JP\/3\/INS<\/p>\n
Indonesia should learn from its failure in East Timor<\/p>\n
Former foreign minister Ali Alatas talked to The Jakarta
\nPost's Kornelius Purba about his views on Aceh. Now the advisor
\nto President Megawati Soekarnoputri, he pointed out that
\nIndonesia should not repeat the mistakes it made in East Timor,
\nespecially in regards human rights issues, in resolving the Aceh
\nproblem. The following is an excerpt from the interview:
\nQuestion: In your capacity as the advisor to President Megawati,
\nand with your experience in handling the problems in East Timor
\nand in Papua as a former foreign minister, what is your view on
\nthe current problems in Aceh?<\/p>\n
Answer: I have always been one of those who, from the
\nbeginning, preferred that Aceh be resolved through peaceful
\nnegotiations -- for example, as we have tried through the
\nCessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).<\/p>\n
We agreed in the COHA that one of the items on the agenda of
\nthe inclusive Joint Council dialog is to review this peace deal
\n-- to make it better, but not to go beyond the terms of the
\nagreement. We defined the word \"review\" as meaning that we would
\nimprove upon it. You review it, you look at it again.<\/p>\n
COHA could have been the first good step toward resolving the
\nproblem through a peaceful path of negotiations. But I am getting
\nvery pessimistic now, and very concerned. I can now fully
\nunderstand the concerns of the government and the limits to their
\npatience, because it is true that GAM, in the four months since
\nthe COHA was implemented, did many things that went completely
\nagainst the agreement.<\/p>\n
They never gave up their original purpose, nor have they
\nchanged their minds about not accepting a solution based on
\nspecial autonomy for Aceh. Of course, they will have to rethink
\nand to renegotiate this point, for which we are prepared. If the
\nend objective between the two warring parties are disparate, it
\nis very difficult to see eye-to-eye.<\/p>\n
Why did the negotiations between the MNLF (Moro National
\nLiberation Front) and the Philippine government succeed? The
\nMNLF, from the beginning, said,\"OK, we drop our demands for
\nindependence. We accept a broad-based autonomy; but we want this
\nand that.\" We needed two years to get to the agreement stage (in
\nwhich Indonesia acted as a facilitator).<\/p>\n
Look at Cambodia -- they were fighting for years, but when
\nthey agreed on the end objective, namely that the two sides would
\nform a national government, that Cambodia would be a non-aligned,
\nneutral country, and so on, negotiations could start. The
\nnegotiation, from start to finish, took from 1989 to 1991.<\/p>\n
Now, look at Sri Lanka -- they waged a ferocious war against
\nthe government for many years. Now the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have
\nstopped their calls for independence; only after this could
\nnegotiations start in regards the special autonomy for them. It
\nwill certainly take a long time, but the end result is clear.<\/p>\n
GAM, though, does not behave like that.<\/p>\n
What if they pretend to accept the autonomy, but still have
\nindependence on their minds?<\/p>\n
That is why we are still keeping the door open to a possible
\nJoint Council meeting, which has failed to materialize. But this
\ntime we must be very clear, because independence can never be
\naccepted -- it will not even be accepted by our neighbors, by
\nother countries, because they continue to declare that they are
\nagainst separatism. That is what we mean by the phrase, \"We
\nsupport the territorial integrity of Indonesia.\" That is another
\nway of saying that we are against separatism.<\/p>\n
But many other countries said the same thing in regards East
\nTimor, didn't they?<\/p>\n
No, No, they never did, because East Timor was not recognized
\nby the UN (as part of Indonesia). They supported our efforts to
\nfind a solution. Only Australia recognized (our sovereignty over
\nEast Timor), but even Australia changed its position later.<\/p>\n
The President sent you to Stockholm to persuade the Swedish
\ngovernment to take action against GAM leaders residing there,
\ndidn't she?<\/p>\n
I was sent there, first of all, to appraise the government of
\nSweden, which has given citizenship to one of the brains (behind
\nGAM). But more importantly, two GAM leaders, Hasan Tiro and Zaini
\nAbdullah, maybe more, are there. So I asked the Swedish
\ngovernment, why they still allowed them to mastermind, to lead an
\narmed insurrection and separatist movement against the government
\nof a friendly country? They are Swedish citizens who are
\ninterfering in the affairs of other country. They are leading an
\narmed rebellion in Indonesia, which has caused great suffering
\nand difficulties for Indonesia, for the Acehnese people. Was this
\nallowed, according to international as well as national laws?<\/p>\n
The Swedish government started by saying that they supported
\nthe sovereignty of Indonesia and our efforts to find a solution
\non the basis of special autonomy. But in regards this question of
\nthe two men, Sweden was very sensitive. Besides, they (the two
\nGAM leaders) hadn't broken any laws in Sweden; they were law-
\nbinding citizens. This is why Sweden needed additional evidence
\nfrom Indonesia that linked them clearly to the activities I
\nmentioned.<\/p>\n
I told them that no further evidence was needed.<\/p>\n
What can the government learn from our failure in East Timor,
\nespecially in resolving human rights violations?<\/p>\n
We should learn from how we handled East Timor. We should
\nlearn from our past mistakes. In East Timor, I believe, there
\nwere a series of violations of human rights. Toward the end,
\nespecially, there were a lot of things that were done wrongly,
\nfor which we were severely criticized.<\/p>\n
In East Timor -- we have to admit -- we failed to win the
\nhearts and minds of the people.<\/p>\n
Our approach there was security -- but an approach we held
\nonto for too long.<\/p>\n
Therefore, all our experiences must be lessons for us in what
\nwe choose to do and not do.<\/p>\n
How should the government face the Aceh issue?<\/p>\n
Negotiate with the Acehnese people, talk to them directly; and
\ntherefore, we don't want to make it an international issue. But
\nwe can ask an NGO, the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), to act as a
\nfacilitator. Already on that score, we have received many
\ncriticisms from within the country, but it (the facilitator) is
\nnot from the government, or the United Nations.<\/p>\n
As a senior diplomat, how do you perceive Aceh from an
\ninternational perspective?<\/p>\n
The world cannot deny the sovereign right of the government to
\ndeal with its own internal problems, especially when the internal
\nproblem is an armed insurrection. The only way, perhaps, that we
\nopen ourselves to foreign criticism is if we commit human rights
\nviolations. We should be aware that we can only be faulted if we
\nagain commit human rights violations, which, according to the
\nview of the West, are to be criticized.<\/p>\n
But we have human rights issues now in Aceh, don't we?<\/p>\n
It can be prevented now. Let us learn from the past, let us
\nnot repeat the same mistakes we made during the DOM (1989-1998
\nMilitary Operation in Aceh).<\/p>",
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