Is East Timor a case of UN neglect?<\/p>\n
By Soegio Sosrosoemarto<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The United Nations is coming to East Timor; no
\ndoubt belatedly. In hindsight, taking its cue from the
\ndecolonization of Asia, the UN should have been in East Timor no
\nlater than 10 years after India took Goa back in 1961.<\/p>\n
The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) has been in East Timor
\nsince late-June 1999 under the New York accord of May 5, 1999.
\nUNAMET has been tasked to hold and supervise the referendum on
\nthe status of East Timor which is scheduled for Aug. 30, 1999,
\nbarring any untoward eventualities.<\/p>\n
Under the referendum, East Timorese can choose one of two
\noptions: Either remain part of Indonesia with wide-ranging
\nautonomy, or secede from Indonesia and establish an independent
\nentity.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, while UNAMET is supposed to maintain its
\nneutrality and impartiality in executing its tasks and duties in
\nEast Timor, one can unmistakably note a series of apparently
\nunrelated instances which seem to indicate on oblique campaign on
\nthe part of UNAMET for the second option.<\/p>\n
The recent visit to Jakarta of a 1997 Nobel Peace Prize winner
\nwas apparently intended to remind the East Timorese that he is
\nthe heir presumptive to the high office in East Timor, and that
\nhe has all along been the rightful spokesman of the East
\nTimorese.<\/p>\n
The following instances perhaps could raise questions whether
\nUNAMET has wittingly or unwittingly supported the option of
\nindependence for East Timor:
\n* The Australian newspaper The Age on July 31, 1999
\nreported the UN was preparing a draft text on the formation of a
\nprovisional government for East Timor. If the report was true,
\nthe premature leakage of such a plan was probably not as innocent
\nas it might appear, and probably had an ulterior motive. It could
\nlead the East Timorese to believe that whatever the results of
\nthe referendum, an independent East Timor was the UN's preference
\nor had even been arranged.
\n* Besides complaints about partiality on the part of certain
\nUNAMET personnel and their assistants, there have been reports
\nabout disrespectful acts committed by certain UNAMET members,
\nincluding taking down Indonesian flags and flying the flags of
\ntheir own countries. Is this not a blatant expression of
\narrogance and ingrained dislike, at the least, toward Indonesia?
\nAre these acts not intended to dissuade people from choosing to
\nremain a part of Indonesia?
\n* A high-ranking official from a neighboring country was reported
\nby local newspapers to have stated in East Timor that his country
\nwas committed to giving aid to the East Timorese in recognition
\nof the help they provided his country during World War II.<\/p>\n
This statement, made during the voter registration period, was
\nutterly unwise. It could convey the message -- unintentionally
\none surely hopes -- that despite a lack of natural resources, for
\nexample, East Timor could depend on this foreign country for its
\nwell-being and survival. Further, the Commonwealth of Portuguese-
\nSpeaking Countries, which was established in Lisbon in July 1997,
\ncould be a source of aid to East Timor.<\/p>\n
UNAMET's task is certainly not an easy one. However, a
\nreferendum on the two options given the East Timorese seems to be
\nthe only practical way to find a lasting and internationally
\nacceptable solution to the East Timor problem.<\/p>\n
Looking back at the genesis of the conflict in East Timor in
\nthe 1970s, one rightfully doubts if the UN presence and face-to-
\nface meetings between proindependence and prointegration East
\nTimorese leaders can completely extinguish the burning embers of
\nhatred and suspicion among them.<\/p>\n
Therefore, combined guarantees from the UN and the Indonesian
\ngovernment are absolutely necessary to ensure that whatever the
\nresults of the referendum, democracy and human rights will be
\nrespected in East Timor. Such guarantees are also needed to make
\nsure that whoever loses the referendum will not resort to armed
\nopposition.<\/p>\n
The referendum on East Timor is not the first of its kind in
\nhistory. Referendums on similar issues have been held before,
\nnotably in Algeria by the French government in 1962, and in
\nCanada in 1980 and 1992. Canada's high literacy rate and long
\ndemocratic tradition seem to be responsible for the peaceful
\nprocess of the referendums, even though the origin of the demand
\nfor the referendum had racial backgrounds.<\/p>\n
Basically, in a well-established democratic system, one can
\nexpect referendums to proceed peacefully. Nevertheless,
\nreferendums on matters with serious consequences, where ideology
\nor economic issues and interests are at stake, are usually
\ncharged with potentially explosive and dangerous emotions.<\/p>\n
In East Timor, where more than half of its population of some
\n600,000, according to a 1970 census, are illiterate, a referendum
\nis more an exercise in formality than a way of ascertaining the
\ntrue wishes of the people. Presumably, many of them cannot fully
\ngrasp what their choices entail.<\/p>\n
Is the referendum in East Timor free from ideology?<\/p>\n
At least one of the three political groups contending for
\npower in the 1970s was reported to have ideological goals, then
\nin fashion among national liberation movements in Africa.<\/p>\n
Hence, the group's rash and unilateral declaration of
\nindependence for East Timor in the capital of Dili, and the
\ncreation of an armed wing to achieve its purported ideological
\ngoals. Unlike national liberation movements in Africa, this
\nideological-based political grouping in East Timor was formed
\nonly after the collapse of the fascist regime in Portugal in
\n1974, and then at the behest of the Portuguese authorities. Its
\narmed supporters were equipped with weapons handed out by the
\ncolonial army and police personnel.<\/p>\n
If their ideology is no longer relevant, for what reasons then
\nare they fighting for an independent East Timor?<\/p>\n
Independence for the sake of independence would be the most
\nlikely answer. One is certainly intrigued by the underlying
\nmotive of their quest for independence. Is there not a hidden
\nfeeling of superiority on the part of their elite?<\/p>\n
Their goal seems to be to establish an independent lusophone
\n(Portuguese speaking) country in this sprawling archipelago.
\nHence, their preference for Portuguese words over native ones,
\nlike Falintil (Forcas Armadas Libertacao di Independencia di
\nTimor Leste) and CNRT (Conselho Nacionale di Resistencia
\nTimorese).<\/p>\n
It is obvious that a western-oriented lusophone in this part
\nof the world would be to the West's interests. One should pay
\nimmediate attention to the use of the word \"Timorese\" instead of
\n\"di Timor Leste\" for the last initial of CNRT.<\/p>\n
Could the use of the word \"Timorese\" have a deliberate
\npurpose? This purpose being that their \"long-term ultimate goal\"
\nis a unified independent island of Timor? The then governor of
\nEast Timor, M.V. Carascalao, told a visiting group of officials
\nfrom the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late-1992 that in the
\ninitial confusing months of conflict between the opposing groups
\nin East Timor, rumors abounded that the proindependence camp was
\neventually aiming for a unified independent Timor. This writer
\nwas among that group.<\/p>\n
As for the pro-Indonesian group, they believe the natural
\nprocess of decolonization in East Timor would dictate the area
\nbecoming an integral part of Indonesia. This belief, which can be
\ncalled a quasi-ideology, is based on a number of elements, such
\nas history, shared experience under colonial rule, geographic
\nlocation and ethnic and cultural affinity with surrounding
\nislands.<\/p>\n
It is important to note, however, that a strong trend away
\nfrom the \"mainstream\" ideology of the center could weaken the
\nattachment the people feel to the center -- Indonesia -- and
\nstrengthen the tendency to pull away.<\/p>\n
What prompted Indonesia's involvement in East Timor, as is
\nwidely known, was a combination of unforeseen developments
\nsuddenly taking place in the former Portuguese colony.
\nAdmittedly, the Cold War also played an important role in
\nIndonesia's involvement.<\/p>\n
An intriguing question is what would or should the UN have
\ndone if Indonesia's military had not moved into East Timor? In a
\nsimilar case, would the UN -- or any other country for that
\nmatter -- have stood idly by and allowed the killings to run
\ntheir own course until they stopped of their own accord or out of
\nsheer exhaustion?<\/p>\n
The UN should have been more active in acting on colonial
\nproblems and shown a greater sense of urgency and foresight,
\ninstead of waiting to be caught by events. Had the UN, for
\nexample, put pressure on Portugal to introduce self-rule in East
\nTimor years before 1974, the East Timorese would probably be
\npeacefully enjoying their independence -- whether as a part of
\nIndonesia or as a separate entity would be irrelevant. Thousands
\nof lives would have been spared, and the costly and tiring
\ndiplomatic to and fro would have been unnecessary.<\/p>\n
Impartial observers would agree that Portugal no doubt bears
\nthe major portion of the blame for the imbroglio. One, however,
\ncannot expect local colonial authorities long used to a fascist
\nsystem of rule to have a clear notion about self-rule, let alone
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
As history would have it, it was the Portuguese military,
\nusually the bastion of conservatism, and not the UN which
\ndelivered the baby of independence to Africa and would have
\ndelivered it to East Timor but for the unfortunate turn of
\nevents. Indeed, in a number of cases in the past the UN did not
\nmove fast enough. Was the UN's lack of foresight the cause of the
\nEast Timor problem?<\/p>\n
Today, Indonesia is like the prophet Job, afflicted
\nincessantly by troubles and tribulations which come one after
\nanother.<\/p>\n
However, comforters are not nearby. Instead, gloaters are
\nseen, hardly hiding their delight and glee over Indonesia's
\nmisfortunes. They seem to be not only trying to blame Indonesia
\nfor creating problems in East Timor, but are also trying to
\ndisseminate the idea that pro-Indonesia groups are a mere
\ncreation of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The writer was Indonesia's charge d'affaires in Namibia from
\n1992 to 1995. The opinions expressed here are entirely his own.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/is-east-timor-a-case-of-un-neglect-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}