JP\/xx\/ENDY<\/p>\n
The reality of power sharing -- Who is in charge of the ship?<\/p>\n
JP\/XX\/ENDY<\/p>\n
Endy M. Bayuni
\nThe Jakarta Post\/Jakarta<\/p>\n
When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the presidential election in
\nSeptember with more than 60 percent of the total votes, many
\npeople breathed a sigh of relief. Finally, a president with a
\nstrong mandate and trust from the people to fix all the problems
\nthat this country has had for a long time.<\/p>\n
So they thought. Or so they hoped.<\/p>\n
In most other democracies, such a landslide electoral victory
\nwould have translated into a popular endorsement for the winner
\nto carry out whatever programs he promised during the campaign.
\nPresident George W. Bush, with a much smaller margin than Susilo,
\ninterpreted his November election victory as a green light to
\ncarry out his conservative agenda in the United States. And he is
\nwell on his way to do that.<\/p>\n
But not with SBY, as we refer to our new president by his
\ninitials. He may enjoy popular and constitutional legitimacy like
\nnone of the other five previous Indonesian presidents had. As the
\nfirst president to be directly elected by the people, courtesy of
\nthe newly amended Constitution, SBY can claim to be the only
\npresident who truly enjoys both types of legitimacy.<\/p>\n
But the Constitution has also clipped much of the powers that
\nall his predecessors, including Megawati Soekarnoputri until
\nOctober, enjoyed.<\/p>\n
And in the spirit of dispersing power away from one hand,
\nIndonesian voters decided through elections this year to give the
\ncontrol of the House of Representatives to the major political
\nparties, and the presidency to someone from a minority party.<\/p>\n
In our quest for more democracy, we seem to be stretching the
\nconcept of power sharing to the limit.<\/p>\n
At the end of the series of elections this year, Indonesia
\nemerged more like a newly refurbished ship -- and a large one at
\nthat, carrying 220 million people -- with a new captain who
\ncommands the trust of a sizeable chunk of the passengers, but one
\nwho does not appear to have full control over the direction and
\nthe speed of the vessel.<\/p>\n
This begs the question: Who is in control of the ship?<\/p>\n
The direct presidential election was the culmination of a
\nseries of changes that Indonesia has been making these past few
\nyears about how best to manage the country. Power is shared in a
\nway never before so that relations between the constituents, the
\npresident, and legislature as the representatives of the people
\nhave been drastically changed.<\/p>\n
This ship has undergone a complete overhaul. We may be in for
\na rough sail. Not only is the ship untested, but we also have a
\ncaptain who does not seem to have full command of the ship.<\/p>\n
Essentially, we have a brand new Constitution. We'd still like
\nto call it the 1945 Constitution, but the country's basic law has
\nundergone so many amendments these past few years that I doubt
\nthe drafters who wrote the original text 59 years ago would
\nrecognize it as theirs if they were still alive today.<\/p>\n
One of the main features of the amended 1945 Constitution is
\nthat political power is now more widely shared among many
\nplayers. Some might even say that we just have too much power
\nsharing for the kind of challenges we are facing.<\/p>\n
Power today is certainly no longer is concentrated in one
\nhand.<\/p>\n
One thing we have learned from the Sukarno and Soeharto years
\nis that you can never put so many powers in the hands of one
\nperson without the necessary checks and balances. Sooner or
\nlater, he or she is bound to abuse them. Those first two
\npresidents did so to the extent that they undermined the nation
\nbuilding process.<\/p>\n
The Constitution today makes sure that we have a truly
\nindependent judiciary. Like most other state institutions in the
\ncountry, the courts may still be as corrupt as they have ever
\nbeen, and they need to be cleaned up. But at least, the judiciary
\nis now independent from the government, or far more independent
\nthan when it was fully under the control of Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Military (TNI), once a powerful tool at
\nSoeharto's personal disposal, is also subject to greater controls
\nand public scrutiny so that it no longer enjoys the power it had
\ngrown accustomed to in the past. The TNI is no longer represented
\nin the House of Representatives or the regional legislative
\ncouncils. Military officers are barred from holding civilian
\npositions unless they retire from the service first.<\/p>\n
TNI's withdrawal from practical politics is almost complete.
\nIt can still potentially become a dangerous loose cannon, but
\nefforts are still being made to bring the military fully under
\ncivilian control.<\/p>\n
Some of the powers enjoyed by the President in the past have
\nnow gone to the House of Representatives or are at least subject
\nto greater checks and balances by the House.<\/p>\n
Besides controlling the legislative agenda, the House today
\nenjoys so much power that the President or his Cabinet have to
\nconsult regularly even on matters that are essentially the domain
\nof the executive branch.<\/p>\n
But even the power of the House itself has been clipped
\nbeginning this year with the establishment of the Regional
\nRepresentatives Council, supposedly modeled on the U.S. Senate,
\nto give an even greater representation to the regions.<\/p>\n
The move to decentralize government which started in 2001
\nunder the Regional Autonomy Law has further chipped away the
\npowers of the President and his control over the regions. Today,
\neach province in Indonesia, and each regency or mayoralty within
\nthese provinces, is an autonomous entity.<\/p>\n
The region's strength vis-a-vis Jakarta will further be
\nenhanced in 2005 when governors, regents and mayors will all be
\ndirectly elected by the people, and no longer by the local
\nlegislative councils. In the future, these governors and regents
\nwill owe their allegiances and loyalty to their constituents, and
\nnot to the legislative council or to the President in Jakarta as
\nthe case is today.<\/p>\n
Megawati Soekarnoputri, through her Indonesian Democratic
\nParty of Struggle (PDI-P), pretty much exercised control over the
\nelections of these regional chiefs when she was at the helm. And
\nwe all know how dirty those elections could get, with money
\nchanging hands, and regional elections won essentially by the
\nhighest bidders.<\/p>\n
This will not be the case under President Susilo Bambang
\nYudhoyono.<\/p>\n
No amount of money can influence the way people vote in the
\nregions in 2005. Like the national elections in 2004, elections
\nin the region will be through a secret ballot.<\/p>\n
When Susilo was elected president in September, many people
\nimmediately drew an analogy between him and Soeharto. Some had
\nthis nostalgic notion that, coming from the Army himself, SBY
\nwould have many of the positive qualities of Soeharto, hopefully
\nwithout the evils that came with the package.<\/p>\n
During the election campaign period, we frequently heard the
\ndesire expressed among voters for strong leadership, to elect
\nsomeone who has the power to sort out this big mess that
\nIndonesia is today.<\/p>\n
To some extent, SBY was elected on that ticket.<\/p>\n
But any notion that SBY would be as effective and efficient as
\nSoeharto was in the 1960s in managing the country is an illusion.
\nSoeharto controlled the military and eventually both the
\njudiciary and the legislative branches of the government that
\nmade him an effective tyrant in the sense that he always got what
\nhe wanted.<\/p>\n
This is not going to be the case with SBY.<\/p>\n
He does not control the judiciary, the legislatures or the
\nregions. Some might even say, from the way he picked his Cabinet,
\nthat he does not even have complete control over his own
\nadministration. And now, he also has to share more of his powers
\nwith his vice president Jusuf Kalla.<\/p>\n
Jusuf Kalla's election as chairman of Golkar in October
\nfurther complicated the power equation. Theoretically, the vice
\npresident can be as strong, if not stronger than the president,
\nbecause he also controls a sizable block of the votes in
\nparliament.<\/p>\n
To understand better the complexities of the power relations
\nin Indonesia today, and thus the behavior of the political
\nleaders, we should look at their allegiances.<\/p>\n
In Soeharto's years, it was clear that just about every one of
\nthem owed their allegiance and thus their loyalty, to him. Today,
\nbecause of the way they were voted or appointed, these
\nallegiances changed:<\/p>\n
* President SBY owes his to the people nationwide because he
\nwas directly elected by them.<\/p>\n
* Members of the House of Representatives owe theirs to their
\nparty leaders. The parties nominated the House members, and once
\nelected, the members are subject to recall by party leaders.<\/p>\n
* Members of the Regional Representatives Council owe theirs
\nto the people in their provinces.<\/p>\n
* Governors, regents and mayors owe theirs to the people in
\ntheir respective regions.<\/p>\n
* Vice President Jusuf Kalla and other cabinet members owe
\ntheir loyalty partly to the President but some also partly to
\ntheir party. They were awarded seats because they, or their
\nparties, helped secure SBY's election victory.<\/p>\n
Some of these come from the small Islamist political parties
\nwho do not necessarily share the President's vision.<\/p>\n
With the exception of the Cabinet members, those in the House
\nare the only ones who do not owe their position to the people, at
\nleast not directly.<\/p>\n
Leaders of the major political parties retain strong control
\nover the House, and given the power that the House enjoys today,
\nover the direction of the country.<\/p>\n
Jusuf Kalla's take over of the Golkar chairmanship may have
\ndefused the threat coming from the coalition that his predecessor
\nAkbar Tandjung formed with former presidents Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri and Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid of the PDI-P and
\nPKB respectively.<\/p>\n
Given that Akbar, Megawati and Gud Dur lost the September
\npresidential election to Susilo, there was a lot of sour grapes
\namong the three leaders, such that they were likely to play the
\nrole of an obstructionist opposition if the coalition had held.<\/p>\n
While Golkar under Jusuf Kalla has somewhat strengthened SBY's
\ngrip in parliament, Golkar still needs to negotiate with the
\nsmaller parties to ensure majority support for the president's
\nlegislative agenda.<\/p>\n
The stage is thus set for the nation's political leaders to
\nset this ship carrying 220 million on a perilous journey.<\/p>\n
A newly refurbished ship with unclear rules about who is in
\ncharge is essentially what we have today.<\/p>\n
The captain has to listen not only to the people, but also to
\na handful of people claiming to represent the people, but more
\noften than not, with their own political agenda, in deciding the
\ncourse and the speed of the ship.<\/p>\n
I don't think this ship will go aground, capsize or even break
\nup. As untested as it may be, this ship is just too big to sink.
\nStill, this new power-sharing arrangement will dictate the course
\nand pace of development in Indonesia. A lot therefore will depend
\non the behavior of the political leaders.<\/p>\n
Events in the first few weeks into this journey are too few
\nfor us to foretell what the national leaders have in store.<\/p>\n
* The House was deadlocked for more than a week when the
\nNationhood Coalition found resistance from small pro-SBY parties
\nwho boycotted the sessions in protest over the way the
\nchairmanship of House commissions were given to the coalition
\nrepresentatives. The coalition eventually got the upper hand.<\/p>\n
* The House and the President were locked in a battle over the
\nplanned replacement of the chief of the military. The President
\neventually prevailed and retained Gen. Endriartono Sutarto as TNI
\nchief. The major parties had earlier tried to impose the
\nappointment of a general picked by Megawati before she left
\noffice.<\/p>\n
* The President's proposal to extend the civil emergency
\nstatus of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Aceh) was given smooth
\npassage in the House.<\/p>\n
* Jusuf Kalla's election as Golkar chairman effectively killed
\nthe Nationhood Coalition.<\/p>\n
What these few incidents tell us is that we are likely to see
\nsome more fighting between the legislative and the executive
\nbranches this coming year. The House can play the role of an
\nobstructionist opposition at times, like the way it tried to
\nimpose its will on the appointment of the military chief. But it
\ncan also play the role of an effective partner, like the way it
\nquickly endorsed SBY's Aceh plan with little debate.<\/p>\n
The first few weeks have essentially been used by all the
\npolitical leaders to measure their strength, to see how much real
\npower they have in the decision-making process. But they still
\nleave some unanswered questions that only time will tell.<\/p>\n
We have yet to see how the big parties will use their power in
\ncontrolling the country's legislative agenda, which is very much
\nin their hands rather than in the President's. While the major
\nparties may feel that they are powerful, they have lost
\ngrassroots support in the September presidential elections, when
\nmany of their traditional supporters voted for SBY.<\/p>\n
We have yet to see how the Regional Representatives Council
\nuses its power, not only to counterbalance the power of the
\nHouse, but also to push the aspirations of the people in the
\nregion into the political corridors in Jakarta. Most of the
\nregional administrations are dependent on central government
\nfinancing, but the rich and thus independent regions have begun
\nto be more assertive in pressing for more concessions from
\nJakarta.<\/p>\n
We have yet to see how governors, regents and mayors, once
\nthey are elected directly by the people in their regions
\nbeginning in 2005, will use that power in dealing with Jakarta,
\nespecially when pressing for more concessions.<\/p>\n
At the same time, we know that the President has got a little
\nmore than he can handle. These are just some of the priorities in
\nhis \"to do\" list of issues that people are watching closely.<\/p>\n
* Fighting corruption<\/p>\n
* Hiking domestic fuel prices and slashing the costly subsidy<\/p>\n
* Restoring investor confidence, bringing investors in<\/p>\n
* Striving for a 6 percent economic growth rate to eradicate
\npoverty and cut the massive unemployment and underemployment<\/p>\n
* Fighting terrorism, dealing with armed insurgency in Aceh
\nand Papua, solving communal conflicts in Maluku and Central
\nSulawesi, restoring security and order throughout the country<\/p>\n
* Continuing with political and economic reforms<\/p>\n
In each of these issues, he will need the support and
\nendorsement of the House, the Regional Representatives Council,
\nthe regional administrations and the people.<\/p>\n
On some issues, he will probably enjoy an easy passage and
\nfind them to be cooperative.<\/p>\n
On other issues, however, he will face a tough battle,
\nespecially from the opposition factions in the House of
\nRepresentatives.<\/p>\n
The central and region governments have yet to see the battle
\nlines drawn, but they will come soon. The imminent hike in
\ndomestic fuel prices is going to be a very unpopular move that
\ncould be very destabilizing and chip away at the massive goodwill
\nthat SBY enjoys from the people.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, much depends on the leadership of the captain of
\nthis ship.<\/p>\n
Here, we see some encouraging signs, at least going by the
\nfirst few weeks of SBY's presidency.<\/p>\n
Here is a president who tries to reach out to as many as
\npossible; a president who listens; a president who knows the
\nlimits of his power, hence he feels the need to consult with
\nthose who matter, including the House; and a president who is
\nvery calculating in making decisions.<\/p>\n
Together with his vice president Jusuf Kalla, they have had
\nthe experience of government serving as Megawati's lieutenants.
\nThey are not complete novices in their knowledge of the
\nchallenges or the complexity of running a country as big as
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Indonesia today is a ship that is being commanded by the best
\ncaptain it can ask for. He is certainly skilled and experienced,
\nand his military skill gives him the discipline needed for the
\njob. Let's hope that in steering this ship, the captain also has
\nthe wisdom and statesmanship that is necessary to navigate the
\nnation safely on this perilous journey.<\/p>\n
The author is editor-in-chief of The Jakarta Post.This paper
\nwas first presented at the seminar on Indonesia: The Road Ahead,
\norganized by Network Indonesia Singapore, in Singapore on Dec.
\n7.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jpxxendy-1447899208",
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