JP\/3\/DJATI<\/p>\n
Behind the occasional strain between neighbors<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono
\nPolitical Analyst
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Geographic proximity does not ensure easy relations between
\nneighboring countries. On the contrary, it may precisely be a
\nhindrance to good and friendly relations. Take a look at
\nrelations between India and Pakistan, Japan and China, Japan and
\nSouth Korea, China and Russia, or between Japan and Russia.<\/p>\n
Likewise, commonalities and similarities in historical
\nbackgrounds and cultural traditions that often relate to
\ngeographic proximity do not necessarily contribute to smooth
\nrelations. In fact, similarities and differences are often of
\nlittle relevance to friendly relations between neighbors, unless
\nthey are of complementary nature in terms of their national
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
The present analysis will focus on the case of Indonesia's
\nbilateral relations with Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
\nThere is nothing new about that, except to the extent that it has
\nrecently assumed a more serious dimension.<\/p>\n
There has been a constant problem between Malaysia and
\nIndonesia on the flow of immigrants from Indonesia to Malaysia,
\nlegal as well as illegal, in search of a better life. Since the
\neconomic crisis in 1997, however, the problem has become worse.
\nIncreasing numbers of Indonesian immigrants of either status have
\nbeen returned, not to say deported, to Indonesia than ever
\nbefore.<\/p>\n
Indeed, if in the past, particularly since Sukarno's policy
\nagainst Malaysia in the early 1960's, Malaysia has a lingering
\nperception of Indonesia as potential source of threat to its
\nsecurity. Now if not in military or expansionist terms, since the
\nworsening crisis in 1997, Indonesia remains a potential threat to
\nthe security of its neighbors. One can imagine the possible flow
\nof \"boat people\" from Indonesia. The increase of immigrants,
\nlegal and illegal, is its manifestation.<\/p>\n
As regards Indonesia's relations with Australia, the strong
\nopposition expressed by Speaker of the House of Representatives
\n(DPR) Akbar Tandjung and Speaker of the People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR) Amien Rais to the recent visit of the Australian
\nPrime Minister John Howard reflected, again, how complex
\nrelations between the two countries had been. And the boisterous
\nreaction in Indonesia to the remark by Senior Minister Lee Kuan
\nYew that Indonesia is a nest of terrorists has reflected the
\nsporadic strains in the relations between the two neighbors.<\/p>\n
The question of the truth or falsity of Lee's remark has
\nbecome irrelevant. Emotion has dominated the controversy over the
\nissue.<\/p>\n
Indeed, geographic proximity has tended to give rise to undue
\nexpectations. Consciously or otherwise, Indonesians tend to
\nexpect Australia to understand Indonesia better than the United
\nStates and, therefore, to be more tolerant and less critical
\ntowards Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Thus Australia's attitude or policy that is negative in the
\neyes of Indonesia would tend to be resented more than a similar
\nattitude or policy adopted by the United States. In fact, despite
\nthe differences, there are more similarities between Australia
\nand the U.S, something Indonesians seem to ignore or could not
\ncare less about.<\/p>\n
Geographic proximity also tends to create certain
\nmisperceptions. Because of its sheer size in terms of its
\nterritory and population, Indonesia is often perceived by certain
\nquarters in Australia as a potential source of threat to their
\nsecurity, even if in the vague expression of a \"threat from the
\nNorth\", which may well refer to China.<\/p>\n
Officially, Indonesia often expresses its resentment, although
\nat the same time such a perception may have somewhat \"ego
\nmassaging\" effect on Indonesians.<\/p>\n
As regards Singapore, there is often a perception in Indonesia
\nthat Singapore is \"little China\". Its large Chinese population,
\nas part of the entire overseas Chinese population of Southeast
\nAsia, are often described as a potential \"fifth column\" for China
\nin the future. That such a perception is wrong on historical
\nground -- i.e. contrary to the original idea in the Spanish civil
\nwar in the mid 1930s -- is either overlooked or never known.<\/p>\n
It is often said that Singapore seems to be beset with a
\nbesieged mentality, like Israel. Indonesians do not seem to
\nappreciate this. Thus they do not seem to understand why
\nSingapore as well as Malaysia seem cautious towards Indonesia,
\nperceiving it as a potential source of threat to their security,
\neven that of the region.<\/p>\n
Towards the end of Soeharto's rule, for example, Senior
\nMinister Lee Kuan Yew often made the point that the stability of
\nthe region had been linked to the personal leadership of
\npresident Soeharto. He seemed to have been worried lest
\nSoeharto's successor might be one who would be one not as
\ncommitted as Soeharto had been to ASEAN.<\/p>\n
That cautious attitude, however, is not without foundation. It
\nis certainly based on past experience, particularly as related to
\nthe confrontation policy of Sukarno, and the invasion and, if not
\ndirectly impacting to ASEAN, the annexation of East Timor by
\nIndonesia under Soeharto. Even so, when the issue of East Timor
\nwas first discussed in the United Nations, the resentment of
\nIndonesia, Singapore abstained from a resolution that seemed to
\nfavour Indonesia's stand.<\/p>\n
There is also a lingering prejudice in Indonesia that
\nSingapore's prosperity has been at the expense of Indonesia.
\nThis, as well as the cry of \"intervention,\" is often brought to
\nthe surface again whenever Indonesians feel offended by Singapore
\nsuch as Lee Kuan Yew's remark.<\/p>\n
As regards Malaysia, in the past, probably to give a sense of
\nhaving a \"big brother\" in the face of China before Malaysia
\nopened diplomatic relations with that Asian giant, Malaysia was
\nkeen on the idea of \"Malay solidarity\" or \"brotherhood\" (Rumpun
\nMelayu), as a basis for Malaysian-Indonesian relations. However,
\nsuch an idea did not last long. Probably with the opening of
\ndiplomatic relations between Malaysia and China in the early
\n1970s and the strengthening of ASEAN, the idea of Rumpun Melayu
\nwas after all no longer necessary nor relevant.<\/p>\n
More importantly, in Indonesia the idea was losing support.
\nIndonesians of non-Malay stock and those who racially may well be
\nMalays but not Muslims began to feel less and less comfortable
\nwith it. In Malaysia, a Malay is by constitution a Muslim. That
\nis not the case in Indonesia.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jp3djati-1447899208",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}