JP\/6\/DJATI1<\/p>\n
2004 ELECTION & THE REFORM PROCESS: In Search of a Leader<\/p>\n
Part 1 of 2<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono
\nPolitical Analyst
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Under Soeharto's \"New Order\" regime a general election was
\nheld every five years from 1971, the last being the general
\nelection of 1997. It resulted in the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR), the supreme governing body based on the 1945
\nConstitution, which, in turn, elected Soeharto president
\nconsecutively for the seventh time, each time as sole candidate.<\/p>\n
But for his resignation in May the following year, thereby
\ncompleting his 32 years of dictatorial rule, the 1999 elections
\nwould not have been held. This was the first general election
\nduring the \"era of reform\"; the next general election in 2004
\nwill be the second.<\/p>\n
In terms of reform in the sense of a change within and through
\nthe existing system, the 1999 elections may be regarded as the
\nbeginning of reform toward democratization.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the drastic, if excessive, increase in the number of
\npolitical parties contesting the elections, from three for most
\nof the New Order period to over 40, clearly indicated the degree
\nof freedom of expression and association enjoyed by the people.<\/p>\n
No less important, if equally excessive, was the number of
\npresidential candidates nominated by the political parties.
\nThe election of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) to the presidency was
\nan interesting phenomenon. He was, indeed, the most
\ndemocratically elected president in the history of independent
\nIndonesia until then, at least within the context of the 1945
\nConstitution.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, for one thing, Gus Dur's election clearly
\nindicated not only one of the fundamental defects of the 1945
\nConstitution, as it was also a mockery of democratic ideals,
\nparticularly the principle of equality. A direct presidential
\nelection was unknown to the 1945 Constitution. The president and
\nvice president were to be elected by the MPR.<\/p>\n
That was, in a way, ironic. Megawati won a majority in the
\ngeneral election, if not a single majority vote. But because many
\nof the members of the Islamic-based political parties, which
\nafter the elections formed the \"central axis\" in the MPR, were
\nagainst the election of a woman president, she had to accept the
\npost of vice president.<\/p>\n
In addition, while Gus Dur was elected president by the MPR on
\nthe basis of a majority vote by the MPR, he was a representative
\nof the ill-defined \"functional group\", whose membership in the
\nMPR was by government appointment; thus he was chosen without
\ncontesting the election. This was a mockery of the election.<\/p>\n
Therefore, Gus Dur could not but be indebted for his
\npresidency to his supporters in the MPR, particularly the central
\naxis forces and the Golkar party, rather than to voters at the
\nelection. It was reflected in the membership of the cabinet he
\nformed, which looked more like than a parliamentary one within a
\nmultiparty system, than a presidential cabinet, as required by
\nthe Constitution.<\/p>\n
As he honestly admitted, his cabinet was not just a compromise
\ncabinet or a \"thank-you cabinet\", but also a \"salad cabinet\". The
\n1945 Constitution created the distinction between election
\npolitics and MPR politics.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, the new government under Abdurrahman Wahid and
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri was, in fact, a blessing in disguise. It
\nwas the best for national unity, in that the election of both Gus
\nDur and Megawati saved the nation from serious conflict.<\/p>\n
In fact, the new government appropriately called itself the
\n\"Cabinet of National Unity\", which served to indicate the right
\npriority of the government's overall policy. One of the most
\nserious consequences of the country's multidimensional crisis was
\nthe danger of national disintegration.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the political elite, particularly legislators,
\nseemed to enjoy to the full their newly won freedom. Under Gus
\nDur's presidency, continuous bickering among politicians, arguing
\non legal and constitutional matters, particularly a tug-of-war
\nbetween the legislature and the president, marked Indonesian
\npolitics.<\/p>\n
The DPR would resort to the Constitution in its action against
\nthe president. In turn, the president would challenge the DPR,
\nand then the MPR, also by using the very same Constitution as the
\nbasis of his arguments.<\/p>\n
Indeed, since the 1999 election, Indonesians have been
\nwatching an increasingly chaotic ball game without an umpire. The
\npresident seemed to hope that the involvement of the Supreme
\nCourt would help him win the match.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the president's opponents questioned the
\nauthority of the Supreme Court, and thus the effectiveness of its
\nintervention. Ideally, the Supreme Court should have been in a
\nposition to act as umpire, for the ball of the politicians' game
\nwas the 1945 Constitution, which was supposed to provide the
\nrules of the game.<\/p>\n
In this country, however, in the new ball game between
\npoliticians, it is not a question of the rules of the game that
\nmatters, for it is precisely a game of the rules. Unfortunately,
\nwithout an institution vested with the power of judicial review,
\nthe bickering between Indonesian politicians was like a football
\ngame without an umpire.<\/p>\n
If Sukarno's \"guided democracy\", as well as Soeharto's New
\nOrder regime, became in effect a dictatorship, since then
\nIndonesia seems to have developed into a \"parliamentary
\ndictatorship\".<\/p>\n
The 1945 Constitution as practiced in this country for over
\nhalf a century has been in force merely on the basis of Sukarno's
\ndecree of July 5, 1959, not on a decision by democratically
\nelected people's representatives.<\/p>\n
It provides for no effective control mechanism, because it
\ndoes not provide the principle of separation of powers in a
\nsystem of checks and balances, thereby rendering it vulnerable to
\nmanipulation by whichever branch of government happens to be the
\ndominant power.<\/p>\n
It seems doubtful if today's politicians are aware of that
\ndelicate aspect of the country's current system of government. In
\nfact, the 1945 Constitution was never meant to be final and
\npermanent.<\/p>\n
Yet, most of them seem to understand that constitutional
\nreform should not only be limited to amendments -- thereby not
\nresulting in a change to the constitution itself -- but also
\nunderstand that constitutional amendments do not apply to the
\npreamble of the Constitution containing the five principles of
\nthe state ideology Pancasila, which they consider to be
\nsacrosanct.<\/p>\n
;JP;ANR;
\nANPAk..r..
\nelections-reform<\/p>\n
Part 2 checked
\nJP\/6\/DJATI<\/p>\n
Part 2 of 2<\/p>\n
2004 ELECTION & THE REFORM PROCESS: In Search of a Leader<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono
\nPolitical Analyst
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
The 1945 Constitution is one of ambivalence and
\nambiguity, subject to conflicting interpretations, right from the
\npreamble. This has resulted in contradictory legislation that is
\ncontrary to the Constitution. At the very least, it may result in
\nendless legal and constitutional wrangling.
\nYet, it would be dangerous to have a mechanism for
\njudicial review unless and until Indonesians reach a consensus on
\ncertain core (common universal, human) values that bind the
\npeople together as a nation, as expressed in human rights and
\ndemocratic ideals. These might be possible if Indonesians were
\ncommitted to the principle of a separation between state and
\nreligion.
\nThis is the essence of secularization, which is by no
\nmeans opposed to religion, but definitely against state
\nintervention in religion and religious matters -- matters that
\nrelate to human conscience -- such as reflected in the marriage
\nlaw and the law on the national system of education, as well as
\nthe current bill to replace the latter.
\nUnfortunately, Indonesians tend to revel in ambivalence
\nand ambiguity, which make apparent consensus seem possible, but
\nwhich also make it possible for every group to take advantage of
\ntheir different interpretations. Pancasila is a clear case in
\npoint, particularly its first principle.
\nWithout a complete change to the Constitution, on the
\npretext that \"the people are not ready\", that \"they do not want
\nto betray our founding fathers\", or some other senseless
\nargument, we are likely to get another form of dictatorship --
\nwhoever may happen to be president -- in which the incumbent
\nwould be capable of manipulating this ambiguity or ambivalence.
\nHence the reform process is at a crossroads.
\nWhat, then, could we expect from the 2004 election and
\nthe reform process thereafter? The most important aspect of the
\n2004 election is the direct election of the president, the first
\nsince Indonesia's independence.
\nIndonesia is now going through the worst stages of a
\nleadership crisis since the resignation of president Soeharto,
\nthe onset of the \"era of reform\".
\nSince the monetary crisis in 1997, which has developed
\ninto an ever-worsening multidimensional crisis, there seems to
\nhave been little, if any, serious sense of crisis or sense of
\nurgency on the part of any of the leaders, from Soeharto to
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri.
\nThe leadership crisis also lies behind the current legal
\nconfusion and uncertainty and the increasing tendency toward
\nlawlessness. It is important to note that, despite the increasing
\nantiwar protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq barely three
\nweeks ago, demonstrations demanding the resignation of President
\nMegawati and Vice President Hamzah Haz -- which had begun
\nearlier, particularly since increases in the price of fuel,
\nelectricity and telephone calls, and, before that, over the issue
\nof illegal Indonesian migrant workers, particularly to Malaysia
\n-- have continued to this day across the nation.
\nThe nation clearly needs and demands a new leader, who
\nwill carry on and determine the direction of the reform process.
\nIt is clear that not only the present leader, but also the
\npresent generation of political leaders and politicians, have
\nbeen losing credibility and confidence, at home and abroad.
\nUnfortunately, the crisis of leadership also means a
\nscarcity of potential leaders who are likely to meet the needs,
\nrequirements and aspirations of the people in many respects: a
\nperson who will be regarded as being genuinely concerned about
\nthe public interest, particularly that of the poor, alienated and
\ndowntrodden, and who will therefore enjoy public trust and
\nconfidence.
\nThe question is whether the 2004 general election,
\nparticularly the direct election of the president and vice
\npresident, will resolve the leadership crisis.
\nThe main obstacle would be a condition set by the
\nelection law that only political parties that had previously won
\na certain percentage of the seats in the legislature (DPR) -- a
\n\"threshold\" -- could nominate presidential and vice presidential
\ncandidates. That, at least, is the issue now in the DPR in the
\ndebate on the election bill on the presidential election, yet to
\nbe enacted.
\nGiven the possibility, even the probability, that the
\nmajor parties of 2004 will more or less be the same as today's
\nmajor parties in terms of the result of the 1999 general
\nelection, then the \"new\" leaders after the next election in 2004,
\neven with a direct presidential election, will most likely come
\nfrom these same large parties.
\nUnfortunately, our electoral law does not provide for
\nindependent (nonparty) candidates to contest the election. People
\nhave mostly lost confidence in most -- if not all -- existing
\npolitical leaders.
\n However, a potentially good leader is almost definitely
\nto be found outside the party system. This would give us some
\nhope. The question is, in the light of the electoral law,
\nparticularly that relating to the direct election of the
\npresident and vice president, will there be a political party, or
\nat least a coalition or alliance of parties, large or small,
\nready and willing to nominate their candidates for president and
\nvice president from outside any of the existing political
\nparties?
\nSuch candidates, however, must be willing to join a
\npolitical party, or one of the political parties in a coalition.
\nIndonesia can learn from the experience in the U.S., where, upon
\nretirement, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower eventually chose to be
\nnominated for president by the Republican Party and won the
\npresidential election in 1952.
\nThere may be a setback, however, as regards the election
\nof politicians to membership of the DPR from an open list or an
\nopen, proportional system. Indeed, through such an open list,
\nmembers of the legislature would be more representative of the
\npeople than of their respective political parties.
\nBut with the spirit of \"regional autonomy\" tending to
\nbecome \"ethnic autonomy\", not only the election of provincial
\ngovernors -- as has been the case with some provinces -- but also
\nthat of representatives of the people at the national level, may
\nin part be heavily and adversely affected by ethnic or sectarian
\norientation.
\nStill, the election of a good president and vice
\npresident will be of greater importance, in that they would
\nlikely be more decisive on matters of national policy, and thus
\nof the reform process as a whole.<\/p>",
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