JP\/6\/PAULO<\/p>\n
Sharp criticism of UNTAET's role in East Timor
\n
\nPaulo Gorjco
\nLusmada University
\nPortugal
\npaulogorjao@yahoo.com<\/p>\n
After more than two years and six months, the legacy of the
\nUnited Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
\nis still marred by several structural problems.<\/p>\n
First, East Timor became independent while conflicting claims
\non land and property ownership remained unresolved. By itself,
\nthis was already a significant underachievement. Yet without
\nclear land and property rules, foreign investment could not flow
\nto the territory. This reality was recognized by the UNTAET
\nadministrator himself, Sergio Vieira de Mello.<\/p>\n
Second, UNTAET wasted much time in its dealing with the future
\nof the National Liberation Armed Forces of East Timor (Falintil),
\nanother problem it acknowledged.<\/p>\n
Moreover, when UNTAET was compelled to act due to the threat
\nof mutiny among Falintil's ranks, the integration of its former
\nmembers into the new East Timorese Defense Forces (FDTL) was left
\nto personal loyalties, instead of clear and transparent criteria.<\/p>\n
Third, UNTAET was incapable of establishing and maintaining a
\nfunctioning justice system. Indeed, it is a miracle that there
\nwere a few convictions for crimes committed during 1999. At the
\nsame time, intra-East Timorese reconciliation did not occur,
\nwhile refugees in West Timor returned to the territory at a
\nsnails' pace. The idea of amnesty towards perpetrators of
\nviolence has been always in the air, but without clarity.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the "Timorization", i.e. the incorporation of the
\nlocal population at all levels of the public administration, only
\nprogressed under pressure from the East Timorese. It was only
\nlater on that the international "experts" working for UNTAET
\nstarted to teach local citizens how to do what they were doing.<\/p>\n
Fifth, UNTAET left East Timor with a Constitution drafted
\naccording to Fretilin's wishes and with a parliament controlled
\nentirely by the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent
\nEast Timor). Again, this was short-sighted.<\/p>\n
UNTAET could have chosen to select several East Timorese
\nrepresentatives from different parties, religious groups, non
\ngovernment organizations and minority groups. Then, with UNTAET
\nsupport, they would draft an inclusive and widely representative
\nConstitution, which would certainly have more political
\nlegitimacy than the current one.<\/p>\n
The interim Assembly elected in August 2001 should not have
\nbeen allowed to automatically become the new parliament. Fresh
\nelections should have been scheduled in the near future.<\/p>\n
Various East Timorese also cite the above examples, though
\nthey are also partially responsible for shortcomings.<\/p>\n
None of the above problems have been resolved in the past six
\nmonths.<\/p>\n
Uncertainty continues to face former Falintil members. There
\nare at least two veterans' associations, which reveal different
\nloyalties within the East Timorese political system. The justice
\nsystem is seriously understaffed and almost paralyzed, while the
\nestablished Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation is
\ntaking too long to start functioning.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the amnesty law to be approved by the parliament
\ncontinues under careful and long study.<\/p>\n
There are several explanations for the apparent executive and
\nlegislative paralysis that took place in the last six months. The
\nlack of a competent bureaucracy is one of them.<\/p>\n
Also, in the same way that the National Council did not
\nsuggest or prepare any legislative draft regulation to submit to
\nthe UN Transitional Administrator, a similar process is occurring
\nwith the new parliament vis-a-vis the government.<\/p>\n
When the members of the parliament are not absent -- which
\nmany of them repeatedly are without any justification -- they
\nspend most of their time dealing with minor details which do not
\nresult in any substantive legislative outcome. Indeed, they have
\nnot come forward with any relevant legislation in the last six
\nmonths, despite Fretilin's clear majority.<\/p>\n
In turn, this fact is related with the third reason why
\ndemocratic governance has been so poor thus far. The East
\nTimorese have no prior democratic experience and the last six
\nmonths have been a learning experience in every way. The
\npresidency, the government, and the parliament are still looking
\nfor the right balance of power among them.<\/p>\n
Institution-building is probably the greatest challenge that
\nEast Timor will experience in the forthcoming years. Like
\nelsewhere, institution-building is always a protracted process,
\nwith many pitfalls in its path.<\/p>\n
In the last six months, the East Timorese had a first taste of
\nhow hard the exercise of self-ruling can be. The results have not
\nbeen brilliant. For the sake of democratic legitimacy in East
\nTimor, we can only look forward to see a better performing
\npolitical system in the forthcoming months.<\/p>\n
The writer is also a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense
\nStudies Center.<\/p>",
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