{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1296667,
        "msgid": "kopassus-and-biological-warfare-1447893297",
        "date": "2000-01-19 00:00:00",
        "title": "Kopassus and biological warfare",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Kopassus and biological warfare In the middle of 1997 members of the Army's Special Force, the red berets, known locally as Kopassus, received Pentagon training in a course entitled Nuclear Chemical Biological. It is no idle question to ask to just what use this training, part of a wider program of illegal U.S. military assistance given in defiance of Congress, may have been put.",
        "content": "<p>Kopassus and biological warfare<\/p>\n<p>In the middle of 1997 members of the Army's Special Force, the<br>\nred berets, known locally as Kopassus, received Pentagon training<br>\nin a course entitled Nuclear Chemical Biological. It is no idle<br>\nquestion to ask to just what use this training, part of a wider<br>\nprogram of illegal U.S. military assistance given in defiance of<br>\nCongress, may have been put.<\/p>\n<p>Kopassus, which has been implicated in a whole swathe of state<br>\nterror actions, from disappearances of activists to Aceh and East<br>\nTimor atrocities, is not just any unit of the Indonesian Military<br>\n(TNI). It is the elite action squad, and in 1997 was under the<br>\nleadership of the highly ambitious son-in-law of Soeharto,<br>\nPrabowo Subianto, who has subsequently been drummed out of the<br>\nservice.<\/p>\n<p>Why exactly Kopassus was interested in chemical-biological<br>\nwarfare (CBW) capability is a matter that can hardly be allowed<br>\nto go away. Indeed, what its interests in the nuclear field were,<br>\nwhen Indonesia has neither nuclear arms nor nuclear power to<br>\ndefend, are also worthy of our attention.<\/p>\n<p>When states acquire CBW capability, in whatever degree, they<br>\nbroadly have in mind two uses for it: one offensive, the other<br>\ndefensive. If we leave aside for a moment the fact that chemical<br>\nand biological (CB) agents used against an enemy may rebound on<br>\nthe attacker -- gases and spores, for example, returning on the<br>\nwind -- we may reasonably ask just who Kopassus and the regime<br>\nhad in mind as potential targets.<\/p>\n<p>In 1997 Indonesia had no external enemies, but it did have<br>\n\"internal\" ones. Among the latter of course were the people of<br>\nEast Timor and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Were they targets,<br>\npotential or real, for CBW carried out by Kopassus under Prabowo<br>\nSubianto?<\/p>\n<p>A country sends its soldiers on a course designed to inform<br>\nthem about CBW. Then what?<\/p>\n<p>In several known cases it develops them. Did Indonesia's<br>\nmilitary or a section thereof do so? It may be objected that even<br>\nif Kopassus had the intent it would not have been able to<br>\ndisguise this completely from outside surveillance, but the<br>\ndifference between Indonesia and Iraq is that this country is not<br>\nperceived by the international community as a belligerent. Whilst<br>\nit may have received international opprobrium over East Timor, it<br>\nhas not gone to war against Western strategic interests. Its<br>\nmilitary arsenal is not under the minutest scrutiny.<\/p>\n<p>If Kopassus were developing CB agents what would it<br>\nconcentrate on to avoid such scrutiny? Probably the biological<br>\nelement. Terence Taylor, a biological weapons expert from the<br>\nLondon International Institute for Strategic Studies, says, \"It<br>\nis easier to hide a biological warfare program in civilian<br>\nresearch and production facilities than either a nuclear or<br>\nchemical one.\"<\/p>\n<p>What then if Kopassus had decided to trim sails and focus on<br>\nbiological warfare agents? Prabowo's web of contacts includes his<br>\nbrother Hashim Djojohadikusomo, a man with an industrial plant<br>\nunder his control. Such a plant could theoretically be used to<br>\nconceal such production. Equally, Kopassus camps, which exist<br>\noutside all public purview, might disguise small-scale<br>\nfacilities.<\/p>\n<p>Lastly, if there is or has been a secret CBW program run by<br>\nKopassus, we should point out that under the 1975 Biological<br>\nWeapons Convention all \"research, development, production,<br>\nstockpiling or acquisition of biological and toxic weapons\" is<br>\nforbidden. Likewise \"delivery systems designed for such weapons\".<br>\nThe new Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in<br>\nApril 1997 around about the time Kopassus men were receiving the<br>\ntraining mentioned above, forbids the production, acquisition and<br>\nstockpiling of the chemical equivalents.<\/p>\n<p>The Indonesian people surely have a right to know, even at<br>\nthis late hour, just why Kopassus was interested in Nuclear<br>\nChemical Biological and to what use this knowledge has been put.<br>\nSo, too, do the East Timorese.<\/p>\n<p>DAVID JARDINE<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/kopassus-and-biological-warfare-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}