{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1145113,
        "msgid": "jp6benny-1447899208",
        "date": "2005-02-08 00:00:00",
        "title": "JP\/6\/BENNY",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "JP\/6\/BENNY The Peace Prospect in Aceh: Assessing from the Past Experience Benny YP Siahaan Jakarta Initially, many quarters have been pessimistic about the prospects of any peace dialog between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) after the collapse of cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA) in 2003, which was followed by martial law and then a state of civil emergency.",
        "content": "<p>JP\/6\/BENNY<\/p>\n<p>The Peace Prospect in Aceh: Assessing from the Past Experience<\/p>\n<p>Benny YP Siahaan <br>\nJakarta<\/p>\n<p>Initially, many quarters have been pessimistic about the <br>\nprospects of any peace dialog between the Indonesian government <br>\nand the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) after the collapse of cessation <br>\nof hostilities agreement (CoHA) in 2003, which was followed by <br>\nmartial law and then a state of civil emergency.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, after the breakdown of the CoHA the government has <br>\nsuccessfully undermined GAM's military strength through a massive <br>\nmilitary operation. Thus it is understandable if the government <br>\nis not interested in future negotiations since they are on the <br>\n\"winning\" side.<\/p>\n<p>Surprisingly, as reported by the media, informal contacts <br>\nbetween GAM and the government have been established since <br>\nNovember 2004. However, at that time it was not clear in what <br>\ndirection such discreet talks might lead.<\/p>\n<p>The tsunami catastrophe in late December last year has changed <br>\nthe situation. The government and GAM renewed peace talks in <br>\nHelsinki last week. The government side has sent high-level <br>\nofficials.<\/p>\n<p>If we look from this perspective there has been a change in <br>\nthe nature of the talks, since this is the strongest delegation <br>\nthat Jakarta has ever sent for talks with GAM. The previous <br>\ndelegations were led by a former diplomat, Wiryono S. However. <br>\nThere is little clue about the reason for changing the approach. <br>\nNevertheless, this has already raised concern, especially among <br>\nnationalists, that the new talks will only raise GAM's <br>\ninternational stature.<\/p>\n<p>What remains the same from the current talks is that both <br>\nsides are still using a foreign non-governmental organization as <br>\na mediator. Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), led by former <br>\nFinnish president Martti Ahtisaari, is acting as the mediator in <br>\nthe current talks. So we should learn from past experiences of <br>\nusing an NGO as a mediator.<\/p>\n<p>Many critics would say that the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) <br>\nitself was partly responsible for the failure of the CoHA, mainly <br>\nbecause of its inexperience. This factor can be regarded as the <br>\nless-credibility factor, a factor generated from the HDC's <br>\ninexperience and lack of trust by the two sides. The HDC was a  <br>\nrelatively new organization when appointed mediator in 2000.<\/p>\n<p>The spoiler factor in the CoHA should not be overlooked. <br>\nAccording to Stephen Stedman, spoilers are leaders and parties <br>\nwho believe that peace emerging for negotiations threatens their <br>\npower, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine <br>\nattempts to achieve peace. In the CoHA, GAM and the Indonesian <br>\nMilitary (TNI) could be considered spoilers.<\/p>\n<p>Another thing that can be learned from the HDC's experience is <br>\nthat the mediator should posses the ability to bridge the <br>\ndividing issues. Scholars of ethnic conflict have argued that the <br>\nsuccess or failure of peace negotiations also depends on how easy <br>\nthe combatants divide the stakes over which they are fighting. <br>\nThus, it is argued that the more divisible the stakes over which <br>\nthe combatants are fighting the more likely the war is to end in <br>\na negotiated settlement.<\/p>\n<p>The failure of the CoHA is also said by many to have been <br>\ncaused by the lack of involvement of civil society throughout the <br>\npeace process. Indeed, GAM is not the only group that is <br>\nlegitimate in representing the Acehnese.<\/p>\n<p>For GAM, the exclusion or limited involvement of civil society <br>\nis important since it is afraid other groups from civil society <br>\nin Aceh would erode GAM's role and recognition during the <br>\nnegotiation process. For the government of Indonesia, the <br>\nexclusion or limited participation of Aceh civil groups is <br>\nobvious since the government, especially the military, has a bad <br>\nimage among the Acehnese.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, there was a big problem of involving civil society, <br>\nespecially in selecting which groups would be eligible to be <br>\ninvolved in the negotiation process. In mid-2001 a task force of <br>\ncivil society was formed and consisted mainly of NGO leaders and <br>\nacademics. It was led by Imam Syuja, a widely respected ulema. <br>\nHowever, the task force was never effective.<\/p>\n<p>Despite that, however, the involvement of civil society is <br>\nfairly important in the next phase of negotiations. But there <br>\nshould be a fair mechanism accepted by all elements in Aceh civil <br>\nsociety in selecting which groups are eligible to represent the <br>\nAcehnese since it is impossible to include all groups or <br>\norganizations.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, the fate of the CMI as a mediator will depend on how <br>\nwell it learns from the experience of the HDC.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is an alumnus of Tsukuba University in Japan.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jp6benny-1447899208",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}