Legislative elections and Indonesia's future<\/p>\n
Jusuf Wanandi, Jakarta<\/p>\n
What is the impact of the 2004 legislative elections on
\nIndonesia's two most important assets, a maturing democracy and
\nmoderate Islam?<\/p>\n
A maturing democracy is not only democracy as a formality,
\nsuch as having elections regularly or having political parties,
\nbut also having values and substance. The latter include striving
\nfor freedoms that must go hand in hand with democracy -- freedom
\nof speech and freedom of assembly -- but also supremacy of the
\nlaw and equality before the law.<\/p>\n
Moderate Islam is part of political Islam that strives to
\nharmonize modernity with Islam, reconcile Islam and democracy,
\nand adopting politics that are open and inclusive for all
\nIndonesians, namely a state that is not based on Islam or Islamic
\nlaws.<\/p>\n
The April 2004 legislative elections are widely seen as honest
\nand peaceful. The results have been well accepted by the general
\npublic despite the shortcomings of the General Elections
\nCommission (KPU), a newly established independent body of
\nnonpartisan members. Previously, the KPU was run by the
\ngovernment or political parties.<\/p>\n
The people have shown their displeasure with the ruling
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) party, which has
\nnot done much for the people (corruption, unemployment,
\ninsecurity and bad judiciary). It received 40 percent fewer votes
\nthan in 1999. The elections also showed that voters, especially
\nin the big cities, are also less bound by their formal and
\ninformal solidarity group leaders (based on religion, ethnicity
\nand region).<\/p>\n
They have given the Democratic Party of Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono a big gain of 7.5 percent of the vote due to his
\npopularity. These were in part sympathy voters in response to the
\nway he was demoted by President Megawati Soekarnoputri. In 1999
\nthose votes went to Megawati and the PDI-P. The Democratic Party
\nwas established only in 2002.<\/p>\n
If indeed most of the new House of Representatives (DPR)
\nmembers are younger and better educated than before -- and there
\nwill also be more women among them -- one could expect a
\nqualitatively better legislature in the future. This augurs well
\nfor democracy in Indonesia. But this election is only one step
\ntoward a mature democracy. It may take another two elections to
\nachieve it. Despite the messiness of the process for democracy,
\nit is still worth it for most Indonesians as a lot of
\nimprovements have happened.<\/p>\n
The results may create a greater fragmentation of political
\nparties in the DPR as there are now seven major political
\nparties. This could be further simplified in 2009.<\/p>\n
This fragmentation could make the process of formulating
\npolicies more difficult, because it will take more than two
\nparties to get a majority. At the same time, coalition forming
\nwill not be easy without the blocs of two parties, Golkar and the
\nPDI-P.<\/p>\n
The democratization process will also depend on how the next
\npresident is going to approach politics in general and
\nparticularly how he or she will cooperate with the DPR. If he or
\nshe does realize the need to create majority coalitions within
\nthe DPR to get the legislation, program, budget and appointments
\nthrough, he or she also will be able to make the DPR more
\neffective.<\/p>\n
But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and whether
\nthe DPR is really strengthening a mature democracy or not will
\ndepend on their performance within the next five years.<\/p>\n
But of course a mature democracy not only depends on the
\nelections, the DPR or the political parties. A strong and healthy
\ncivil society, a free press and an active student body are
\nimportant prerequisites for a mature democracy in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
They should have a strong presence as well until the
\nforeseeable future since the political parties so far have not
\nshown their vision and willingness to really stand up for society
\nand the people. Instead, they are still very dependent on
\nindividual and group interests.<\/p>\n
Moderate Islam won in the last election. But beyond figures
\nand numbers, one should note the change of paradigm in the debate
\nof the electorates, which has been divided into so-termed
\nnationalist and Islamic parties.<\/p>\n
The divide between santri and abangan is perhaps no more
\nrelevant. The Golkar Party is defined as \"secular\" or nationalist
\n(abangan), but among its leaders there are many HMI (Himpunan
\nMahasiswa Islam, or Muslim Student Union) leaders. Although
\nGolkar is a proponent of \"nationalist\" policies and programs and
\nis open to every citizen, it is also very sensitive and up to
\ndate on Islamic issues and struggle in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
PAN and the PKB are based on Islamic mass organizations,
\nMuhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) respectively, but are open
\nparties and do not promote sharia as a goal to be implemented in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
The issue of Islam or nationalism did not become an issue in
\nthe last election (2004) campaign. Yet, there are still smaller
\nparties based on Islam that are willing to make sharia national
\nlaw.<\/p>\n
The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), has been very successful,
\nhaving used corruption and good governance as its main themes in
\nthe campaign. That was the compromise it had to make if it wanted
\nto reach out to a large mass of supporters in society.<\/p>\n
If all the Muslim parties are taken together, without PAN and
\nthe PKB, then in 2004 they had 23 percent of the vote or 127 of
\nthe 550 seats in the DPR. In 1999, the PKS (then known as PK, or
\nPartai Keadilan) got 1.7 percent of the vote or seven seats from
\na total 500 seats. If you include PAN and the PKB, then they
\ngained 42 percent or 231 seats this year. In 1999 they got 34
\npercent of the vote or 171 seats.<\/p>\n
This percentage is about the same as what all the Muslim
\nparties got in the 1955 election (43 percent). But 25 years have
\nmade a lot of fundamental difference. In 1955 all the Muslim
\nparties formed one bloc of the Jakarta Charter (or sharia law) in
\nthe Constituent Assembly.<\/p>\n
Nowadays, only 23 percent at most are proponents of sharia,
\nalthough PAN and the PKB are opposed to it. The debates during
\nthe campaigns do not suggest that this issue is important. In the
\nlonger term, if many more Muslim parties become proponents of
\nsharia, it is still open whether or not they are going to come
\nout again in full force for sharia to be accepted as positive
\nlaw.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, only the PKS got more votes and seats among
\nthe proponents of sharia, while the rest stalled or lost votes.
\nThe PKS gain was not generated by a campaign for sharia, but by
\nits anticorruption and welfare strategy. These were brilliant
\ntactics.<\/p>\n
There are two more issues with regard to sharia in Indonesia.
\nThe first is the question of creeping national legislation that
\nwill implement or be inspired by sharia, such as on education,
\nfood, social issues etc. in the future. Until now, the question
\nhas come up only sporadically, such as in relation to the
\nNational Education Law last year, especially on religious
\neducation as a subject matter in private schools.<\/p>\n
But everybody, including moderate Muslims, has to be aware of
\nthis possibility and should also help in overcoming such an
\naberration in future legislation. The second issue is the
\npolitical decisions made by several regents such as in Garut,
\nTasikmalaya, West Java, who have proclaimed the implementation of
\nsharia in their regencies. This is essentially a political act,
\nbecause they do not have the legal instruments to put sharia law
\ninto practice. Those decisions could be misunderstood
\npolitically. However, they are not a widespread phenomenon, and
\nwould be impossible to implement in practice.<\/p>\n
The writer is cofounder and member of the board of trustees of
\nthe Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).<\/p>",
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