JP\/4\/MOHTAR
\nA closer look at the Muhammadiyah-NU meeting<\/p>\n
Mohtar Mas'oed
\nExecutive, Nahdlatul Ulama
\nYogyakarta<\/p>\n
He has done it again. Syafi'ie Maarif has repeated what he did
\nalmost 10 years ago. In 1993, as one of the Muhammadiyah leaders,
\ntogether with young figures from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mostly from
\nYogyakarta, he tried to bridge the gap between the activists of
\nthe two largest Muslim organizations.<\/p>\n
\"Reaching out\" is Syafi'ie's prescription -- somebody's got to
\ndo it. Once again, in last week's meeting between the country's
\ntwo largest Muslim organizations, he has reached out and was
\nwelcomed in the same spirit by the leaders of NU, who are known
\nto be open-minded. Why do it again? What happened between 1993
\nand 2002? In what light should we understand this latest
\npolitical move?<\/p>\n
We must take another look at the February 1993 meeting held at
\nthe Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta. Though probably not
\nthe first of its kind, it was a very special meeting. The meeting
\nwas conducted not by theologians, but by activists with a
\nbackground in a variety of sciences. Most of them were from the
\nsocial sciences, such as politics, international relations,
\neconomics, sociology, history and education apart from those
\ntaking up Islamic studies. Most acquired their education in the
\ndomestic as well as foreign \"Western\" academies. The attendants
\nwere Muslim activists who were more confident of their
\ncapabilities in comparison with previous leaders, hence they had
\nmore similar viewpoints on the modern world.<\/p>\n
The early 1990s was also an interesting period. Because during
\nthat time many \"liberal\" initiatives emerged among the religious
\nactivists in the city. A number of NU youths -- graduates of the
\nState Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) -- developed a \"neo-
\nmodernist Islam\" through an organization called the Institute of
\nIslamic and Social Studies (LKIS).<\/p>\n
Their activities could be termed as \"liberalizing\" the Islamic
\nway of thinking and so making it a more open religion. This group
\ncooperated with Christian activists in forming the Interfaith
\nDialog forum (Dian\/Interfidei). This \"reaching out\" initiative
\nalso covered other areas, including the empowerment of women.<\/p>\n
In this context, the idea of gathering the activists of the
\ntwo large Muslim organizations cropped up. At the time,
\ndiscussions and implementation of pluralism were quite lively,
\nand were not limited to Muslims.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, at the national level, another movement drew
\nmore attention: That of the Association of Indonesian Muslim
\nIntellectuals (ICMI). It basically utilized state authority in
\nthe struggle of Islamic ideas. With the support of former
\npresident Soeharto, and led by the flamboyant vice president B.J.
\nHabibie, the ICMI movement created more vibrations in the
\nnational political arena.<\/p>\n
During that period the leadership of Muhammadiyah and NU was
\ndistinctly colored by a chemistry between Amien Rais and
\nAbdurrahman Wahid that was difficult to reconcile. The 1993
\nMuhammadiyah-NU meeting was rendered insipid when the two leaders
\nindicated an extremely \"realistic\" and pessimistic attitude on
\ncreating the \"Muhammad-NU project\". Although one senior NU leader
\nwas so high-spirited as to suggest the possibility of dual
\nmembership, meaning one can become a member of both organizations
\nsimultaneously, the atmosphere after the speeches by the two
\nforemost leaders turned pale.<\/p>\n
The \"realistic\" attitude was indicated by the way Abdurrahman
\ndescribed the factions in both organizations. He said that both
\nMuhammadiyah and NU had factions A and B, and that the
\ncooperation was limited to the A and B factions of each
\norganization. But just as the two leaders seemed to agree on this
\nperspective, the spirit of ecumenism soon disappeared.<\/p>\n
A further catastrophe occurred. Not the economic crisis since
\nJuly 1997 or the fall of former president Soeharto in May 1998.
\nThis was the fighting among the political elite, beyond the
\ncomprehension of their respective followers. For the sake of
\nhigh-ranking political positions, many Muslim leaders initiated
\nactivities which spurred religious conflicts that spread all over
\nthe nation. The conflicts were not only between followers of
\ndifferent religions, but, worse, it was between Muslims
\nthemselves. Since 1998 we could even say the hardest hit victims
\nwere those in the Muslim community (ummah) itself, given the
\nextraordinary rupture among Muslims.<\/p>\n
Every party that relied on Islamic politics for electoral
\nsupport in the 1999 general elections suffered a major failure.
\nThe highest percentage of nationwide votes that any one party
\nachieved was only 12. The result of the general elections clearly
\nindicated that the most tremendous split was among the Muslim
\nelectorate.<\/p>\n
In such a situation, the political arena was snatched away by
\ngroups of Muslim extremists. Suddenly very different political
\nagendas appeared. Saying they were reacting towards the conflicts
\nwith religious nuances in Ambon, Poso and other areas, radical
\ngroups emerged, whose activities soon filled the mass media.
\nSuddenly each group seemed to have strong tendencies to hate the
\nother. The hatred was not only between the Muslims and followers
\nof other religions, but also between members of Muhammadiyah and
\nNU.<\/p>\n
As a result, what happened was a far cry from the initial aim,
\nwhich was the development of Islam-based politics that were
\ncompatible with modern democracy. What surfaced instead was \"mob
\npolitics\", with \"impunity\" as its main feature. If one commits a
\nmurder or sets a house on fire by himself, then he is a criminal.
\nBut if one does as part of a crowd, then he is no longer a
\ncriminal. The consequence was that Indonesia became a no man's
\nland.<\/p>\n
If we desire a consolidated democracy in Indonesia, then the
\npeople, interest groups and political parties should pursue their
\npolitical ambitions in peaceful ways, that is competing according
\nto the rules of the game, negotiating and cooperating in the
\nbuilding of institutionalized politics.<\/p>\n
There are two prerequisites to this end.<\/p>\n
First, the majority of the people -- in spite of extreme
\neconomic difficulties, and disappointment with leaders -- should
\nfirmly believe in the democratic procedures and institutions as
\nthe best choice to enable us to live together. Though there would
\nbe those who are against the system, these groups should be
\nprevented from growing larger and disturbing the pro-democracy
\nmovements.<\/p>\n
Second, everyone, including the government, must abide by and
\nget accustomed to the method of resolving conflicts based on the
\nlaw, procedures and the institutions legalized by a fledgling
\ndemocratic process.<\/p>\n
The most important step is a guarantee that ethnic, cultural
\nand religious rifts are not prolonged -- or we will see a setback
\nto authoritarianism (examples abound in Latin America). The more
\ndomination in the political arena by the thoughts and agenda of
\nextremists, the more reasons there will be for the \"status quo\"
\npowers to reinforce an anti-democracy strength.<\/p>\n
Who can be expected to snatch back the political agenda to
\nmake democracy a success, and to make politics compatible with
\nIslamic ideas? The steps taken by the leaders of Muhammadiyah and
\nNU last week raised hopes that further concrete initiatives would
\nbe taken. There are still many obstacles ahead. There are quite a
\nnumber of pessimists in both organizations who are indeed quite
\nrealistic in showing that a major difference exists between the
\ntwo groups. Theologically, it is less problematic. But
\nsociologically and politically, both groups, especially of late,
\nstill find it difficult to meet each other.<\/p>",
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