July 27 marks watershed in modern Indonesian history<\/p>\n
Max Lane, Center for Asia Pacific, Social Transformation Studies,
\nUniversity of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia<\/p>\n
There is an interesting parallel between the history of East
\nTimor and of Indonesia in relation to how international public
\nopinion changed towards the presidency of Gen. Soeharto.<\/p>\n
In December 1991 a massacre took place at the Santa Cruz
\ncemetery which millions of people around the world later watched
\non their TV screens. The footage revived active criticism and
\ncampaigning of the New Order regime's occupation of East Timor.
\nAfter the original invasion of East Timor in 1975, there had been
\nseveral years of intense lobbying and political campaigning by
\nthe East Timorese Diaspora as well as by liberal and democratic
\nsections of the public in the United States, Europe and
\nAustralia. This was especially the case in Australia.<\/p>\n
In Australia, active public campaigning in support of East
\nTimorese independence virtually collapsed in 1983 after the
\nAustralian Labour Party (ALP) won the government under Prime
\nMinister Bob Hawke. The ALP's left wing had always been the main
\nsupport base for such campaigning. The ALP left collapsed under
\nthe Hawke administration demoralized by Hawke's conservative
\npolicies, including his enthusiastic support for the New Order
\nregime. \"Mr President, your people love you,\" he told Soeharto at
\na state banquet in Jakarta in 1983.<\/p>\n
It was the Dili massacre that revived criticism of the New
\nOrder regime's policy on East Timor. But public opinion in
\nAustralia in relation to the New Order's rule in the rest of
\nIndonesia was largely unaffected. Critical public opinion was
\nfocussed primarily on the Soeharto-Golkar policy on East Timor.<\/p>\n
This all changed with July 27, 1996, and the attack on the Jl.
\nDiponegoro headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
\nAs with the Dili massacre, TV footage of the incident appeared
\nagain and again on television screens around the world, including
\nin Australia. Millions of Australians saw bodies being brought
\nout on stretchers and placed in vans.<\/p>\n
They saw the horde of men charge into the PDI office. They
\nheard the cries and yells of all those involved. Then they read
\nthe reports of the casualties and all the rumors at the time of
\nhow many people were killed.<\/p>\n
A vivid impression was left that the New Order regime, made up
\nof Soeharto, Golkar and the Armed Forces, were willing to use
\nviolence against opposition in Jakarta, including against
\nopposition by somebody created from within the New Order elite,
\nsuch as then PDI chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri. This
\nimpression virtually ended the legitimacy of the New Order regime
\nin international public opinion.<\/p>\n
In fact, however, there was more to this process of
\ndelegitimizing than just the terrible images of the attack on Jl.
\nDiponegoro and all the descriptions of the repression.<\/p>\n
Coverage of Indonesian politics had already started to
\nincrease before July 27. The struggle between Megawati and
\nSoeharto was already major news. A strong -- and indeed accurate
\n-- image had been created that Megawati was refusing to budge
\nagainst Soeharto's maneuvers to crush her political career. This
\nwas the first time a figure from the Jakarta political elite was
\nstanding firm against Suharto and thereby creating somebody who
\nappeared to be a genuine opposition figure.<\/p>\n
It was already clear to most people that Megawati was only
\ninterested in defying Soeharto on one issue: Namely her right to
\nlead the PDI. Her silence on the repression against other
\npolitical figures and groups was widely noted. However, her
\ndefiance on the single issue of her own role had clearly turned
\nher into an important political symbol, both in Indonesia and
\ninternationally.<\/p>\n
But because this defiance was based on such a narrow, self-
\ncentered form of resistance, other factors were necessary in
\norder for public opinion in countries like Australia to change.
\nThe key development widely reported in Australia was the fact
\nthat the PDI offices on Jl. Diponegoro had become a center for
\nthe gathering of a wide range of pro-democracy groups.<\/p>\n
Very few people in Australia would have heard of the Majelis
\nRakyat Indonesia (MARI), the coalition of democratic groups that
\nheld constant public forums in the PDI offices. But reports did
\nconstantly refer to the gatherings there, the free speech forums.
\nThe message started to get out in Australia that there was a
\nspectrum of opinion in Indonesia that was opposed to Soeharto and
\nthe New Order.<\/p>\n
It was not just Megawati's name that started to be familiar,
\nbut also that of Sri Bintang Pamungkas and labor leader Mochtar
\nPakpahan. There had been news reports also of the arrest of
\nanother labor leader, Dita Indah Sari in Surabaya earlier in
\nJuly. Later after July 27, when the New Order tried to blame the
\nriots that took place that day on the Peoples' Democratic Party
\n(PRD), its chairman's name, Budiman Sujatmiko, also became very
\nwell known in Australia, the United States and Europe.<\/p>\n
There was also an increasing number of other Indonesian
\ncritics of Soeharto that gained some profile. These also included
\nacademics such as George Aditjondro and Arief Budiman.<\/p>\n
The weeks leading up to July 27 itself and then the aftermath
\nall showed people in Australia, that there was a significant
\nrange of alternative opinion to that represented by Soeharto, the
\nArmed Forces and Golkar. This further advanced the decline in the
\nNew Order's international legitimacy.<\/p>\n
There was another aspect of the July 27 process that further
\nstrengthened this decline in legitimacy. It also became clear
\nthat the dissatisfaction and defiance of the New Order
\nrepresented by the opposition figures and critics was finding
\nactive support among ordinary people, on the streets.<\/p>\n
The July arrest of Dita brought to peoples notice that there
\nwere worker protests happening that involved thousands of people.
\nThere had also been TV reportage of the PDI-organized mass march
\nfrom the PDI headquarters to Gambir station a few weeks before
\nJuly 27 that had been met with a military blockade and resulted
\nin injuries.<\/p>\n
The courage and militancy of the PDI members inside their
\nheadquarters was another potent symbol of this popular sentiment.<\/p>\n
The broadcast from July 27 itself also showed demonstrations
\nand protests taking place. And, of course, the rioting itself
\npointed to widespread mass anger.<\/p>\n
The emergence of a figure from within the political elite,
\nMegawati, who persisted in defying Soeharto began the process of
\neroding the New Order's legitimacy. However, Megawati's narrow
\nagenda would have been insufficient for any real sense of
\nimpending change to develop overseas.<\/p>\n
July 27 was the beginning of the end of the New Order because
\nof the other factors that had emerged: A coalition of democratic
\nforces; a range of new political figures, including youth, labor
\nleaders and academics; and popular street mobilizations
\nreflecting the demand for change.<\/p>",
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