{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1107284,
        "msgid": "is-indonesia-really-collapsing-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-05-08 00:00:00",
        "title": "Is Indonesia really collapsing?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Is Indonesia really collapsing? By Jusuf Wanandi JAKARTA (JP): Much has been written in the press about the mess in Indonesia. There is also a lot of speculation about Indonesia's implosion and its demise as a nation. Contingency plans have reportedly been drafted to include joint military exercises under the United States, in anticipation of the impact on Southeast Asia. How valid are all these speculations, assessments and scenarios about Indonesia's future breakup?",
        "content": "<p>Is Indonesia really collapsing?<\/p>\n<p>By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): Much has been written in the press about the<br>\nmess in Indonesia. There is also a lot of speculation about<br>\nIndonesia's implosion and its demise as a nation. Contingency<br>\nplans have reportedly been drafted to include joint military<br>\nexercises under the United States, in anticipation of the impact<br>\non Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n<p>How valid are all these speculations, assessments and<br>\nscenarios about Indonesia's future breakup?<\/p>\n<p>The depth of the crisis and the lack of sense of urgency among<br>\nleaders and the elite has often led us to despair. Yet we should<br>\ntake a longer, historical view of the Indonesian crisis.<\/p>\n<p>A more balanced view might further result from a sociological<br>\nunderstanding of the crisis environment and a psychological<br>\nexplanation of the Indonesian character. That will give us a less<br>\npessimistic view about Indonesia's future, especially her chances<br>\nfor recovery and survival.<\/p>\n<p>This also helps one to understand why Indonesia has survived<br>\nthe last three years of deep and multiple crises.<\/p>\n<p>Following eight years of authoritarian rule under Sukarno and<br>\nanother 32 years under Soeharto, the current disorder is<br>\nunderstandable. It was contributed to by the swing of the<br>\npolitical pendulum from one end to the other. It will need some<br>\ntime to settle again at the center, especially for a country as<br>\nhuge and diverse as this. The complication is that the political<br>\ncrisis has coincided with an economic and social crisis -- and<br>\neven a cultural crisis regarding values.<\/p>\n<p>Soeharto's regime was not only authoritarian but also very<br>\nJavanese centric and centrally organized. Immediately after his<br>\nfall, the regions, which bore deep resentment against the center,<br>\nasserted themselves. In part, this resulted in the outbreak of<br>\nregional tensions and conflicts. Some of the conflicts, such as<br>\nin Aceh and Irian Jaya, however, had already begun under<br>\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesians are still very paternalistically inclined and to a<br>\ncertain extent remain feudal, especially in Java. On top of that<br>\nthe Constitution stipulates a presidential system of government,<br>\nalbeit not a complete one as the president is not directly<br>\nelected by the public but by the People's Consultative Assembly.<\/p>\n<p>But the president's position is still very strong and is also<br>\nlooked upon as a model. With a weak presidency, such as that<br>\nunder B.J. Habibie or Abdurrahman Wahid, not much could be<br>\nachieved, while an overtly strong one might create havoc and<br>\nexcesses -- as in the case of Soeharto.<\/p>\n<p>All these factors have had a bearing on the crisis. But there<br>\nare also countervailing streams in Indonesia's history and<br>\ncharacter that have helped alleviate some of the negative<br>\nimpacts.<\/p>\n<p>One is strong nationalism that began in the last century,<br>\nmarked by the founding of the Boedi Oetomo organization in 1908.<br>\nThis was consolidated during the national revolution against the<br>\nDutch (1945-1949) and through the efforts and struggle of<br>\npresident Soekarno during the 1950's. The second is the<br>\nresilience and patience of Indonesians at large. Only if these<br>\ncountervailing streams in the psyche and intellect of Indonesians<br>\nare taken into account can one start to understand why the<br>\ncountry still survives.<\/p>\n<p>Even the Acehnese in general did not think of separation and<br>\nindependence initially. Their number one concern has been whether<br>\ntheir sense of justice is being listened to, and whether the main<br>\nperpetrators of human rights abuses there will be brought to<br>\ntrial.<\/p>\n<p>And second, they are concerned whether a new social contract<br>\ncould be reached with Jakarta, giving them full \"home rule\" or<br>\n\"special status\". Although Aceh's separation could be considered<br>\nthe main threat against Indonesia's unity, nationalism has always<br>\nbeen strong in Aceh. They have been the centerpiece of<br>\nIndonesia's struggle for independence and against Dutch<br>\ncolonialism. The weak government of President Abdurrahman cannot<br>\ndeliver what has been promised to the Acehnese and therefore a<br>\nsolution is still elusive.<\/p>\n<p>Irian Jaya's problems are different. The degree of nationalism<br>\nis not as high, since the province only became part of Indonesia<br>\nin 1963. Since society is largely tribal, their resistance<br>\nagainst Jakarta is obviously limited. But Indonesia must take<br>\nheed of increased international support for independence<br>\nmovements in Irian Jaya, given allegations of widespread gross<br>\nhuman rights violations, as in the earlier case of East Timor.<\/p>\n<p>Irian Jaya also needs a substantive \"special status\". It is<br>\nimportant that Jakarta can deal effectively with Irian Jaya in<br>\nthe near future. Elsewhere in Indonesia, real autonomy, as drawn<br>\nup in the new legislation, appears to be adequate so far. The<br>\ncapacity of the regions have however to be strengthened before<br>\nthey can exercise fully fledged autonomy.<\/p>\n<p>Nationalism is therefore still very strong here; it has been<br>\nable to keep alive the idea of a united nation, despite the deep<br>\ncrisis over the last four years.<\/p>\n<p>This emotional, unifying factor has been complemented by a<br>\nresilient, patient populace. Without these vital characteristics<br>\nmany more conflicts could have occurred. There have been so many<br>\npolitical conflicts, but never one which could split the nation.<\/p>\n<p>All this does not mean that further efforts should not be made<br>\nto overcome the crisis; the threshold for misery and pain<br>\nnevertheless has its limits. The country is starting to burst at<br>\nthe seams with all the recent ongoing conflicts.<\/p>\n<p>Given the importance of the President as the highest<br>\nexecutive, an immediate change of leadership is critical. He or<br>\nshe must be a model, being willing to sacrifice for the nation,<br>\nwhile receiving the support of a majority and having a good team<br>\nto implement policies. If such a leader could be elected,<br>\nrehabilitation and reform could be undertaken more smoothly. At<br>\nleast there would be hope that the country could move again.<\/p>\n<p>The past three years have been a difficult transition period<br>\nand we have not been fortunate to get the right leader. Soeharto<br>\nnever allowed anyone to grow to be able to take over from him.<br>\nBut the nation has learned a dear lesson. While an \"ideal\" leader<br>\nmay not be immediately available, a new generation of leaders<br>\nfrom non-governmental organizations, the press, intellectuals,<br>\npolitical parties and bureaucrats is likely to take over after<br>\n2004.<\/p>\n<p>Then there have been new economic forces driving real growth<br>\nlast year. Informal businesses and small and medium enterprises<br>\ntogether contributed up to 45 percent of gross domestic product,<br>\nwhich grew by 6 percent to 7 percent last year. In a number of<br>\nsectors these businesses have been performing very well in the<br>\nfirst few months of 2001.<\/p>\n<p>They are of course temporary in strength, while real reforms<br>\nand new investments, especially foreign, must sustain their<br>\nfuture growth. The raging political conflict and the slowdown of<br>\nthe developed world have dampened the hopes of these small<br>\nbusinesses.<\/p>\n<p>But at least it has been shown that new economic forces which<br>\nare not dependent on the government are coming up and will be<br>\nplaying a greater role. As soon as steady leadership is in place,<br>\nsome real development is possible again very soon.<\/p>\n<p>If the last few weeks have been an indication, and if<br>\nIndonesia is able to overcome conflict that could create civil<br>\nwar and chaos, we still have a chance -- more so if a new<br>\npresident can lead us into stability and hope.<\/p>\n<p>This period of transition is one of a catharsis for Indonesia.<br>\nIt is uncertain how it will end. It has yet to run its course<br>\nbefore a turnaround can happen. Thus patience in assessing<br>\nIndonesia is called for, while conviction is needed that the<br>\ncountry is not falling to pieces.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a member of the Board of Trustees at the Center<br>\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/is-indonesia-really-collapsing-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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