Japan's government come and go ...<\/p>\n
On Aug. 8 The Jakarta Post editorialized that Japan is \"still
\ntrying hard to conceal from its own people numerous atrocities
\ncommitted by its troops throughout Asia\". With almost
\nunbelievably bad timing, very late that same day, the newly-
\nappointed Japanese Minister of Education provided additional
\nproof. Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin reports on the incident
\nand the cabinet reshuffle which preceded it.<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): Annual Cabinet reshuffles are a tradition in
\nJapanese politics, even at the height of the Liberal Democratic
\nParty (LDP) 1955-1993 hegemony over the Japanese political scene,
\nwhen one team could easily have held sway for much longer, had it
\nwanted to do so.<\/p>\n
These annual rituals are an excellent example of the
\ndistinction which the Japanese like to make between the tatemae
\n(outward show) and the honne (inner substance).<\/p>\n
The tatemae was that the Prime Minister of the day advertised
\nthe reshuffle in terms of renewed focus on a certain policy, the
\nneed for greater cohesion in the face of crisis, the desirability
\nof diminishing intra-LDP faction fighting, or the necessity of
\nimproving the government team in the face of electoral losses.
\nPrime Ministers themselves were regularly replaced, as a result
\nof the faction-fighting, so that meant yet another cabinet
\nreshuffle, too.<\/p>\n
Of course, these explanations were not mere excuses, and had
\nvarying degrees of validity. However, the fact that very little,
\nif anything, changed as a result of the regular reshuffles
\nindicated that the honne lay elsewhere -- in the paramount need
\nto provide jobs for the party faithful.<\/p>\n
Essentially, LDP backbenchers with sufficient seniority had to
\nbe rewarded for their loyalty to their respective factions.
\nWhether a particular person had talents suitable for appointment
\nto a certain ministry was besides the point. Cabinets were not
\nbuilt to last. That is why Japan has had more cabinets than even
\nhigh-scoring Italy, since World War II.<\/p>\n
In other words, Japanese Prime Ministers seldom, if ever, set
\nabout a reshuffle with a determination to produce a talented
\ncabinet, capable of meeting the challenge of the day. In most
\nministries, it was assumed that bureaucrats were firmly in
\ncommand, and that few, if any, appointees would take real charge
\nof their portfolio.<\/p>\n
So, reshuffles often became prolonged bargaining sessions
\nbetween the factions on the basis of \"jobs for the boys\". The
\nstronger Prime Ministers aimed at an acceptable balance of power,
\nand did their own balancing. The weaker Premiers simply appointed
\nthose recommended by the factional bosses.<\/p>\n
Most of these tendencies have been present in the recent
\nreshuffle conducted by current Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama.
\nOften they have been so exaggerated as to provide almost a
\ncaricature of the tradition.<\/p>\n
Thus, Murayama duly produced his tatemae. The reshuffle was
\nnecessary, he said, in order to continue administrative and
\neconomic reforms, and to secure Japan's economic recovery. \"I
\nhave to consider a fresh cabinet, to respond to all these
\nthings,\" he added. The trouble was that he said this almost at
\nthe end of two weeks of devious maneuvering, which preceded the
\nAug. 8 announcement of the new government line-up for the ruling
\ncoalition between the Socialists, the LDP and Shinto Sakigake
\n(New Pioneer Party).<\/p>\n
Sheer opportunism had brought the three parties together
\nthirteen months ago, and expediency finally held them together
\nagain, in the wake of the recent House of Councilors election in
\nmid-July.<\/p>\n
The Japan Times provided the best honne for the whole
\nexercise. Dubbing the reshuffle \"Mr Murayama's midsummer farce\",
\nthe paper editorialized that \"the change best illustrates the
\ncurrent political mess in Japan\".<\/p>\n
Faced with the coalition's perceived poor performance in the
\nelection -- it won 64 seats at the polls instead of an
\nanticipated 75 -- initially the reshuffle was reluctantly agreed
\nto by the coalition, to head off a barrage of criticism.
\nIronically, now that the reshuffle has been completed, another
\nsuch barrage is being fired by the nation's media because of the
\ncynical way in which the reshuffle was handled.<\/p>\n
Once the need for a reshuffle was reluctantly conceded,
\nMurayama felt that he should stand down as Prime Minister, and
\nthat LDP president, and foreign minister, Yohei Kono should take
\nhis place. Such a move would have had the virtue of placing the
\npremiership where the real power of the coalition lies.<\/p>\n
But it would also have meant the break-up of the coalition.
\nSakigake, made up of former LDP members, would not serve under
\nthe leadership of the party from which they had rebelled.
\nConversely, the Sakigake leader, Finance Minister Masayoshi
\nTakemura, could not replace Murayama either, the LDP would not
\nserve under a former rebel. So, Murayama stayed on as Prime
\nMinister by default.<\/p>\n
Takemura then made it known that he, too, should leave the
\nFinance Ministry, to take responsibility for the poor Sakigake
\nperformance in the election. Takemura ostensibly wanted to devote
\ntime to rejuvenating Sakigake before electoral defeat eliminates
\nit as a political force altogether.<\/p>\n
Then it was Kono's turn to insist that he should depart from
\nthe onerous duties of being the Foreign Minister, while retaining
\nthe title of Deputy Prime Minister.<\/p>\n
Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto
\nwould have none of it. He insisted that, if Kono left the
\nGaimusho, he would depart from MITI.<\/p>\n
Kono placed his desire to go in the tatemae context of \"not
\n(being) for personal, selfish reasons.\"<\/p>\n
But the real (selfish) reason for these gambits was soon
\nobvious to all. Kono's two-year term as LDP President is almost
\nfinished. The next LDP presidential election is on Sept. 22.
\nWorrying about the time-consuming problems of foreign policy is
\nhardly the way to go, with that date and contest looming.
\nHashimoto, who aspires to replace Kono, was not about to conceded
\nplenty of time for campaigning to his rival.<\/p>\n
Kono insisted that Murayama retain Hashimoto in the burdensome
\npost of keeping Japan's restive trade partners in line.
\nHashimoto insisted that if Kono took time off from affairs of
\nstate, so would he.<\/p>\n
Eventually, after much to-ing and fro-ing along these lines,
\nMurayama's reshuffle predictably resulted in no change at the
\ntop.<\/p>\n
Critics pounced on the fact that the prime, finance, trade and
\nforeign ministers all retained their posts, even though, at
\nvarious times, they had all said that they did not want to retain
\nthem.<\/p>\n
The consolation for Murayama was that his Socialist Party
\nretained five other ministries, so five of the most senior party
\nmembers were appointed, no doubt on the principle that they had
\nwaited the longest.<\/p>\n
But the Socialists, despite the fact that Murayama remains
\nprime minister, still lost control of the crucial construction
\nministry. This post went to former LDP secretary-general, Yoshiro
\nMori, who is thought to be an ally of Kono.<\/p>\n
Traditionally, the construction firms, which are naturally
\nbeholden to the ministry, have donated large sums to the LDP's
\nfactional and party coffers. Mori's services will no doubt be
\ninvaluable, prior to the Sept. 22 contest, and the next general
\nelection.<\/p>\n
Kono, seemingly, won another tactical advantage as he
\nappointed Hiroshi Mitsuzuka to take Mori's place as LDP
\nsecretary-general. When the LDP formally dissolved all party
\nfactions last January, Mitsuzuka's faction was then the largest.
\nSo far, Mitsuzuka has been a Kono supporter.<\/p>\n
The appointment laid bare another aspect of the reshuffle.
\nThe tatemae is that the LDP factions have been dissolved. The
\nhonne is that they still exist.<\/p>\n
In the new 20-man Cabinet there are six Socialist ministers,
\nplus one from Sakigake. The other thirteen ministers are all from
\nthe LDP and clearly, Murayama's appointments reflected the wishes
\nof the old LDP bosses and the old factional line-up, which was
\nostensibly abolished.<\/p>\n
Against this background, it can be clearly seen that in
\ndealing with the education minister's historical outburst about
\nWorld War II, Murayama simply could not do what he should have
\ndone.<\/p>\n
An appropriate response, bearing in mind the proximity of the
\n50th anniversary of the end of World War II, would have been for
\nMurayama to dismiss Shimamura for flouting his reported
\ninstruction. Such a move might have at least given South Korea,
\nChina and other Asian countries the hope that historical lapses
\nby Japanese politicians would no longer be tolerated.<\/p>\n
But the prime minister could not do that. He had not really
\nappointed Shimamura in the first place.<\/p>\n
Perhaps the most important result of the reshuffle is the
\nvisible degree of public distaste and disillusion with all the
\npolitical shenanigans. It could lead to more public apathy
\nregarding politics. The hope must be that it will create more
\npublic anger, which will be eventually reflected at the polls.<\/p>\n
Fifty years ago, Japanese leaders showed a lamentable lack of
\nresolve in dealing with the grave issues that then faced the
\nnation. Fifty years on, in this respect, not much has changed.<\/p>",
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