JP\/6\/LA19<\/p>\n
Which path for East Asia?<\/p>\n
Hilton L. Root
\nFormer Senior Adviser
\nU.S. Department of the Treasury<\/p>\n
The Washington Post<\/p>\n
Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent visit to Asia aimed
\nto reassure countries assisting the U.S. anti-terror effort, but
\nit may have had the opposite effect by highlighting how much U.S.
\ninterests have diverged from the priorities of that region.<\/p>\n
In emphasizing the anti-terrorist theme for both South and
\nEast Asia, the administration seems to underestimate the
\ncontinuing effect of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia. A
\none-dimensional approach would be unfortunate in a region that
\nwelcomes broad U.S. engagement and cannot imagine its future
\nwithout a strong U.S. role. It would also facilitate China's
\nexpanding leadership in the region.<\/p>\n
A comparison of East Asia with the Middle East shows why the
\nBush administration should recognize the need for nuances in its
\nforeign policy. While Middle Eastern and South Asian leaders
\nsacrificed their nations' well-being to pursue geopolitical
\nagendas, East Asia's leaders emphasized growth with equity,
\ngrounding their claims to political legitimacy on their economic
\nsuccess.<\/p>\n
Their governments are pursuing structural changes to ensure
\nhealthy growth -- including steps to open labor markets, protect
\nintellectual property, contain corruption, improve bidding and
\ncontract terms on infrastructure projects, and attract new
\ninvestment in high-value-added industries.<\/p>\n
China is now imitating this formula and emerging as the
\nregion's economic anchor, leading many Asian business leaders to
\nconsider China a more reliable player in regional security than
\nJapan. By not addressing regional economic stability vigorously,
\nthe U.S. invites more active regional leadership by China.<\/p>\n
U.S. policymakers should understand that Japan's leadership
\nrole is one of the region's most troubling uncertainties, and
\nthat the 1997 crisis began a quiet shift in the regional balance
\nof power. East Asian leaders recall that Japanese banks withdrew
\nsignificant amounts of capital from the region, exacerbating the
\n1997 crisis.<\/p>\n
Tokyo has also conceded that, if necessary, it will defend
\nJapanese economic interests before addressing regional needs,
\neven undertaking radical devaluations of the yen.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, China is filling the leadership vacuum. It acted as
\nthe responsible party in the 1997 crisis, refusing to devalue and
\nthereby helping prevent a cycle of competitive devaluations.
\nToday, as sponsor of regional free-trade discussions, Beijing
\ncontinues at every possible opportunity to link itself to the
\nregion's future growth.<\/p>\n
U.S. policymakers preoccupied with the impact on U.S. trade of
\nChina's accession to the World Trade Organization often ignore
\nthe influence it will have on interregional trade: making the
\nregion more dependent on China.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the region's business leaders play down China's
\nterritorial ambitions because many believe China's leaders need
\ngrowth -- and therefore stable political relations with their
\nneighbors -- to maintain their grip on power.<\/p>\n
While the percentage of trade between the region and Japan has
\nbeen stable, China's share has grown dramatically. Investments in
\nthe natural resource sector in Indonesia, and in Taiwan's
\nsemiconductor industry, will further increase China's influence.<\/p>\n
By contrast, Japan's prosperity depends more on shifts among
\nthe Group of Seven than on the Asian economies. Japan's
\ncumulative foreign investment is more focused in Europe and North
\nAmerica, its share of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
\nNations) exports is smaller than the U.S.' share, and its
\noverseas production ratios are lower than those of the U.S. or
\nGermany.<\/p>\n
Many would suggest that an ascendant China might jeopardize
\nthe region's democratic aspirations, but Japan itself has been
\nambiguous in its support of regional democracy. Unconvinced of
\nany link between strong democratic institutions and future peace
\nand prosperity, Tokyo, in its overseas assistance, places little
\nemphasis on building strong civil institutions.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, China is subtly moving toward a kind of capitalism
\nthat depends more on corporate governance and shareholder rights
\nthan does Japan's system and that also seems more willing than
\nJapan's to open its economy to foreign investment.<\/p>\n
U.S. policy will be more effective if it becomes more
\nsensitive to the structural economic changes in East Asia. If
\nChinese leaders understand that smooth integration into the
\nglobal trading system will be the key to ensuring future economic
\nstability and job growth, then a central objective of U.S. policy
\nmust be a responsible China committed to, and benefiting from,
\nstrong international economic organizations.<\/p>\n
This does not mean abandoning Japan in favor of China. East
\nAsia will find most comfort if the U.S. sits down with China and
\nJapan to work out the basis for trilateral cooperation that will
\nprovide the bedrock for future security and growth in the region.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jp6la19-1447899208",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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