were
\ndominantly Roman Catholic. To a large extent, one could also say
\nthat Yugoslavia was established as a multi-nation-state. This, in
\nturn, brought about a huge task for the government to convince
\nits citizen, whose cultural and historical backdrop were so
\ndiverse, that the idea of the state would represent the idea of
\nnation.<\/p>\n
It is under these circumstances that the conflict in
\nYugoslavia need to be understood. Accordingly, Yugoslavia is
\ndistinct from countries that have been endowed with homogeneous
\ncultural and historical legacy, such as Japan, in which the
\nestablishment of nation precedes the establishment of state.
\nYugoslavia is almost like Indonesia where nation building seems
\nto have become an unfinished and painstaking business. In this
\nregard, the main difference may lie in the form of government.
\nThe form of federal government on the basis of ethnic landscape,
\nadopted by Yugoslavia when it was established in 1945, appeared
\nto have worked effectively only for a short-term solution.<\/p>\n
The overlapping boundary line between ethnic jurisdiction with
\npolitical jurisdiction structured within a form of federal
\ngovernment has a great tendency to erect a psychological block
\nfor the whole populace in their efforts to search for a single
\nnational identity. Rather than weakening traditional sentiments,
\nsuch a federal government seems to have cultivated a distinctive
\nfeeling in the mental constructs of the entire ethnic groups that
\nthey are basically different culturally. This has also become
\nevident in the north-eastern part of India, where various
\nseparatist movements have recurred in Nagaland, Mizoram, Megalaya
\nand Assam. However, there is a striking difference between
\nYugoslavia and India.<\/p>\n
In Yugoslavia, the federal government was not established
\nalong with the political mechanism for participation, while in
\nIndia, there has been political pluralism as clearly indicated by
\nthe presence of many political parties and the freedom of
\nexpression. Such political circumstances were absent in
\nYugoslavia.<\/p>\n
During the late president Josip Broz Tito's leadership,
\npolitical participation was only channeled through a centralized
\ncommunist party. What is the difference then is that though the
\nseparatist movement has posed a problem for the Indian federal
\ngovernment, it has failed in gaining wide political support from
\nlocal people. The majority still put their strong belief in the
\nidea of political pluralism.<\/p>\n
In fact, if one looks back to the history of Yugoslavia, she
\nor he would come to know that the conflict provoked by ethno
\nnationalism has been there through several generations. The only
\ndifference is that the spirit of ethno nationalism in the past
\ndid not turn into violent conflict on a massive scale due to the
\nfigure of Tito.<\/p>\n
When he was still alive, Tito was seen as an undisputed
\nleader, despite the fact that he was not a Serb. Very few people
\ndared to challenge him and the policies he imposed were largely
\naccepted with no significant criticism.<\/p>\n
In the mean time, the cold war had also made it easy for Tito
\nto cultivate a sort of united feeling among the populace. Since
\nthe collective and bitter memories from the Balkanization period
\nwere still vivid, Tito did not face a huge task to mold a
\ndominant perception that the country could easily turn into the
\ntheater of war because of other regional power's intervention.<\/p>\n
It is in this context that Yugoslavia's foreign policy since
\nthe very beginning was designed not to side with any bloc and the
\nmost important priority at the time of cold war was how to
\npreserve its independence and territorial integration.<\/p>\n
The crucial moment came out shortly after Tito passed away in
\n1980. Almost similar with the case of Indonesia after former
\npresident Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, Yugoslavia was
\nimmediately faced with the crisis of national leadership not only
\nin terms of its legitimacy but also in terms of its power
\neffectiveness. This was clearly symbolized by the adoption of
\ncollective leadership in the presidency.<\/p>\n
At a glance, this solution seems to have been motivated by the
\nidea of political democracy that no one could govern Yugoslavia
\nlike Tito had ruled the country. On the other side of the coin,
\nhowever, such a collective leadership could also indicate the
\nfailure of political institutionalization.<\/p>\n
The political framework left out by Tito did not work,
\nparticularly in the context of leadership succession, as there
\nhas been a power vacuum since he passed away. In this context,
\nTito can be considered as the most proper example of a successful
\ndictator as he never intended to prepare for his successor. It,
\ntherefore, will not come as a great surprise, that there has been
\npolitical disaster since his rule.<\/p>\n
Now let us discuss the second tension. Many had pinned their
\nhopes that when an authoritarian leader was ousted from power and
\nif market reform was introduced, then the prospects for the
\nevolvement of stable democracy would become bright. This has not
\nturned into reality in Yugoslavia.<\/p>\n
In fact, following the death of Tito, several market reforms
\nhad been introduced and the most progressive one had been
\nlaunched when Ante Markovic was appointed as prime minister of
\nYugoslavia in 1989. He was noted for his strong advocacy for a
\nWestern economic system. It is also worth mentioning that the
\nfirst free election, as a symbol of democratization, was carried
\nout in 1990. Ironically the election were won by politicians who
\nadvocated the secession of their republics from Yugoslavia. As a
\nresult, the demands for separation has become increasingly
\nstronger. Why has this happened?<\/p>\n
The first reason may lie in the lack of vision among the
\nruling elite after the end of cold war. It has been clear that
\nideology, following the end of cold war, has ceased to be a glue
\nfor the preservation of the national unity. From a political
\npoint of view, the ruling elite in Yugoslavia seems to have not
\nbeen well prepared for this abrupt change. Before the break-up of
\nthe country, they could not find answers to the following
\nquestion: What is Yugoslavia for? Where is the country heading?
\nWho is now the common external enemy?<\/p>\n
As a matter of fact, not only the Albanians, the Bosnians, the
\nCroats and the Slovenes were disappointed with the system built
\nby Tito, but also the Serbs as an ethnic majority. All ethnic
\ngroups seem to have their own version and interpretation of the
\nhistorical events. As such, making objective judgments seems to
\nbe impossible unless one takes a partisan stance.<\/p>\n
An example can be learned from the case of the Kosovo
\nconflict. Serbians have insisted that Kosovo is the cradle of
\ntheir civilization and for this reason they have demanded that
\nthe status of special autonomy for the Kosovo province given by
\nTito in 1974 should be abolished. On the other hand, Albanians
\nwho are the majority in Kosovo have put forward another version
\nof history. They have argued, it is their ancestors who were the
\nfirst settlers in the province and by saying so they have refused
\nto accept the argument aired by Serbians. Keeping this debate in
\nmind, one can see that the history of Yugoslavia tends to be seen
\nby political leaders and intellectuals of all ethnic groups not
\nas an asset but as a liability.<\/p>\n
The second reason may lie in the lack of democratic tradition.
\nIt has been clear from the case of Yugoslavia, as shown earlier,
\nthat the free general election and market reforms conducted by
\nbreaking state monopolies of economic resources are not a
\nsufficient condition for democratization. What has lacked,
\nreferring to Habermas' conceptual thinking, is the existence of a
\npublic sphere, through which private individuals are engaged in
\nrational critical debates concerning public matters. The validity
\nof each statement would be judged not by baseless racial or
\nreligious sentiments but solely by reason. The absence of this
\ncondition would generate only a political change without
\ndemocratization.<\/p>\n
After more than 30 years ruled by a totalitarian government,
\nit is reasonable to say that Yugoslavia does not have sufficient
\ninstitutional resources for the evolvement of critical, rational
\ndebate. Moreover, intellectuals who dared to raise their
\ncriticism against Tito were punished severely. Milovan Djilas is
\na case in point. He was put in jail by Tito simply because he
\nwrote the book The New Class, criticizing the behavior of
\nYugoslavia's communist party elite.<\/p>\n
Without a long tradition for critical debate, it is no wonder
\nthe political elite after the death of Tito have been strongly
\nencouraged to raise communal sentiment to the effect of equating
\nthe idea of democracy with the idea of self-determination. This
\nis certainly a misleading interpretation. It also has not come as
\na great surprise if territorial integration, as a symbol of
\nnational unity and one of the very foundations of the state, has
\nnot been accepted without question.<\/p>\n
Thus, at least two lessons can be picked up from the break-up
\nof Yugoslavia. First, the hostile relations between different
\nethnic and religious groups in the country is not the cause of
\nthe current conflict. By contrast it is merely a natural product
\nof the totalitarian government inherited from the era of Tito's
\nleadership. Second, there is no short-cut and instant formula for
\nthe evolvement of democracy, particularly for developing
\ncountries marked by diversity of culture and history and by a
\nlack of tradition for critical debate.<\/p>",
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