{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1382616,
        "msgid": "is-reform-era-at-an-end-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-12-01 00:00:00",
        "title": "Is reform era at an end?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Is reform era at an end? By Rochman Achwan JAKARTA (JP): Six months have passed since Soeharto stepped down. The \"spring\" of democracy that arose along with his going has sailed into uncharted waters. Today, Indonesia is at the crossroads. Will the political system give rise to another military regime or will it progress into democracy?",
        "content": "<p>Is reform era at an end?<\/p>\n<p>By Rochman Achwan<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): Six months have passed since Soeharto stepped<br>\ndown. The &quot;spring&quot; of democracy that arose along with his going<br>\nhas sailed into uncharted waters.<\/p>\n<p>Today, Indonesia is at the crossroads. Will the political<br>\nsystem give rise to another military regime or will it progress<br>\ninto democracy? The forces of pro-reform relentlessly engage in<br>\nundermining and even abolishing Soeharto&apos;s political machinery<br>\nand believe that this is the nation&apos;s path for entering a new<br>\nera.<\/p>\n<p>At the opposite pole, however, this political machinery<br>\ncontinues to function and reposition its roles in order to defend<br>\nits own political and economic interests. The public arena which<br>\nis believed to be an arena of public salvation turns its face<br>\ninto a threatening one.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesians are witnessing the rise of processes sharpening<br>\nthe boundaries of sociopolitical groups based on deep-rooted ties<br>\nand narrow political and economic interests. Will this nation<br>\nstart to dream about a father figure, a strong autocratic leader<br>\nsuch as Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo? Or will Indonesian enter<br>\nthe process of reform and democratization peacefully as happened<br>\nin the countries of Latin America almost ten years ago?<\/p>\n<p>The wave of democracy that sweeps over Indonesia exhibits<br>\nanomalies seen from the tradition of transition to a democratic<br>\nsociety. Olle Tornquist (1998), Scandinavian political scientist,<br>\nargues that current Indonesian political reform can hardly be<br>\ncompared to other countries which have undergone reform in the<br>\nmodern age.<\/p>\n<p>The real though dangerous festivity of democracy has given<br>\nbirth to new and &quot;rejuvenated&quot; old leaders in the public sphere.<br>\nThe supporters of the Soeharto political machinery try to<br>\nrelegitimize their positions and wealth. Its anti-communist<br>\nsupporters who became political dissidents during the Soeharto<br>\nera try to recover their losses. Many new faces, unknown by most<br>\nIndonesians, establish new political parties to achieve their own<br>\ninterests. All speak out about the importance of reform.<\/p>\n<p>It is sadly true, however, most of them do not have clear<br>\nideas on the necessity of political institutional reform as one<br>\nof the prerequisites for democratization. In contrast, students<br>\nand university lecturers uncompromisingly struggle to demand the<br>\nabolition of the Soeharto political machinery as the only<br>\nconditionality for this nation to enter a new millennium.<\/p>\n<p>Why does this all happen in the midst of economic catastrophe?<br>\nThe answer should be put down to two factors. The first refers to<br>\nthe way Soeharto stepped down. The second relates to the<br>\nbreakdown of social trust.<\/p>\n<p>Although the student movement has played pivotal roles, it was<br>\nthe global currency market and the IMF that pushed against the<br>\nwall of Indonesia&apos;s empire of authoritarian institutions,<br>\nbringing down Soeharto and paving the way for democratization.<\/p>\n<p>One can say that at the close of this century, modern<br>\nsocieties for the first time witness the key role played by<br>\nglobal financial crises in bringing down the most authoritarian<br>\nAsian leader. He was not challenged by any single domestic power<br>\nor leader. This is why the fall of Soeharto is not accompanied by<br>\nthe sinking of his political &quot;ship&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>In contrast to the fall of Latin American military dictators<br>\nand Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto&apos;s political machinery<br>\ncontinues to stand up, repositioning itself even though it is<br>\nbeing undermined.<\/p>\n<p>During a certain period of the Soeharto era, this political<br>\nmachinery contributed to achieving a level of prosperity that<br>\nthis nation has never reached in its economic history. But at the<br>\nsame time, it also burned the bridge that connected the state and<br>\nthe nation. Negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict<br>\nsolution -- all that is the lifeblood of democracy -- have been<br>\nsubstituted by state violence, propaganda, and cooptation in<br>\ndealing with the whole society.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, upper and middle strata gradually turned their<br>\nbacks on this political machinery. In this tumultuous era, its<br>\nsupporters try to repair the damage so that it is capable of<br>\nmaintaining political power. As time has evolved over the last<br>\nsix months, it is clearly evident that this political machinery<br>\nmaintains the political status-quo rather than making<br>\nsignificant political reform.<\/p>\n<p>The second, the breakdown of social trust. Social trust is the<br>\nvery essence of a healthy society. Its functions are to reduce<br>\npolitical and economic complexities and uncertainties in modern<br>\nlife. It creates social solidarity among groups, an important<br>\nelement for the rise of a genuine civil society. When social<br>\ntrust is damaged the society as a whole suffers; and when it is<br>\ndestroyed, society falters and collapses.<\/p>\n<p>A society that is characterized by a high level of trust<br>\nprefers negotiation, compromise, and peaceful conflict solutions<br>\nto head-on physical confrontation in solving political and<br>\neconomic problems. In this type of society, institutional and<br>\npersonal leaders create great trust. Unfortunately, Indonesian<br>\nsociety can not in any sense be described as having a high level<br>\nof social trust. On the contrary, this society is painfully<br>\nundergoing processes of the breakdown of social trust in the<br>\nmidst of the double reform of polity and economy.<\/p>\n<p>A sense of societal distrust toward government institutions<br>\nand leaders appears in the public arena and haunts the future of<br>\nIndonesian reform. Moreover, in contrast to other societies that<br>\nhave undergone democratic transitions, Indonesia&apos;s moralizing<br>\ninstitutions (church, mosques, and universities) play a feeble<br>\nrole in pointing out the direction to the achievement of peaceful<br>\nsolutions.<\/p>\n<p>Other social leaders choose ad hoc options by making public<br>\ncondemnation of every round of violence that erupts in the<br>\ncountry. This is quite different to the guiding roles of the<br>\nChurch in Poland and the Philippines during the period of<br>\n&quot;reform&quot;. This ad hoc option, of course, is not sufficient as a<br>\nstrategy to build the trust between the masses and them. It will<br>\nnot be an exaggeration, therefore, if one comes to the conclusion<br>\nthat Indonesian society is experiencing what one calls a<br>\n&quot;headless chicken syndrome&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>This is a situation in which the masses lose trust in<br>\ngovernment institutions, political and moral leaders and in turn<br>\nact blindly and sometimes brutally, attacking &quot;objects&quot; that are<br>\nassumed to harm society. The &quot;festivity&quot; of brutal killings of<br>\nsuspected &quot;ninjas&quot; (men dressed in the fashion of Japanese<br>\nassassins) in East Java, the recruitment by the military of<br>\nunemployed men as private paramilitary forces for the guarding of<br>\nthe recent Special Session of the People&apos;s Consultative Assembly,<br>\nand the latest brutal violence in Jakarta (Ketapang) are all<br>\nevidence of the widespread nature of the syndrome.<\/p>\n<p>There is mounting public fear in big cities that the brutal<br>\nkillings and violence that recently spread over Java are being<br>\nengineered by irresponsible political adventurers aiming at the<br>\ndestruction of public order.<\/p>\n<p>Today, the smell of terror is knocking at the doors of<br>\nIndonesian houses. How on earth will reform and democratization<br>\narrive at a peaceful destination if the public arena is filled by<br>\nthe smell of terror? If this situation continues, if the<br>\ngovernment fails to reduce sky-rocketing unemployment, and if the<br>\nsilent middle and upper strata lose their patience, one can not<br>\ndeny the chances of the rise of Der Fuhrer or a Generalissimo. If<br>\nthis happens, mothers of reform heroes will keep on crying<br>\nbecause the dream of their children of the rise of a new era will<br>\nnever materialize.<\/p>\n<p>It is, therefore, high time for Indonesia&apos;s ruling and moral<br>\nleaders to prevent the rise of a strong autocratic leader who<br>\nwill purge all &quot;suspicious&quot; and &quot;alien&quot; persons, organizations,<br>\nand institutions with an iron fist. In doing so, they should<br>\nembrace a policy of inclusion, rather than exclusion, as a means<br>\nof bringing this nation into the new era of reform.<\/p>\n<p>The state and the nation should look to the future rather than<br>\nrespectively defending old political machinery and retaliating<br>\nagainst past leaders. The ruling and opposition leaders must stop<br>\ndebating whether their political decisions are constitutionally<br>\nand legitimately correct or not. This is not only an unproductive<br>\ndebate but also pushes aside the pressing political problems from<br>\nthe public sphere.<\/p>\n<p>Rejuvenating and creating legitimate institutions should be<br>\nthe new rules of the game for the present government to reduce<br>\nmounting political tensions. For instance, the planned<br>\nestablishment of the &quot;independent&quot; commission for investigating<br>\nSoeharto&apos;s wealth should include leaders from outside the<br>\ngovernment so that it will be legitimized by the nation.<\/p>\n<p>The government&apos;s attempts to create legitimate institutions<br>\nwill not come to materialize if the nation does not have<br>\nindependent moral leaders who guide it to take the road of moral<br>\npolitics. This nation desperately needs the birth of this sort of<br>\nleader who has beauty of mind similar to Vaclav Havel of<br>\nCzechoslovakia during the communist rule or Cardinal Sin of the<br>\nPhilippines during the last years of Marcos era.<\/p>\n<p>These leaders, undoubtedly, have provided inspiration not only<br>\nto their fellow citizens but also to the rulers to guide the<br>\nwhole nation to arrive at a peaceful destination.<\/p>\n<p>If this leader emerges, the headless chicken syndrome might be<br>\nremedied, the irresponsible political adventurers may lose their<br>\ngrip and finally this nation will enjoy the beauty of the reform<br>\nera in the years to come.<\/p>\n<p>Rochman Achwan PhD is a teaching staffer at the Department of<br>\nSociology, University of Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>Window: In contrast to the fall of Latin American military<br>\ndictators and Marcos of the Phillipines, Soeharto&apos;s political<br>\nmachinery continues to stand up, repositioning itself even<br>\nthough it is being undermined.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/is-reform-era-at-an-end-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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