Key to win war on terror<\/p>\n
Ridwan Max Sijabat, Staff Writer, Ridwan@thejakartapost.com, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Unlike Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore seem to have obtained
\ngood lessons on social order and legal certainty from their
\nBritish colonizers. Indonesia, some historians reveal, inherited
\na corrupt and permissive culture from the Dutch colonial rulers
\nwho frequently colluded with the local bureaucracy and Chinese
\nbusinesspeople to further their political and business interests.<\/p>\n
For the people and governments in Malaysia and Singapore, law
\nenforcement and legal certainty is absolutely necessary to
\nmaintain social order and achieve advancements while for
\nIndonesia legal certainty still depends on the situation.<\/p>\n
The two countries have so far remained fairly safe from any
\nterrorist attacks and they are cautious in taking preventative
\nmeasures against the increasing terror threat in Southeast Asia.
\nThis is not so much thanks to the established formal legal and
\nsecurity system in Malaysia and Singapore, but more because of
\nthe people's common awareness of the importance of law
\nenforcement and of public order for their own sake.<\/p>\n
Is it necessary for Indonesia to adopt an Internal Security
\nAct (ISA) or to revise the newly enacted Law No. 15\/2003 on
\nterrorism? The answer lies in how far Indonesians have a common
\nawareness of security issues, not merely by giving the police or
\nmilitary more power in fighting terrorism, as officials and
\nlegislators have suggested.<\/p>\n
Basically, the antiterrorism law, to some extent, is better
\nthan the ISA in Malaysia and Singapore because it is, in legal
\nterms, lex specialis, one which applies to specific persons. On
\nthe other hand the ISA in these countries is a lex generalis that
\ncould be abused for the benefit of an authoritarian regime.<\/p>\n
This in effect means that the law gives power to security
\npersonnel (police, intelligence agencies and attorneys) to arrest
\nsuspected terrorists for 20 days, which could be extended for
\nanother six months, without any evidence. As it requires strong
\nevidence, the new Indonesian law cannot be abused by the
\ngovernment to arrest political dissidents or to "kill" its
\npolitical rivals.<\/p>\n
Comparably, the ISA gives the authority to the security
\nauthorities to arrest all those suspected of disrupting security
\nand political stability or jeopardizing the state -- the
\ninterpretation of which lies in the hands of those in power.<\/p>\n
The problem is actually not the ISA or the legal system but
\nthat Indonesia seems less confident about its own law and in
\nseeking to revise the new law, as always, seeks a scapegoat
\noutside itself.<\/p>\n
Building common awareness of national security issues requires
\nthe government including the security authorities and the House
\nto empower the existing system by involving as many parties as
\npossible.<\/p>\n
Yet adopting the Soeharto model of a military-supported
\nsecurity system would not be the answer; it created stability and
\nsecurity on the surface only, but people were victimized.<\/p>\n
While the House is revising the legislation, the government
\nshould start deploying people to maintain security and public
\norder by reviving for instance the neighborhood security system
\nthat requires visitors to report once in 24 hours when they enter
\na certain area and\/or village. This system was very effective in
\nstrengthening the Japanese defense against the allied forces and
\nits three-year-and half occupation in the country from 1942 to
\n1945.<\/p>\n
Under this system, all housing areas and villages are required
\nto have direct contact and coordination with security authorities
\nin maintaining security and public order and providing
\npreliminary information on potential disturbance.<\/p>\n
Jamaah Islamiyah's suspected members who were recently
\narrested by the police would not have been able to rent a house
\nin Semarang, Central Java, if such a security system was in
\nplace. Likewise suspected terrorists could be detected if such a
\nsystem is revived.<\/p>\n
In revising the antiterror law, the House should play a
\nstrategic and important role to empower the National Police in
\nhandling security and public order and not the Indonesian
\nMilitary.<\/p>\n
Terrorism is a serious threat, which falls under police
\njurisdiction as stipulated by the amended 1945 Constitution.
\nTherefore, the police should be given a larger budget to train
\nterrorism experts and detectives and to purchase more equipment.<\/p>\n
The House and the government could lobby the military
\nleadership to discuss a possible transfer of the military's
\nexperts and trained personnel who are not fully utilized, to
\nstrengthen the police in its counterterrorism program as well as
\nto maintain the military's professionalism.<\/p>\n
Such a move was conducted by the United States when a number
\nof its soldiers formerly deployed in the Vietnam war were
\ntransferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).<\/p>\n
Reinforcing the authority of the police and the military is
\npart of building a civil society. Giving the military more power
\nin handling security, including counterterrorism, could lessen
\nthe role of the police and bring the military back into politics,
\nsince the security approach could be politicized for its
\npolitical interests. The House should play a central role in
\nensuring that the main role of the police in domestic security is
\nstrengthened.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/key-to-win-war-on-terror-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}