Justice for East Timor<\/p>\n
The expected arrival of United Nations investigators in East
\nTimor this week to look into allegations of severe human rights
\nabuses in the territory, particularly shortly before and in the
\nwake of the Aug. 30 self-determination ballot, is easily the most
\nserious blow to Indonesia's international reputation to date. It
\nalso has the potential of bringing the most far-reaching
\nconsequences, whose impact on the country are difficult to
\nforesee.<\/p>\n
The experts UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
\nRobinson plans to bring to East Timor this week are well
\nqualified for the job. They will include field and forensic
\nexperts from the Boston-based U.S. Physicians for Human Rights
\nand from Argentina. These experts will be looking for evidence of
\nthe alleged killings, torture, rapes and forced expulsions
\ncommitted by pro-Jakarta militias, in many cases allegedly
\ncondoned or supported by Indonesian troops.<\/p>\n
If such evidence is found, the next step would be for the UN
\nto appoint a special international tribunal to try the
\nperpetrators either for war crimes or crimes against humanity. It
\nis difficult even to imagine how average Indonesians would react
\nto such an unprecedented experience of seeing some of their most
\nprominent leaders, either military or civilian, exposed and
\nbrought to account for such abominable crimes.<\/p>\n
Considered in this context, it is easy to understand the angry
\nreaction of Minister of Justice\/State Secretary Muladi on
\nlearning that a number of Australian jurists were planning to
\nvisit East Timor to collect evidence of past Indonesian
\nwrongdoings in the territory. If that were to occur, the minister
\nsaid, Indonesia would have to reconsider its relations with
\nAustralia -- a hint that such \"extraordinary arrogance\" could
\nlead to diplomatic relations between the two countries being
\nbroken off.<\/p>\n
Yet, though vehemently opposed to the idea of having an
\ninternational team of investigators browsing through Indonesia's
\ndirty linen in East Timor, there is little Jakarta can do to
\nprevent justice from taking its course in the former Portuguese
\ncolony, short of refusing to cooperate. The territory, after all,
\nis effectively under UN control. Personal security would be the
\nonly possible hindrance left to bar the investigators' access to
\nsuspected crime sites and witnesses. However, refusing to
\ncooperate could have dire consequences for Indonesia, in the form
\nof being regarded as a pariah state and being isolated from the
\nrest of the world. What that would mean for the crisis-stricken
\ncountry is not difficult to imagine.<\/p>\n
In this situation, there is an ominous ring to the statement
\nmade by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's spokesman Fred Eckhard
\non Thursday, that the UN would hold an inquiry into human rights
\nabuses in East Timor regardless of whether Indonesia accepted or
\nrejected the inquiry. If there is any light amid the gloom, it is
\nin Eckhard's promise the UN would strive to cooperate with
\nIndonesia's National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM).<\/p>\n
One may ask why the UN cannot just make things easier by
\nallowing Komnas HAM to lead the investigation, and simply assist
\nthe commission with whatever expertise it may need. Komnas HAM,
\nafter all, has a well-earned reputation of integrity, despite its
\nhaving been established by the New Order regime. The answer to
\nthis question, of course, is the lack of credibility -- not on
\nthe part of the rights commission, but of the Indonesian
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
In the past year since the fall of the Soeharto regime, the
\ncommission has made a number of recommendations to the government
\nbased on its investigations of major incidents, including the
\n1997 kidnapings of political activists, the May 1998 riots, the
\nTrisakti University shootings and the shooting of student
\nprotesters at the Semanggi cloverleaf. None of the
\nrecommendations have been followed up by the government.<\/p>\n
Not to be overlooked in all of this is the predominant role
\nthe Indonesian Military (TNI) continues to play in the country's
\nsocial and political lives. In all of the mentioned cases -- and,
\nof course, in East Timor -- the military is suspected of being
\neither directly or indirectly involved.<\/p>\n
Obviously, the TNI leadership will resist with all its power a
\ncandid exposure of the military's past wrongdoings. An indication
\nof this is seen in Muladi's about-face regarding the question of
\nwhether Indonesia should accept foreign investigators in East
\nTimor. A similar indication was the government's earlier U-turn
\nover whether to declare martial law in the territory.<\/p>\n
It can be said that given the currently prevailing
\ncircumstances in Indonesia, the only way for the UN to
\nsatisfactorily investigate human rights abuses in East Timor
\nwould be to hold its own independent inquiry. Another option
\nwould have been to ensure Indonesia's National Commission on
\nHuman Rights was able to work as a truly independent body, free
\nof any outside influence, particularly from the government. That,
\nhowever, is difficult to achieve as long as the military remains
\neffectively in control of civilian politics and the civilian
\nadministration.<\/p>",
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