{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1144876,
        "msgid": "jp7seth-1447899208",
        "date": "2005-02-05 00:00:00",
        "title": "JP\/7\/SETH",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "JP\/7\/SETH The relations between Jakarta and Canberra have been strained by becuase of the way East Timor got its independence. What Went Wrong in Indonesia-Australia Relations? S.P. SETH Sidney The tsunami disaster has brought Indonesia closer to the world, particularly with rich developed countries able to help with their human and material resources.",
        "content": "<p>JP\/7\/SETH<\/p>\n<p>The relations between Jakarta and Canberra have been strained by<br>\nbecuase of the way East Timor got its independence.<\/p>\n<p>What Went Wrong in Indonesia-Australia Relations?<\/p>\n<p>S.P. SETH<br>\nSidney<\/p>\n<p>The tsunami disaster has brought Indonesia closer to the <br>\nworld, particularly with rich developed countries able to help <br>\nwith their human and material resources. Australia, for instance, <br>\nhas committed about $A1billion (half as grants and rest as low <br>\ninterest loans) for reconstruction work over a period of time. <br>\nThe government aside, the Australian people have also chipped in <br>\nfor disaster relief in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region. <br>\nThis then is seen as an opportune time to forge closer relations <br>\nwith Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>The relations between Jakarta and Canberra have been strained <br>\nbecause of the way East Timor got its independence. The <br>\ndeterioration occurred under John Howard&apos;s stewardship as <br>\nAustralia&apos;s Prime Minister. Around the same time, Indonesia <br>\nunderwent a severe economic crisis and the fall of President <br>\nSoeharto, Indonesia&apos;s long term authoritarian president.<\/p>\n<p>It was under then president Soeharto that Australia and <br>\nIndonesia forged close relations. Australia&apos;s then prime minister <br>\nPaul Keating made it a priority foreign policy consideration. <br>\nWith Soeharto and Keating both gone from the political scene, the <br>\nrelationship became fatherless, so to say.<\/p>\n<p>When the Labor Party in opposition sought to make East Timor a <br>\npopular political issue, the Howard Government quickly wrested <br>\nthe initiative by advocating special autonomy for East Timor <br>\nfollowed by a referendum sometime into the future. Indonesia&apos;s <br>\nthen president Habibie, though, opted for immediate referendum in <br>\n1999.  In the process, Indonesia lost East Timor when its people <br>\noverwhelmingly voted for independence.<\/p>\n<p>Australia found itself in the middle of a political and <br>\nhumanitarian crisis, with John Howard&apos;s Government winning <br>\npolitical kudos for bringing about East Timor&apos;s independence. It <br>\nwasn&apos;t true, though. Australia simply happened to be in the right <br>\nplace at the right time.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, Canberra played a significant peacetime role after <br>\nthe mayhem created by the departing Indonesian forces and their <br>\nmilitia creations. The leading peacekeeping role was, in some <br>\nways, foisted upon Canberra as there was no one else in the <br>\nregion willing to do it.<\/p>\n<p>But inadvertently or by design Canberra managed to over-<br>\ndramatize its political and military role; making it look like a <br>\nmilitary victory over a demoralized Indonesia already in the <br>\nmidst of a severe economic and political crisis. Indonesia&apos;s <br>\nruling class, particularly its military elites, haven&apos;t forgotten <br>\nor forgiven Australia for this.<\/p>\n<p>It was felt that Australia had taken advantage of Indonesia&apos;s <br>\nweakness as it was grappling with its manifold problems. And they <br>\nhad a point. Because over the years, since Indonesia occupied <br>\nEast Timor in 1975, Canberra had accepted Jakarta&apos;s sovereignty <br>\neven signing the maritime boundary in the Timor Sea to partake of <br>\nits oil riches. This is now a contentious issue between Australia <br>\nand the independent state of East Timor. But that is another <br>\nstory.<\/p>\n<p>East Timor is now history, though it will continue to cast a <br>\nshadow on Indonesia-Australia relations. For instance, despite <br>\nAustralian protestations that Canberra respects Indonesia&apos;s <br>\nterritorial integrity, it is taken with a pinch of salt. Whether <br>\nit is the separatist movement in Paupa or Aceh, Australia is <br>\nbelieved to be somehow involved, largely because of its perceived <br>\nrole in facilitating East Timor&apos;s independence.<\/p>\n<p>Even as the tsunami relief operations are continuing, <br>\nimportant elements of Indonesia&apos;s establishment see sinister <br>\nmotivation behind foreign involvement in Aceh-principally from <br>\nAustralia and the United States. Maj. Gen. Syamsir Siregar, the <br>\nhead of the National Intelligence Agency, has reportedly said <br>\nthat foreign troops in Aceh brought a hidden political agenda to <br>\nmap territory and secure the strategic Strait of Malacca.<\/p>\n<p>Be that as it may, Australia does sound arrogant when <br>\nreporting on Indonesia. For instance, the front page banner <br>\nheadline in the Sydney Morning Herald about Canberra&apos;s instant <br>\nresponse to the tsunami disaster in Aceh was titled &quot;Australia <br>\ntakes charge in Indonesia.&quot; The report that followed wasn&apos;t much <br>\nbetter. It read: &quot;Indonesia has asked Australia to come into the <br>\nheart of its Government and help lead the reconstruction of its   <br>\ntsunami-stricken regions, a diplomatic coup for the Prime <br>\nMinister John Howard&quot; It might just be a newspaper report but it <br>\ndoes seem to reflect a certain mindset.<\/p>\n<p>Commenting on what a brilliantly executed move the tsunami-<br>\npackage announcement was, an Australian analyst wrote, &quot;What once <br>\nlooked like a haphazard strand of foreign policy has been <br>\ntransformed into a coherent policy for reducing security and <br>\neconomic risks emanating from the Solomons, Papua New Guinea, <br>\nEast Timor and Indonesia-Australia&apos;s northern &apos;ring of fire&apos;.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>Leaving aside the propriety of reducing a decent humanitarian <br>\ngesture to a political gain, it just doesn&apos;t seem right to club <br>\nIndonesia with some of the tiny South Pacific states under <br>\nAustralia&apos;s zone of influence.<\/p>\n<p>Such insensitivity is also reflected in official policy <br>\npronouncements. Prime Minister John Howard&apos;s December 15 <br>\nannouncement to effectively extend Australia&apos;s maritime security <br>\nzone to 1000 nautical miles is a recent example. Apparently, this <br>\nwas a unilateral decision without consultation with Indonesia. <br>\nAnd not surprisingly, Jakarta is unhappy.<\/p>\n<p>Canberra&apos;s own pre-emption doctrine against regional terrorism <br>\nstill rankles in Indonesia and other regional countries.<\/p>\n<p>At another level, Indonesia is tarred with the problem of <br>\nterrorism. At times Indonesia looks like a one-dimensional entity <br>\nneeding to be tackled as a regional terrorism hub. Prime Minister <br>\nJohn Howard believes that moderate Islam could be strongly <br>\nencouraged by increased investment in Indonesia. At the Asia-<br>\nPacific Economic Co-operation forum in Chile, he said, &quot;It&apos;s <br>\nimportant to try and tackle inequalities in societies which <br>\nprovide, how should I put it, a point of advocacy for <br>\nterrorists&quot;, as in Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>There is certainly more to Indonesia than terrorism. And to <br>\nsee Indonesia as a regional terrorist hub requiring terrorist-<br>\nrelated help is a limited and limiting policy approach.<\/p>\n<p>The author is a free-lance writer based in Sidney.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jp7seth-1447899208",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}