JP\/7\/DAMIEN2<\/p>\n
Damien Kingsbury
\nHead
\nPhilosophical, Political
\nand International Studies
\nDeakin University<\/p>\n
In trying to justify the actions of the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) in Indonesia's westernmost province of Aceh, Indonesia's
\nforeign minister Hassan Wirayuda says that nothing less than the
\nfuture of the state is at stake. Wirayuda may be right, but not
\nin the way that he thinks.<\/p>\n
The behavior of the TNI in Aceh has, by all accounts, been
\nappalling since it started its most recent campaign. The reports
\npublished here and elsewhere are disturbing enough.<\/p>\n
Further worrying is the flood of private reports coming from
\nnon-government organizations which details more horrific events,
\nincluding an escalating rate of murder, in detailed cases by
\nlocking civilians in their homes and burning them, the
\ndestruction of villages, and rape. This looks not so much as a
\nmilitary campaign against a rebel force, but of an invading
\nfeudal Army intent on destroying an enemy people.<\/p>\n
The TNI now clamping down on the media's reporting of the
\nsituation is a further sign that it wishes to conduct this
\ncampaign unhindered by poor publicity. There is no thought,
\nhowever, that poor publicity derives from poor behavior.<\/p>\n
The clearly stated aim of the TNI is to \"exterminate\" the Free
\nAceh Movement (GAM). However, based on the TNI's previous form in
\nAceh, this operation will not be quick, and may not be
\nsuccessful. The TNI is not especially well equipped and often
\npoorly trained, the terrain is difficult, and GAM are very
\nexperienced guerrilla fighters with a long history of surviving
\nseemingly tight situations.<\/p>\n
Beyond the immediate military outcome, there is also the
\nlikelihood that rather than bring Aceh back into the Indonesian
\nnationalist fold, the TNI is in the process of creating a new
\ngeneration of GAM, as it has done before. In this respect, a
\nmilitary solution may be no solution at all.<\/p>\n
Hassan Wirayuda, and other Indonesian leaders, are fearful
\nthat if Aceh does manage to achieve independence then Indonesia
\nwill fall apart. But the only other substantial claim to
\nindependence in Indonesian is West Papua, and it is quite
\npossible that Indonesian could survive without these two
\nprovinces.<\/p>\n
It would be poorer, certainly, but it would still be viable,
\nand much less violent. Yet without external recognition, and
\nsome form of diplomatic intervention, independence for Aceh is
\nall but impossible. And this seems unlikely. To that end, a
\ncompromise solution must be found.<\/p>\n
Aceh has already experienced \"special autonomy\", from 1962, to
\naddress claims similar to those now being pressed, and most
\nAcehnese believe that failed because it was subverted by Jakarta,
\nnot least through ravaging the province's economy.<\/p>\n
Added to longstanding human rights atrocities by the TNI,
\nthere is a profound sense of distrust of Jakarta and its
\nintentions.<\/p>\n
As a consequence, a new \"special autonomy\" that was proclaimed
\nlast year is not regarded as either substantial or sincere.
\nNegotiations therefore have to be reopened, and a new offer needs
\nto be put on the table. This would involve Aceh being offered the
\nchance to vote for a far more extended form of autonomy, external
\nto Indonesia in nearly all but name.<\/p>\n
With agreement for the disbursement of a nominal percentage of
\nrevenue, Aceh could otherwise be self-governing in effectively
\nall areas but for foreign affairs, monetary and defense. Under
\nsuch an arrangement, the TNI would have to leave Aceh entirely,
\nwhich it would be loathe to do because of its lucrative business
\ninterests there, and the blow to its sense of \"prestige\".<\/p>\n
Such a move would also challenge the TNI's self-defined
\n\"territorial structure\", by which it is located throughout the
\narchipelago.<\/p>\n
Because of the parallel role the National Police have played
\nalongside the TNI in Aceh, not least through the paramilitary
\nMobile Brigades (Brimbob), \"Hunter\" battalions, and the BKO
\n(under operational control) units in which elite soldiers are
\ntechnically accredited as police, they too would have to end
\ntheir presence in Aceh. A local police would then have to be
\nraised, under a local administration.<\/p>\n
Such a settlement would take a huge amount of good will on
\nboth sides, a high degree of honesty and transparency, and
\ninternational monitoring for several years at least. The TNI
\nwould certainly reject such a settlement, but it could have some
\nsupport among civilian politicians in Jakarta who know the war
\nin Aceh is not very popular. Such a solution could also attract
\nthe backing of third countries, such as Japan, Malaysia,
\nThailand, the Netherlands, the U.S., and even Australia.<\/p>\n
Indeed, GAM has said, privately, that it would have accepted
\nsuch an offer until a couple of years ago, although that option
\nvanished when the military campaign escalated in early 2001. With
\nthe latest events, however, it would take a superhuman effort to
\nget back to this point of negotiation.<\/p>\n
Wirayuda is right; the future of Indonesia is at stake. But
\nwhat is at stake is less the geographic shape of Indonesia, than
\nwhat sort of state Indonesia wants to, or can, be.<\/p>\n
The writer is also the author of Power Politics and the
\n Indonesian Military, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.<\/p>",
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