{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1291126,
        "msgid": "jakartan-empire-faces-structural-change-1447893297",
        "date": "2000-03-09 00:00:00",
        "title": "Jakartan empire faces structural change",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Jakartan empire faces structural change By Michael van Langenberg SYDNEY: The Jakarta Post on Nov. 10 editorialized as follows: \"The central government must do away with its obsession with national unity and start giving real autonomy to the regions. The government must not offer half-hearted measures if it wants to spare this nation from disintegrating. Barring complete separation, the ultimate form of autonomy is federalism ... Ultimately, the real threat to disintegration ...",
        "content": "<p>Jakartan empire faces structural change<\/p>\n<p>By Michael van Langenberg<\/p>\n<p>SYDNEY: The Jakarta Post on Nov. 10 editorialized as follows:<br>\n\"The central government must do away with its obsession with<br>\nnational unity and start giving real autonomy to the regions. The<br>\ngovernment must not offer half-hearted measures if it wants to<br>\nspare this nation from disintegrating. Barring complete<br>\nseparation, the ultimate form of autonomy is federalism ...<br>\nUltimately, the real threat to disintegration ... comes from<br>\nJakarta.\"<\/p>\n<p>The New Order regime from its inception in 1966 constructed a<br>\nstate-system in which two factors predominated. First was an<br>\nidealized<br>\nnation conceived in the official motto of \"Unity in Diversity\"<br>\n(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Second were notions of an 'integralistic'<br>\nstate resting on \"family\" principles, designed to protect an<br>\narchipelaegic unity (wawasan nusantara).<\/p>\n<p>From its very beginning in 1945 there has been a crucial<br>\ncontradiction in the Indonesian state-system between ideal legal<br>\nprinciples of regional autonomy, and the reality of an increasingly<br>\ncentralized national state.<\/p>\n<p>The collapse of the Soeharto presidency in 1998 may mark the<br>\nend of a century-long process of bureaucratic centralism in state<br>\nbuilding. That process began with the consolidation of the<br>\nimperial state of the Netherlands Indies at the turn of the 20th<br>\ncentury.<\/p>\n<p>In its later stage, Soeharto's presidency came to resemble the<br>\nimperial governor-generalships, supplemented with resonances of<br>\npre-colonial divine kingship. Soeharto's presidency ended amid a<br>\nmassive loss of popular legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p>National government itself was perceived widely as corrupt and<br>\nnepotistic, responsible for abuses by the military, greedily<br>\nappropriating regional resources, and culturally arrogant.<\/p>\n<p>In the past decade, coherent independence movements emerged in<br>\nseveral territories of the state. East Timor is now on the road<br>\nto full independence. Aceh seems destined to achieve either<br>\nindependence or some kind of special \"federalist\" relationship<br>\nwith Jakarta in the immediate future.<\/p>\n<p>Irian Jaya has just been divided into three provinces,<br>\ncreating increased local resentment against what is perceived as<br>\na further example of Jakartan imperialism. Increasingly coherent<br>\nmovements for regional \"autonomy\" are now also active in Maluku<br>\n(in two areas), Sulawesi (more than one!), Riau, West and East<br>\nKalimantan, West Sumatra, and Bali.<\/p>\n<p>How will the new government headed by President Abdurrahman<br>\nWahid deal with these movements? Executive government is vastly<br>\nweaker than a decade earlier. The legislature is now more<br>\npowerful and more legitimate than at any time since the mid-<br>\n1950s. It has successfully restricted presidential incumbency to<br>\ntwo five-year terms, and made the president answerable to the<br>\nHouse of Representatives once a  year.<\/p>\n<p>The Speaker of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien<br>\nRais, is a prominent advocate of a federalist state. Popular<br>\nlegitimacy of the internal security functions and political role<br>\nof the military is now lower than at any time in the history of<br>\nindependent Indonesia. The ruling oligarchy of the New Order<br>\nno longer dominates the economy to the extent it did prior to the<br>\neconomic crisis of 1997-98. Conditions are ripe for a significant<br>\ndispersal of power within the Jakartan empire.<\/p>\n<p>Supporters of Abdurrahman and Vice-President Megawati<br>\nSukarnoputri present their political partnership as an<br>\nintegrating leadership \"duality\" (dwitunggal), echoing that of<br>\nIndonesia's two independence proklamator, Sukarno and Hatta.<\/p>\n<p>Like them, Abdurrahman and Megawati reflect a partnership<br>\nof Islamic identity and secularist orientation. Similar echoes of the<br>\nearlier dwitunggal are heard in Abdurrahman's stated preference<br>\nfor a federalist Indonesia, while Megawati has emphasized<br>\ncommitment to her father's vision of a centralized unitary state.<\/p>\n<p>However, unlike the symbolic regional duality of Java\/Bali and<br>\nSumatra\/\"outer islands\" of the Sukarno-Hatta dwitunggal,<br>\nAbdurrahman and Megawati constitute an emphatically Javanese<br>\nvariant of national political culture.<\/p>\n<p>The new cabinet has been designated the Cabinet of National<br>\nUnity. In reality it is a cabinet of compromise and coalition<br>\nbuilding. It brings together conflicting political forces - rural<br>\nJavanese Islam, modernizing reformist Islam, secularist<br>\nnationalism, federalists, unitarists, military professionals,<br>\ninternationalists, protectionists, liberal democrats.<\/p>\n<p>It reflects the broad coalition that Abdurrahman built within<br>\nthe MPR in October to gain the presidency. In a sense this was<br>\nless a coalition to ensure that Abdurrahman became president than<br>\nto ensure that Megawati did not.<\/p>\n<p>Once the Abdurrahman-Megawati dwitunggal was in place,<br>\nthe cabinet had to accommodate the wide range of interests behind it.<br>\nThese negotiations saw the cabinet increase from Abdurrahman's<br>\ninitially intended 25 to an eventual 35 portfolios. Policy<br>\ncoherence might prove impossible. Executive government<br>\ninstability is a distinct likelihood.<\/p>\n<p>Alongside reformasi, \"referendum\" has entered the dominant<br>\nnational discourse. The former emphasizes a new era of \"moral\"<br>\npolitics, with national leaders seeking popular legitimacy as a<br>\nmatter of priority. The latter discourse, on display most vocally<br>\nin East Timor and Aceh, has placed the debate about federalism<br>\nand secessionism at center stage. The \"Jakartan empire\" is facing<br>\nfar-reaching structural change.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a private consultant and researcher on contemporary<br>\nIndonesia and Southeast Asia, and fractional employee in the<br>\nSchool of Asian Studies, University of Sydney. The above article<br>\nappears with the courtesy of the Inside Indonesia magazine, in<br>\nwhich it first appeared in the January-March edition.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jakartan-empire-faces-structural-change-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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