Lax upholding of law impeding Maluku's reconciliation<\/p>\n
Clashes in the Maluku islands have gone on for almost one year
\nafter they first broke out on Jan. 19. Thirty-eight people died
\nin the latest clash, while tens of thousands have fled. Jacob W.
\nAjawaila, the head of a study team on intergroup conflict under
\nthe Pattimura University in Ambon, recently replied to written
\nquestions from The Jakarta Post.<\/p>\n
Question: Why do you think the clashes in Ambon have reached
\nalmost a year with little signs of subsiding?<\/p>\n
Answer: Actually, from April to June, there were less conflicts,
\npartly due to a 19-member team formed by the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) to help the local administration ... Community activities
\nhad started to resume but conflicts broke out again at the end of
\nJuly. I see a number of factors which were neglected in the
\ncooling down period: the fact that an investigation into those
\nalleged as provocateurs was not completed; an absence of
\ntransparency in explaining the main cause of each incident of
\nclashes; neglect to counter the many baseless rumors which were
\nmaking people restless and the fact that the reconciliation
\nprogram did not reach community members. Many of those involved
\nin the program had no roots, and there was wide mistrust against
\nauthorities. The other factor has been the slow and lax handling
\nof refugees.<\/p>\n
Q: How much truth is there in statements that provocateurs
\nstarted this prolonged conflict?<\/p>\n
A: I think there is (some truth in the statements). The
\nprovocateurs must have really known the social condition of
\nsociety here and they must have been quite familiar with the
\ncharacteristics of the people who are hardheaded, militant and
\nreactive. They are devoted to their religion and will react
\nstrongly if they feel something insults their religious symbols.
\nProvocateurs have used rumors of the burning or destruction of a
\nmosque or church to flare fanaticism, group solidarity and mass
\nmobilization which have led to clashes.<\/p>\n
Q: Are there any relations between provocateurs and military
\nmembers?<\/p>\n
A: I do not know.<\/p>\n
Q: The military itself has been reportedly divided; they have
\nbeen accused of being biased toward either Muslims or Christians.
\nHow do you view this?<\/p>\n
A: This is difficult to comment on. It has been clear that each
\nof the disputing groups have said that security forces from
\ncertain units have sided with the other group. The Christians,
\nfor example, have said that the artillery unit has been biased to
\nMuslims and have demanded their withdrawal. I think such
\nallegations depend on how people perceive the handling of the
\nclashes. In general, the Marines have been acceptable to all
\nsides, although once Muslims also rallied against them. Military
\nleaders in Ambon have said their forces are united and are doing
\ntheir job according to procedure. Our study team revealed there
\nhas been mismanagement in the handling of conflicts to the extent
\nthat clashes could not be stopped.<\/p>\n
Q: How have the local elite viewed and handled the prolonged
\nclashes?<\/p>\n
A: Since the first clash broke out on Jan. 19 and through the
\ncooling down period of three months, everyone thought the clashes
\nwere over. A large part of security forces were withdrawn. But
\nwhen clashes broke out again at the end of July, the elite here
\napparently could no longer deal with the problem, neither could
\nthe Center of Social Reconciliation, formed by the local
\nadministration. The presence of the military, police from outside
\nMaluku and the special military team sent to help overcome this
\nphase also seemed helpless.<\/p>\n
Authorities and the elite here were of the view that the
\nclashes were very difficult to settle because it had reached a
\ndeeply sensitive stage and had involved feelings of revenge from
\nvictims -- mainly among those of lower-income groups.<\/p>\n
The quality of clashes had also increased. In the first phase
\ntraditional weapons were used; in the second (since the end of
\nJuly), there were homemade weapons with bullets usually used by
\nthe National Police and Indonesian Military.<\/p>\n
Also, the distrust toward leaders increased.<\/p>\n
Q: Could you elaborate on how the poorest people view this
\nconflict and the impact on their lives?<\/p>\n
A: They view the conflict as one between Muslims and Christians
\nso that each group must struggle to preserve their identity --
\nand physical clashes have therefore been inevitable. The conflict
\nis no longer rational and realistic. Victims have been among the
\ninnocent poor who do not really know the causes of the conflict
\nwhich have only been in the name of groups.<\/p>\n
Q: With the change of the central government, did the conflict
\nabate or increase?<\/p>\n
A: More open violent conflicts seem to have declined in
\ngeneral... however, incidents still happen sporadically, which
\nleads to the blocking of roads by disputing groups. But now there
\nhas been abductions (of members of disputing groups, allegedly by
\nrivals).<\/p>\n
It is not clear whether less conflicts have been because each
\ngroup has become fed up or because of changes in the political
\nconstellation following the change in government. I believe the
\nchange in national leadership has very much influenced conflicts
\nhere. The study by the Pattimura University team has shown that
\nthe conflict in Ambon was influenced by political struggle among
\nthe elite, which contributed to the abuse of religion in local
\nconflicts here. So religion was just used to trigger unrest, it
\nwasn't the true cause.<\/p>\n
Q: What was the real cause of the Ternate conflict in the north?<\/p>\n
A: Refugees in Ambon and local papers said it was triggered by
\nleaflets from the Synod of the Maluku Protestant Church (GPM),
\ncontaining a call to attack Muslims. But the chairman of the
\nSynod, Sammy Titaley, said the leaflets had no relation to GPM
\nbecause his name and signature was forged ... he said it was the
\naction of irresponsible people.<\/p>\n
Q: Could you describe the present condition in daily life in
\nAmbon?<\/p>\n
A: The condition has become somewhat better compared to the
\nbreakout of riots at the end of July ... but there are important
\nthings to note as an impact of the conflict. Ambon has been
\ndivided into borders of ... Muslim and Christian inhabitants,
\nwhich have greatly affected daily activities of students, traders
\nand private and public employees. Some routes are no longer
\nblockaded but because such routes are in the vicinity of a
\ndisputing group, those from the other group will not dare pass
\nthe area for fear of safety, even though there are security
\nforces on site.<\/p>\n
This is, of course, related to the declining trust in security
\nforces among all groups. So to get to their destination, people
\nuse alternative routes by sea, even if it means spending much
\nmore on transportation.<\/p>\n
The prolonged conflict has clearly brought dire economic
\nconsequences. The arson of shops owned by Chinese Indonesians in
\nthe shopping center on Jl. A.J. Patty led many owners to flee
\nAmbon, while those who stayed moved their stores to Christian-
\ndominated settlements.<\/p>\n
The division of areas by religious borders has also affected
\ngovernment-related and other formal activities. Many government
\noffices have had to be separated because of security reasons.
\nRegarding education, students of elementary to high school levels
\nhave only been able to study in schools \"dominated\" by their
\nrespective religious groups.<\/p>\n
The (state owned) Pattimura University and private
\nuniversities have opened though they have not been able to
\nfunction properly. We can imagine the situation of people of
\nAmbon today. The above division of areas has greatly damaged
\nsocial relations; the social gap has widened, which has led to
\nincreasing suspicions among the groups.<\/p>\n
Q: The central government has already helped with rehabilitation
\nof a number of victims' homes and it has allocated help to
\nrefugees. Would it be enough to continue these efforts?<\/p>\n
A: Problems here have become so complicated that resolving it
\nshould also be more comprehensive; it is not enough to channel
\nhelp to refugees and rehabilitate homes which were destroyed or
\nset on fire. The central and local governments, and also the
\npolitical and religious elite, need the political will to do so.
\nThe settlement of problems, including those of refugees, should
\ninclude the following:<\/p>\n
a) The law should be upheld, regarding those who broke it or
\nviolated human rights. This should be firm and indiscriminative,
\nand must also be transparent to the public. People involved in
\nthe conflict would be somewhat satisfied and get a sense of
\njustice. An independent fact-finding team needs to be set up
\nregarding rights violations.<\/p>\n
b) Reconciliation attempts should be made between conflicting
\ngroups, as relations among people have become greatly damaged
\nthrough intensive dialog among the elite and among ordinary
\npeople of respective groups -- the latter are the ones most
\ninvolved in the clashes. A respected mediator is needed who is
\nacceptable to all groups. The role of religious leaders is vital
\nto help reconcile relations; this would include the task of
\ncounseling people, mainly those who have become victims. A
\nprecondition of reconciliation attempts is to put a stop to the
\nclashes, so the role of security forces is very important.<\/p>\n
c) The handling of refugees must be done rapidly. It is not
\nunlikely that these victims could flare a new clash if this
\nproblem is not seriously handled. Those who have lost property
\nand family members harbor deep feelings of revenge. Constant
\nguidance and counseling is needed ... to restore self-confidence
\nand help fulfill their needs to face the future. Guidance is
\nurgent for the younger generation who have been mostly involved
\nin the clashes so far. (Jongker Rumthe)<\/p>",
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