JP\/4\/BANYU<\/p>\n
World Islamic body must reject harboring of terrorists<\/p>\n
By Anak Agung Banyu Perwita<\/p>\n
ADELAIDE, Australia (JP): Debate is growing following the
\nU.S.'s controversial plan of \"retaliation\" against terrorists.<\/p>\n
The Muslim world is also divided, with those saying the U.S.
\nmust be more cautious and others implying support for the prime
\nsuspect, Osama bin Laden, and his suspected protector,
\nAfghanistan.<\/p>\n
What role can the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC)
\nplay as the Islamic-based inter-regional organization?<\/p>\n
The OIC evolved from the ideals of \"Pan Islamism\", to promote
\nsolidarity and unity of the Islamic ummah (community). In the
\npost World War II era, decolonization, particularly in Asia and
\nAfrica, provided the setting for an Islamic forum.<\/p>\n
For many newly independent Muslim countries, Islam has
\nprovided \"a strong moral force and source of identity\" vis-a-vis
\ntheir ex-colonial masters. Islam provided a vital driving force
\nin their independence struggle, including in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The experiences of colonialism pushed various Islamic
\ncountries toward closer cooperation.<\/p>\n
The OIC now does not aim to restore Islamic unity as the pan
\n-Islamic movement of the 19th century did, nor is it an
\nindication of the desire to re-establish the traditional Islamic
\nsystem of external relations. Instead, it is a desire to
\ncooperate as an Islamic bloc within the community of nations.<\/p>\n
The history of this \"neo-pan Islamism\" recorded a crucial
\nmilestone when Pakistan took the initiative and convened the
\nconference called the Mu'tamar al-Alam al Islami in 1949,
\nfollowed by other conferences in 1951.<\/p>\n
The main goal of the conference was to establish a
\ncommonwealth of Muslim nations which envisaged Islamic unity and
\ncooperation leading to the formation of a third bloc comprising
\nMuslim states.<\/p>\n
This conference's goal has never been achieved, particularly
\ndue to changes in the foreign policy of some Arab countries and
\nPakistan when they entered an alliance with the West under the
\nmilitary umbrella of the United States.<\/p>\n
Again, the main objectives of the OIC, established in 1969,
\ncould not be completely achieved due to some major internal
\ndifferences among the member states. On one hand, Egypt, for
\ninstance, was too preoccupied with its \"pan Arabism\" in its
\nforeign policy, while on the other, Saudi Arabia emphasized
\nIslamic orientation in its foreign policy.<\/p>\n
The number of participating states in the OIC increased
\ndramatically in 1990s, yet its institutionalization as a modern
\ninternational organization has not progressed smoothly. This has
\nmainly been due to the egos and indifference of some member
\nstates, and the lack of common political, economic, social and
\ncultural factors.<\/p>\n
Despite this wide diversity, as the scholar John O. Oval has
\npointed out, the \"OIC has become a global formal network of
\nofficial linkages among states in which the majority of the
\npopulation is Muslim\" and is the most significant institution of
\nglobal political Islam.<\/p>\n
The formation of the OIC reflected a strong political response
\nfrom the Islamic world to an emotional religious issue. As a
\nresult, the political value of Islamic solidarity among members
\nhas shaped the OIC's development. This can clearly be seen from
\nthe objectives and the principles of its Charter, which states
\nthat the promotion of Islamic solidarity among the members is its
\nfirst priority.<\/p>\n
Yet, it is quite difficult for all the members to cooperate
\nwhen they have to face the West.<\/p>\n
In the post-Cold War era, Islam has often been associated with
\nterrorism. The sharp increase in the threat of \"Islamic
\nfundamentalism\" has been one of the important issues that the OIC
\nhas had to solve. Even though this issue was a priority of its
\nseventh summit in Casablanca, Morocco, in December 1994, the OIC
\nseemed to be incapable of dealing with terrorism.<\/p>\n
To improve the tarnished image of Islam, the OIC members
\nshould first increase its internal cohesion and erase the Arab
\nand non-Arab axis which has weakened its internal unity.<\/p>\n
Second, they should agree to review an unprecedented plan to
\nstop the export of violence which many relate to
\n\"fundamentalists\". The OIC needs to call on members to refuse
\nfinance or support for \"terrorist acts\" and to make sure that
\ntheir territory is not used by violent groups to plan or carry
\nout such acts.<\/p>\n
More specifically, the OIC members should be asked not to
\nhost, train, arm, finance or provide facilities for violent
\ngroups claiming to represent Islam. The OIC needs to stress its
\nsignificance in restoring and cleaning up Islam's image and its
\nposition in relation to the West and emphasize that Islam is not
\nthe enemy of the Western world.<\/p>\n
Only by taking these options can the OIC maintain its
\nrelevance in a rapidly changing map of world politics.<\/p>\n
The writer is a Ph.D candidate at the Asian Studies Department of
\nFlinders University in Adelaide, Australia, and a lecturer of
\ninternational relations at the Parahyangan Catholic University,
\nBandung, West Java.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jp4banyu-1447899208",
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