Islamic radical movements in Indonesia<\/p>\n
Azyumardi Azra
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
The root causes of radicalism among Muslims in modern times
\nare very complex. This complexity has become even greater lately
\nbecause of the numerous driving factors that are working to
\ninfluence the socio-historical course of Muslim societies as a
\nwhole.<\/p>\n
Looking at the whole history of radicalism among Muslims, I
\nwould argue that radicalism among Muslims is more political than
\nreligious. In some instances, the original motive may have been
\nreligious, but it soon became very political.<\/p>\n
The idea of establishing an Islamic state (dawlah al-
\nIslamiyyah) is one of the most crucial issues that is on and off
\namong certain groups of Muslims in Indonesia. Certain groups
\namong the moderates, such as the Masjumi party under the
\nleadership of Mohammad Natsir, for instance, have also attempted
\nto transform Indonesia into a dawlah al-Islamiyyah.<\/p>\n
It is important to point out that the attempts were carried
\nout through legal and constitutional means, more precisely,
\nthrough the legislature. But the idea failed to materialize,
\nmainly because Islamic parties had been involved in quarrels and
\nconflicts among themselves.<\/p>\n
At the same time, however, there remain individuals and Muslim
\ngroups who are keeping alive the idea of establishing an Islamic
\nstate here. Depending on the political situation, these people
\ncan operate underground or openly in trying to achieve their
\ngoal. They may also collaborate with certain elements of unhappy
\nmilitary officers or even with other radical groups which, in
\nterms of ideology, would seem to be incompatible; this awkward
\ncollaboration can be called a \"marriage for convenience\".<\/p>\n
Therefore, one should be very careful in his\/her analysis and
\nperspective of radical groups; some of them could be genuine,
\nmotivated mostly by religious reasons, but some others could be
\n\"engineered\" radicals sponsored by certain individuals and groups
\nof people for their own political ends.<\/p>\n
The fall of president Soeharto after more than three decades
\nof power unleashed the then idle Muslim radicals. The euphoria of
\nnewly found democracy, and the lifting of the \"anti-subversive
\nlaw\" by president BJ Habibie, provided very good ground for the
\nradicals to express their extremism and radical ideas and
\nactivities in a more visible manner. The lack of law enforcement
\nbecause of the demoralization of the National Police and the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI) created a kind of legal vacuum that has
\nbeen used by the radical groups to take the law into their own
\nhands.<\/p>\n
Some of the most important radical groups should be mentioned
\nin this account. They are the Lasykar Jihad, formed by the Forum
\nKomunikasi Ahlussunnah Wa al-Jamaah under the leadership of
\nJa`far Umar Thalib; the Front Pembela Islam (FPI\/Islam Defenders
\nFront) led by Habib Rizq Shihab; the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
\n(MMI\/Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters) led by Abu Bakar
\nBaasyir; Jamaah Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia (JAMI) led by Habib
\nHusein al-Habsyi; and Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI\/Indonesian
\nParty of Liberation).<\/p>\n
It is important that some of these groups have been either
\ndisbanded by their own leaders -- like Lasykar Jihad -- or have
\nbeen idle or have been lying low after the arrests and trials of
\na number of the perpetrators of the Bali and Marriott Hotel
\nbombings.<\/p>\n
It is important to make clear, however, that though these
\nradical groups, to a certain degree, tend to be violent, there is
\nno clear evidence that they have also been involved in terrorism.
\nMost of -- if not all -- terrorist activities in Indonesia have
\nbeen conducted by individuals or groups of individuals that in
\none way or another have a certain connection or links with
\nAzahari and Noordin M. Top.<\/p>\n
It is clear that all of these radical groups mentioned above
\nare independent and have no connection with established
\norganizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and the
\nlike; nor are they affiliated with Islamic political parties.
\nThis indicates that the radical groups do not trust other
\nestablished Muslim organizations, either socio-religious or
\npolitical in nature.<\/p>\n
There are at least two categories for these radical groups:
\nthe first is radical groups that are basically homegrown,
\nincluding Lasykar Jihad, the FPI and some other smaller groups.<\/p>\n
The second category is Middle Eastern-affiliated or oriented
\ngroups, like JAMI, which has its origin in al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun
\nin Egypt, and Hibz al-Tahrir, which was initially founded in
\nJordan by Syaikh Taqi al-Din Nabhani in the 1950s.<\/p>\n
Despite this distinction, all of these radical groups have a
\nvery strong Middle Eastern-oriented ideology, which they believe
\nto be the most genuinely Islamic worldview.<\/p>\n
A series of terrorist bombings in Indonesia, beginning in
\nLegian, Bali, in October 2002, followed by the Marriott Hotel in
\nJakarta in 2003, the bombing near the Australian Embassy in
\nJakarta (Sept. 9, 2004), and most recently the second Bali
\nbombings, is certainly a sad human tragedy in contemporary
\nIndonesia. In fact, the bombings reflect a new phase of violence
\nand terror in the country.<\/p>\n
Worse is the fact that the perpetrators of the Australian
\nEmbassy and the second Bali bombings were suicide attackers,
\nreminding one of the Palestinian suicide bombers. It is difficult
\nfor Indonesian people in general to believe that individuals
\namong them are increasingly becoming so ruthless and inhumane in
\nthe name of jihad.<\/p>\n
But now, after intensive police investigation, the first Bali,
\nMarriott Hotel, Australian Embassy and second Bali bombings, for
\nseveral reasons, could be seen as a \"blessing a disguise\".<\/p>\n
First, police have been able not only to catch the alleged
\nperpetrators of the bombings, but also to uncover some fresh
\nevidence on the networks of terrorists in Indonesia and Southeast
\nAsia in general. The revelation of the networks has been crucial
\nfor establishing the fact that networks of radicals have been
\nworking in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Second, the revelation of the terrorist networks by the police
\nin so convincing a manner has silenced most of the skeptics, who
\nfrom the first Bali blasts have maintained that the bombings were
\nsimply a Western plot to discredit Islam and destroy the image of
\nMuslims in the country.<\/p>\n
The disclosure of networks of radicals has apparently showed
\npeople that this \"conspiracy theory\" does not ring true. The
\nstatements by Amrozi, Imam Samudra and their accomplices,
\ninvolved in the Bali and other bombings, make it clear that the
\nbombings were motivated both by \"genuine\" radicalism and hatred
\nagainst the U.S. and other Western powers. The fact that the
\nperpetrators have shown no remorse for the innocent victims has
\nfurther strengthened the idea that they were motivated by their
\nown terrorist ideology rather than by anything else.<\/p>\n
Third, the revelation of the terrorist networks points to the
\nfact that there are indeed terrorists among Indonesians, who
\nhappen to be Muslims and who are more than happy to use violent
\nmeans to achieve their ends. Before the police disclosure, there
\nhad been widespread reluctance among Indonesia's Muslim leaders
\nto admit there were Islamic terrorists here misusing the
\nteachings of Islam to justify their terrorist activities.<\/p>\n
The events following the second Bali bombings, however, have
\nseen some shift in the attitude of Muslim leaders. They agree
\nthat the bombings were not part of a legitimate jihad, as
\nasserted by the suicide bombers, and that it is prohibited to
\nconduct jihad in such a way and, similarly, it is also prohibited
\nto be a suicide bomber.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, Muslim leaders agreed to disseminate, on a large
\nscale, the teachings of true jihad among Muslims across Indonesia
\nin an effort to help prevent terrorist groups from recruiting new
\nmembers and carrying out attacks and suicide bombings. They also
\nacknowledged that terrorism was being carried out by Muslims
\nusing heretical Islamic teachings.<\/p>\n
There is no doubt now is the time for Muslim leaders in
\nIndonesia and Southeast Asia, the majority of whom are moderate,
\nto sincerely admit that there is a serious problem of radicalism,
\nnot to mention terrorism, among certain Muslim individuals and
\ngroups.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it is time for moderate Muslim leaders to make more
\nclear that a literal interpretation of Islam will only lead to
\nextremism, which is unacceptable to Islam, and that Islam cannot
\ncondone, let alone justify, any kind of violent or terrorist act.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, moderate Muslim leaders should not be misled by
\nthe claims and assertions of the radicals. The radicals are
\nshrewd not only in abusing Islamic doctrines for their own ends,
\nbut also in manipulating Muslim sentiment through the abuse and
\nmanipulation of the media, particularly television. The claims
\nthat the arrests of certain radical leaders means the suppression
\nof Islam and the \"ulema\" (Muslim religious scholars) are very
\nmisleading.<\/p>\n
Similarly, the claims that police investigations in Indonesia
\nof certain pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in the search of
\nthe perpetrators of the bombings is the initial step toward
\nhostility and suspicion of all pesantren are even more
\nmisleading.<\/p>\n
I suggest that one of the most important root causes of
\nviolence and terrorism in present-day Indonesia is the almost
\ncomplete absence of law enforcement and, worse still, impunity.
\nIn fact, the law enforcement vacuum has been an important raison
\nd'etre for certain radical groups to take the law into their own
\nhands through unlawful activities such as raids on discotheques,
\nnightclubs and other places the radicals believe cause social
\nills.<\/p>\n
Above all, the future of moderate and peaceful Indonesian
\nIslam is dependent on the fair, objective, proactive attitude of
\nthe moderate majority to respond to any developments among
\nMuslims in the region. A reactionary and defensive attitude is
\nnot going to help in the efforts to show to the world that Islam
\nis a peaceful religion and that Muslims are peace loving people.<\/p>\n
Again, it is time for the moderates to be more assertive and
\nlead the way to reestablish the peaceful nature of Islam in
\nIndonesia and Southeast Asia in general.<\/p>\n
The writer is a professor of history and rector of
\nHidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta. This
\narticle is an excerpt of a paper presented at the 17th Asia
\nPacific Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution
\nin Jakarta.<\/p>",
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