Islamic values and civil society<\/p>\n
By Komaruddin Hidayat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): All the major religions of the world, such as
\nHinduism, the Jewish religion, Christianity and Islam, did not
\nrely on bureaucratic and institutional power in the early days of
\ntheir movement, but rather on the power of the founders, who
\noffered freedom from the tyranny oppressing the people.<\/p>\n
These figures were usually supported by alternative and
\nvisionary ideas so that at their inception all religious
\nmovements could easily win militant support from the oppressed.
\nHowever, when a religious movement developed with a large body of
\nfollowers and gave birth to political institutions with religious
\ncharacteristics, various deviations and betrayals of the
\nunderlying message of the religion in question began.<\/p>\n
While a religion was originally very much concerned with the
\nstruggle for human rights, justice and the principles of
\ndemocracy, a religion-based political institution was frequently
\nthe other way around. This phenomenon is evident throughout
\nhistory, in which dynasties and forces with religious
\ncharacteristics often resorted to authoritarian and feudalistic
\npolitical practices, hiding behind the authority of clerics
\ncoalescing with dynastic rulers. At this point a religious
\nauthority collaborated with a political authority in such a way
\nthat a culture of criticism could hardly develop.<\/p>\n
If we observe the history of political development in Islam it
\nwould be no exaggeration to conclude that the Islamic world is in
\nfact still devoid of a tradition of a civil society in the
\nunderstanding and context of Western society. Although the term
\nmasyarakat madani (the Indonesian equivalent to \"civil society\")
\nis gaining popularity today, historically and conceptually there
\nis a fundamental difference between the civil society as known in
\nthe West and what is termed here as masyarakat madani.<\/p>\n
The genealogy of Western civil society came into being out of
\nhistoric-empirical experiences which placed religion outside
\npolitics. The teaching of the church \"to leave religion to the
\nchurch and politics to the state\" contributed to the theological
\nlegitimacy of a secular-humanistic civil society in the West.<\/p>\n
In the history of Islam, the concept of a civil society came
\nabout as a legacy of the Prophet Muhammad, the messenger and the
\nfounder of the Islamic movement. The model of society in Madinah
\nin Saudi Arabia, which was the greatest legacy of Muhammad, was
\nmaintained and continued by his successors. Unfortunately, the
\nIslamic political tradition and structure which was originally
\nhighly egalitarian, underwent great deviation when it fell to
\ndynastic powers. The long history of Islam is one of the ups and
\ndowns of various dynasties relying upon ulema and blue blood
\ndescendants. This is why, toward a modern era stressing
\ndemocracy, justice, egalitarianism, human rights and
\ntransparency, the political tradition of the Islamic world began
\nto look bleak and needed reform.<\/p>\n
In the Indonesian context, since its inception, this nation
\nhas, theoretically, progressed ahead of others in the Islamic
\nworld. The choice of a republic and of Pancasila as its ideology
\nmeant the application of the principles of a civil society in a
\nmodern sense, despite the fact that the majority of the
\npopulation is Muslim. The seedlings and legacy of Islam have been
\nfostered here together with those of modernity from the West. Not
\nsurprisingly, widely accepted politicians and scientists who are
\nknown to be critical are those who inherited the Islamic
\ntradition and have also acquired modern Western education.<\/p>\n
The spirit of Islam and modernity grows on Indonesian soil,
\nwhich in turn will give birth to what has been termed the
\n\"modern-Indo-Muslim.\" What has been imagined of Indonesian
\nsociety is an ideal and an image marked by, among other things,
\nreligious pluralism and democracy, the realization of which must
\nstill be fought for together.<\/p>\n
In a traditional community, religious institutions and figures
\ncan easily be used to attain political power, but in a democratic
\nera this will no longer be effective and acceptable. Even if
\nIndonesia refuses to be dubbed a secular state, a number of basic
\nelements of the system of a secular state have already taken
\nshape, as indicated by the strengthening of democracy and a
\nmulti-party system here. To reach political power one must be
\nelected by the public, and can no longer rely on religious
\nauthority.<\/p>\n
Interestingly in the previous general election religious-
\noriented political parties lost, and those with a nationalistic
\nideology won more votes. This reality reinforces the emergence of
\ndemocratic and pluralistic Indonesia, leading to a significant
\nshift in the traditional role of religion.<\/p>\n
It is true that in the election, religious figures and symbols
\nstill exerted great influence in order to gain votes. But future
\npublic demand of political actors will shift to quality,
\nprofessionalism and morality instead of religious figures
\ndepending on their established ties and emotional loyalties of
\npotential voters. However, we have to be ready for disappointment
\nin view of the development of political culture here which has
\nyet to become rational. Suspicions, intrigues and political
\nmaneuvers based on ideology still seem strong enough to stay. In
\nthe tradition of Western society, the term \"ideology\" has a
\nnegative connotation because an ideological power relies more on
\nemotional strength, simplification of problems and manipulation
\nof the masses; it always assumes there is an enemy to be
\nconquered, leading to constraints in a win-win solution in view
\nof such an exclusive character.<\/p>\n
Yet, in Indonesia, the term and power of ideology is
\napparently still strong and is being preserved because of its
\nassociation with religious militancy and ethnic identity.<\/p>\n
In this transitional period, in which political and economic
\nstability is yet to be seen, it is highly likely that ideological
\nforces based on religious and ethnic sentiments will be
\nreinforced. The final target of reform -- upholding supremacy of
\nthe law and the creation of a democratic political climate --
\nwould suffer a setback.<\/p>\n
Support for our foreign policies under President Abdurrahman
\nWahid would be useless unless followed by domestic restructuring
\nof politics and the economy. The trouble is that the forces of
\ninterest groups, and ethnic and religious groups, have indicated
\nmutual suspicion and efforts of disrupting each other instead of
\nclosing their ranks to solve the nation's acute problems. While
\nin continental Europe there is a centripetal movement in which
\nsmall states formerly embroiled in disputes are now approaching
\none another, in Indonesia our unity is instead threatened by
\ncentrifugal motions.<\/p>\n
Ironically, the military so far considers these forces to be a
\nunifying one for the nation and was the disintegrating factor
\nunder former president Soeharto since its role was coopted by
\nrulers' political adventures. This led to various human rights
\nviolations leading to the emergence of these centrifugal motions.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the Paramadina Foundation which
\npursues Islamic studies and is also a professor of philosophy.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/islamic-values-and-civil-society-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}