Killer bug exposes WHO's shortcomings<\/p>\n
Andy Ho<\/p>\n
The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
On March 15, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned that a
\nmystery killer pneumonia, christened severe acute respiratory
\nsyndrome (SARS), was spreading rapidly from East Asia to other
\nparts of the globe.<\/p>\n
With 219 cases, excluding Guangdong province, already
\nreported, it released a rare \"emergency travel advisory\", calling
\nSARS a \"worldwide health threat\". Why did the WHO system for
\nglobal surveillance of infectious diseases fail to catch this
\noutbreak? If not for the impending Iraq war, the media would be
\nfocusing on the SARS outbreak.<\/p>\n
In 1918, as World War I was winding down, an influenza
\npandemic began, which killed more people than the war.<\/p>\n
Outbreaks swept through America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the
\nSouth Pacific. By the time it ended, a fifth of the world's
\npopulation, or about 20 to 40 million people, mainly 20 to 40
\nyears old, had succumbed. People struck with the disease died
\nrapidly, drowning in lung secretions that filled their airways.<\/p>\n
It was never precisely established where the virus had
\noriginated but scientists postulated that new strains seemed to
\nemerge from the Far East each year and spread to the rest of the
\nworld.<\/p>\n
The consensus among experts was that the big one in 1918
\nprobably started in China where a rare genetic mutation in the
\nvirus could have given rise to a variant so novel that all
\nnatural immunity was useless.<\/p>\n
The SARS epidemic seems to have also begun in China where an
\noutbreak occurred in November. It appears that news about it was
\nsuppressed until February; WHO experts were called in this month.<\/p>\n
Even then, the Asian Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday,
\nWHO experts were not allowed to visit the afflicted areas.<\/p>\n
Instead, they had to wait in Beijing to confer with provincial
\nhealth experts, according to whom the outbreak involved 305
\npatients, with five deaths. No patient samples, test results or
\ntreatment details were shared.<\/p>\n
The AWSJ report suggests that patients and hospital workers,
\ntravelers to China and international experts \"may have been left
\nin the dark about the disease's dangers because of official
\nreluctance to acknowledge a problem\". It was left to an
\nunidentified American businessman traveling from Shanghai to
\nHanoi, via Hongkong, to expose the cover-up inadvertently.<\/p>\n
He caught the bug in China and died, becoming the first SARS
\nvictim outside China. Soon cases were reported in Canada,
\nGermany, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
\nand Hongkong.<\/p>\n
Clearly, international cooperation is critical if the spread
\nof infectious diseases is to be controlled. International health
\nregulations inherited by the WHO from the 19th century used to be
\nlegally binding rules governing the global surveillance of
\ninfectious diseases.<\/p>\n
These required countries to notify other nations about
\noutbreaks within their territories, maintain adequate public
\nhealth capabilities at border points, and take rational,
\nscientific steps to prevent disease spread such that world
\ntraffic and international trade are restricted minimally.<\/p>\n
In 1995, however, the WHO moved away from its system of
\nbinding rules to a reliance on information gathering through its
\nGlobal Outbreak Alert and Response Network. This, unfortunately,
\ndepends on the voluntary compliance of member states.<\/p>\n
Today, WHO's 192 member states determine for themselves,
\nwithout criteria laid down by WHO, whether an outbreak is a
\n\"public health emergency of international concern\". China felt it
\nhad everything under control and chose not to disclose its
\noutbreak -- until it was too late.<\/p>\n
There are also no legal consequences if WHO ascertains that a
\nmember state has failed to report such an outbreak. Even now,
\nChina refuses with impunity to cooperate fully.<\/p>\n
Further, geopolitical tugs-of-war prevent WHO from being an
\neffective controller of disease. Taiwan, for instance, has seen
\nfive SARS fatalities so far, but as it is not a WHO member, it is
\nunable to contribute its data or expertise.<\/p>\n
By default, the role of international coordinator seems to be
\nfalling to the Atlanta-based Centers for Disease Control and
\nPrevention. So it is not just the United Nations Security Council
\nthat seems to risk irrelevance: Even the role of WHO in
\ninfectious disease surveillance and control has become uncertain.<\/p>\n
The writer is a medical doctor by training.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/killer-bug-exposes-whos-shortcomings-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }